The High Court is seeking submissions from the parties to the Digital Rights Ireland case. See the Pleadings HERE.

The Court is seeking suggestions as to the form of questions to be submitted to the European Court of Justice. DRI has, in its Statement of Claim, suggested a form of question or questions to be submitted. Clearly, the High Court is not convinced that the form of question suggested by DRI is exactly right (or is seeking the assent of the State to DRI’s form of question). The hearing next Wednesday will show us which is the case.

DRI’s case is brought in its own name, but it is an action with implications for every citizen of Ireland, whether they know it or not.

For this reason McGarr Solicitors have published DRI’s pleadings on the Web since 2006. This is reasonable; the Respondents are, in effect and name, the State. The issues are public law issues and there can be no prevailing claim to privacy on those issues from these Respondents. It is worth noting that it is not common, to put it at its lowest, to see pleadings of current proceedings published but there is usually an exception to every rule and we have one here.

Between now and next Wednesday we will re-formulate the questions to go to the ECJ. These questions will form part of the Order of the Court making the reference to the ECJ. We currently estimate a two year wait to get a hearing in the ECJ. Delay is inevitable; every Member State of the EU has a right to intervene and be heard in the matter. That implies that every Member State must receive a copy of the Questions and the parties’ submissions.

THE HIGH COURT
2006 No. 3785P
Between
DIGITAL RIGHTS IRELAND LIMITED
Plaintiff
And
THE MINISTER FOR COMMUNICATIONS, MARINE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM, THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE GARDA SIOCHANA, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Defendants
UPDATE (5/5/2010)
1. Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. has taken a case against the Irish Government.

2. McGarr Solicitors act for Digital Rights Ireland Ltd.

3. DRI brought an application to the High Court to seek a ruling from the ECJ on an EU law issue. The State responded with its motion challenging DRI’s right to bring the proceedings. The Irish Human Rights Commission applied for leave to make submissions in the proceedings. These Motions were heard in the High Court in July 2008.

4. On 5th May 2010 the High Court delivered its