As this is written, the public perception of AIB and Bank of Ireland is that they are solvent. They may not be. If they are not, the Government, or part of it, knows it. The Government, although it is silent on the point, is in that case, in effect. perpetuating the illusion of the banks’ solvency. This split between what is officially the case and what is really the case is common. We have seen recently that, although they were not directly protected by the State, we slowly, and by chance, learned that Liam Carroll’s property interests were financially unsustainable with Paddy Kelly’s likewise, followed by Bernard McNamara’s. These truths, easily comprehended when brought to view, are part of the more obscure greater truth, that the crash of these property interests was facilitated by massive Government failures and that the possible insolvency of the banks was caused by the Government.

The recent apology from the British Government to the victims of the Thalidomide scandal reminds us of what is required when important issues are denied or ignored; quality journalists.

In the UK they had the Sunday Times “Insight” team under Harold Evans. As editor of the Sunday Times, Evans refused to knuckle under in the face of Distillers’ court injunction preventing the newspaper from publishing the truth (to the extent then known) about the cause and history of the dreadful birth defects that had appeared as a result of the use of the Thalidomide drug by women. (Distillers was the distributor of Thalidomide).

(Ironically, given the title to this post, a newspaper of the name “Sunday Times” continued to exist after Harold Evans left it, but it was not what it had been; Rupert Murdoch owned it then).

At the crucial time and on the central issue, openness, the UK courts came down emphatically on the side of Distillers and attempted to impose secrecy.

Here in Ireland, if there were to be a reprise of that struggle we can not be sure that the courts’ response might not be equally inadequate.

The reasons for this are twofold; access to public records is still regularly denied as a consistent Government policy, and, within the court system, access to paper and electronic records is a matter of chance and whim. The Government has not only set the policy of “closed” administration, it has written the legislation to make it legal to refuse access to public records.

There is an argument to be made that the broad statement in the blog post “Slip and Fall” acknowledging impunity for public authorities for non-feasance is wrong.

Under the European Convention on Human Rights, persons have the following rights;

Article 8: The right to respect for home (private and family life)
Article 2: the Right to life;
The First Protocol, Article 1: the right to protection of property.

Under the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, the Courts are obliged to interpret Irish law to conform with the Convention.

In Guerra v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 357, toxic emissions from a factory injured many nearby residents and killed some. The ECtHR found that the absence of information on the effects of living near the factory breached the Applicants’ right to respect for home under Article 8 of the Convention.

Consequently, where a failure by public authority would result in a breach of an Article of the Convention, it would be incumbent on the authority to act and the authority would be liable in those circumstances for any failure to so act.

We have the Ryan report to consider; there is a lot to consider.

What are we to make of the judges of that era? (Strictly the era has not ended; the Ryan Commission had a time period to consider, that period only has ended).

A handy, if not good, place to begin on this, is with Jeremy Bentham.

Bentham said, of “the right to silence”;

If all the criminals of every class, had assembled and framed a system after their own wishes, is not this rule the very first which they would have established for their security? Innocence never takes advantage of it; innocence claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of silence.”

As a matter of fact he was wrong in saying that “innocence never takes advantage of it”, otherwise the practice and procedure of criminal trials in his day would have demonstrated case after case of defendants proving themselves to be innocent, something that did not happen.

He was wrong also to imply that invocation of the “privilege of silence” was a sign of guilt. Determination of guilt was and is the precise purpose of a trial. His opinion implied that the burden of proof should rest on the accused, something civilised nations currently do not admit as reasonable.

In reality, Bentham was on the comfortable side of a power relationship.

He was not the first and will not be the last such person.

Crimes are prosecuted because it suits the person in power to launch the prosecution. Whether that is a proper action depends on the circumstances of the prosecutor as much as the circumstances of the accused.

What, for instance, of Ireland’s political and administrative leaders during the years of the Bush administration in the USA?

(Actually, let us confine the inquiry to the period after the passing of the International Criminal Court Act 2006).

Under Section 8 of the Act of 2006:

Any person who does any act specified in paragraph 3 of Article 25 (crimes ancillary to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) is guilty of an offence (in this Act referred to as an “ancillary offence”)”

Under Article 25 (3) (c) it is an offence for a person who;

(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;

“War crimes” are defined in Article 8 and include;

Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial;”

That is exactly what George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld did to the prisoners of Guantanamo, as was generally known.

Furthermore, they used Shannon airport to facilitate the transport of some of those prisoners to Guantanamo;

When will we have an investigation of the complicity (or ignorance, if such be the case) of our politicians, particularly our Ministers for Justice etc. during those years, in relation to those matters?

The law relating to the arrest of suspects is complex.

Every arrest must be in accordance with law. Members of the Garda Síochána have extensive powers of arrest, but do not have a right to arrest on a whim, or for a wrongful purpose.

Members of the public have a power of arrest in some circumstances, but this post does not deal with that.

It is a criminal offence to resist a lawful arrest, but not an unlawful arrest. Some unlawful arrests are plainly that; more often than not they are seen to be unlawful with hindsight.

Therefore, as a practical matter, even if a person believes that his/her arrest is unlawful, it is wiser to submit and challenge the arrest and its consequences later. (See Section 18 (6) Non-Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997).

The general purpose of an arrest is to charge the suspect with a crime and bring him/her before the courts.

In Ireland, there are exceptions to this. (Strictly, these exceptions should be thought of as “detention” rather than “arrest”).

Under Section 30 of the Offences against the State Act 1939 (as amended), a Garda may arrest a suspect (whom it is suspected has committed one or more of certain offences) and take him/her to a Garda Station for questioning.

Likewise, under Section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 and Section 2 of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 a Garda may arrest a suspect and take him/her to a Garda station.

These detentions are subject to rules and regulations. Commonly, suspects are released without charge after such detentions; but equally commonly the suspect is charged with an offence and brought before a court.

The charging document may be a charge sheet or it may be a summons. The charge sheet will be delivered to the suspect at the Garda station whereas the summons will be delivered later when it issues from the District court.

A person charged on a charge sheet needs bail; no bail is needed on a summons.

The Gardaí may give bail or the court may determine the bail when the accused appears there.

(This bail will be a personal bail; a promise to pay a sum of money if default in appearance in court occurs, or it may be that AND a similar promise from a third party). The Irish bail system is unlike the system in the USA.

Equally unlike the USA, in Ireland we do not have “the Perp Walk”.

The Courts Service has issued information on what it means to go to court as a witness.

Good luck to them.

It’s a pity they don’t seem to have done the same for parties to litigation.

Given that they are close to the persons who make up the Rules Committee of the Superior Courts, they will be unlikely, currently or in the future, to direct any criticism or complaint at the work of the Committee.

The Rules determine what the experience of going to court will be like.

The Committee, in effect, makes the Rules of the Superior Courts; the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform has a nominal role but he, I venture, is busy elsewhere when the Rules get changed. (I could be wrong; perhaps it is a State secret, and the Committee does the bidding of the Minister).

In any event, the Courts Service will not be looking askance at any practice or procedure under the Rules.

The Committee is one example of bodies that, in effect, make and promulgate law. The Rules are published in the form of Statutory Instruments. Statutory Instruments are generally seen as “secondary legislation”. “Primary legislation” is to be found in the Acts of the Oireachtas. The Acts often make provision for detailed regulations to be made, “fleshing out” the bones of the particular Act. To be lawful the “regulations” must not go beyond the terms of the Act; they must express the “policies and purposes” of the Act.

The reason for this lies in the Constitution. Only the Oireachtas has the power to make law. Nevertheless, there are on occasion instances where “secondary legislation” is in fact “primary legislation”. Regulations made under the European Communities Act 1972 (as amended) have this status.

Most “secondary legislation” takes the form of a statutory instrument.

The European Communities Act 1972 aside, “ordinary” statutory instruments become law after, notionally, having been laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas.

This is an antiquated procedure to give the validity or endorsement of the Oireachtas to the instrument. Given the fact that the Executive dominates the Oireachtas with regard to primary legislation, the idea that the Oireachtas might even notice the statutory instrument being “laid” is a delusion.

Consequently, a vast body of law is promulgated every year and is open to challenge, in effect, only by Judicial Review proceedings in court.

FLAC has just issued a condemnation of the fact that, in Ireland, access to justice is denied many due to lack of resources. Free legal aid is available only to a limited number of people and for a limited number of issues.

Challenging the State in Judicial Review (particularly the Rules Committee of the Superior Courts) is definitely, practically, off that list of issues.

My post on audio recordings in Garda custody is about establishing the grounds for the making of adverse inferences at trial, not about the procedure for interrogation in Garda custody.

Under Section 19A of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 (as inserted by Section 30 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007), it is open to a court to make an adverse inference (of guilt; what else?) arising from …the failure of an accused to mention… [“…any fact relied on in his or her defence in those proceedings, being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time clearly called for an explanation from him or her when so questioned, charged or informed, as the case may be…]

Consider what this implies; it implies that, after the interrogation is over, the Gardai encounter the articulated defence of the accused and feel (presumably) that it is not credible, given the failure of the accused to refer to that defence during the interrogation. They can only ask the court to effectively, take the same view, if the conditions set out in Section 19A of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 (as inserted) are met. One of those conditions is that the interrogation is recorded electronically, or, with the permission in writing of the accused, recorded other than electronically.

Hence, to lay the ground for asking the court to make the adverse inference the Gardai must get the consent in writing of the suspect/accused to non-electronic recording where that form of recording is not available, or is not being used.

“Continuous Professional Development” (CPD) is an idea with a banal element. It behooves everybody to stay on top of their job, and to express that in jargon is to suggest that the work of some people is beyond accountability; otherwise, why the need to nudge them to competence?

Of course we know the work of some people is beyond accountability, but that is for another day and another subject.

The Government’s new Bill on “Surveillance” is certainly a necessary topic for a CPD seminar, not least in that the Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform, in announcing it to the media, laconically, but defiantly, remarked that it would cause upset in “human rights quarters” (or words to the same effect).

Now, to whom was he referring? We can only say with confidence that he was not referring to the Government: (the Bill is a collective product of Government, not the work of the Minister).

Implicitly he was referring to the judiciary. Each judge in Ireland is sworn (and has sworn) to defend, protect and vindicate human rights. The Minister has given clear warning that the Government’s Bill is calculated to injure, in some way, human rights in Ireland.

Keeping that in mind, it would be naïve to think that breaches of human rights under this Bill will be confined to some areas of County Limerick. No, we may expect the breaches, of which the Minister warns, to occur across the country.

So, the CPD seminar or seminars will have to cater to professionals in every county in the country. Bring it on.

Hopefully, the Government’s vandalism will run up against systemic opposition; senior Gardai are currently attending countrywide seminars on the application of human rights in policing. Perhaps the things they learn (but there will always be dunces) will permit them to do their jobs correctly and not as the latest political lifebelt dictates.

If the risks of litigation were equivalent to the risks of betting on this year’s Aintree Grand National, with Mon Mome winning at 100/1 nobody would dream of going to court. Luckily, the risks are lower, or can be made to be lower.

Nevertheless, the risks are high, given the unavoidable costs. Those costs are particularly high in Ireland. We have a Criminal legal aid scheme which works reasonably well; we have a Legal Aid Board which directs funding, essentially, to Family Law litigants.

And that’s it.

Neither the Government nor the Rules Committee of the Superior Courts have ever shown the slightest interest in facilitating litigation. In fact, the Government has positively legislated to obstruct and undermine personal litigants (as opposed to corporate litigants) from vindicating attacks on their rights or entitlements.

In the UK, if lawyers agree to work for a litigant, conditional on winning to get paid, they are, in law, entitled to get paid a premium on their fees for taking the chance of not getting paid. These agreements are known as Conditional Fee Agreements. In Ireland, such an agreement would be probably illegal and would possibly result in a failure to recover any fees for the lawyer party to the agreement.

Again, in Ireland, the torts of maintenance and champerty are still alive and kicking. Consequently, we are falling further and further behind the UK in many issues relating to legal profession and the practice of law.

See HERE for news from the UK of the timely development of investment opportunities in litigation.

Litigation, whether personal or corporate, is so expensive it behooves a litigant to take whatever steps are available to offset the risks. In the UK, that is now possible.

We, with our Government, will wait a long time for progressive social-minded policies in this area.

I have adverted HERE to the provisions of Section 19A of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 (as inserted by Section 30 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007).

Section 19A is one of the Sections in Part 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007. Part 4 has had a predecessor (so to speak) in the United Kingdom in Section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.

That section has caused a lot of difficulty in the UK courts.

The UK Court of Appeal in R. v Bresa [2005], stated:

As we made clear in our discussion of the authorities at the commencement of this judgment, Section 34 is a very difficult area. In our view however the criticisms that can be made of this direction are soundly based. The question that remains is whether, having regard to the misdirection, we could conclude that the conviction was safe. There was a very powerful case against the appellant and without an explanation from the solicitor as to the basis on which the appellant was being advised not to comment, there is a powerful case for saying that the jury could be sure that the appellant did not mention self-defence in his interview because he had not at that stage thought of that as his defence. But we cannot be sure what part the direction on Section 34 played in the jury’s decision making. It was a significant aspect of the summing up and for that reason it seems to us that we could not conclude that this conviction was safe.”

What the Court of Appeal were considering was the direction the judge had given to the jury in the “Bresa” case.

They summarised the terms of the direction that the judge was required to give to the jury:

The latest JSB guideline direction, which appears at Archbold 2004 Ed at para 15-427, has taken account of the above authorities and that supports the view that among the key features of a direction under Section 34 are the following. First there needs to be the striking of a fair balance between telling the jury of a defendant’s rights [to remain silent or not to disclose advice], and telling the jury that the defendant has a choice not to rely on those rights. Second there needs to be an accurate identification of the facts which it is alleged a defendant might reasonably have mentioned. Third there needs to be a warning that there must be a case to answer and the jury cannot convict on inference alone. Fourth there must be a direction to the effect that the key question is whether the jury can be sure that the accused remains silent not because of any advice but because he had no satisfactory explanation to give.”

In the UK, the accused is entitled to have his solicitor present with him during his interview with the police. This is not the case in Ireland.

In Ireland, under Seb-section 3 (b) of Section 19A, the Section only applies if the accused was given a reasonable opportunity to consult his solicitor.

Consider what a solicitor might say to an accused; the solicitor is very likely not acquainted with the accused [hence the title to this post}. The solicitor will need time to take full instructions and analyse the facts; in these circumstances the best advice is to advise him to say nothing.

If that is the advice given to the accused, what possible adverse inferences can be drawn if the accused fails to mention a fact he later relies on for his defence?

It should be remembered that the Gardaí will have cautioned the suspect that;

you are not obliged to say anything, but anything you do say will be taken down and may be used in evidence against you”.

It should be further remembered that the advice a solicitor gives to his/her client is privileged; the client is not obliged to divulge what advice he got from his solicitor.

So, the accused is in a position where i) he is not obliged to say anything; ii) his solicitor’s advice is secret (privileged); and iii) he is menaced with an adverse inference if he remains silent.

The question in the title to this post is very likely a common question to be put to suspects by Gardai.

The reason is found, firstly, in the terms of Section 19A of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 (as inserted by Section 30 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007) and secondly, in the fact that, here in Ireland, not many Garda stations are equipped for electronic monitoring of questioning of suspects.

Under Section 19A an adverse inference may be drawn from the failure of an accused to mention a fact, later relied upon by him in his defence, while he is being questioned etc., by the Gardai.

Section 19A contains the following sub-section:

(6) This section shall not apply in relation to the questioning of a person by a member of the Garda Síochána unless it is recorded by electronic or similar means or the person consents in writing to it not being so recorded.”

Section 19A only applies if the person is charged with “an arrestable offence”.

“an arrestable offence” was defined in the Criminal Law Act 1997 as:

“arrestable offence” means an offence for which a person of full capacity and not previously convicted may, under or by virtue of any enactment, be punished by imprisonment for a term of five years or by a more severe penalty and includes an attempt to commit any such offence;”

To put that in context, Section 4 (6) of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act, 2001 provides:

(6) A person guilty of theft is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or both.”

Few people charged with theft are sentenced to ten years in prison, but they might be, and that is sufficient to make theft “an arrestable offence”.

Consequently, while being questioned about the theft of groceries in a supermarket, say, the Garda Síochána, in preparation for any subsequent trial, knowing that the questioning will not be recorded electronically, are very likely to say,

…sign here, to say you don’t mind us not recording you”.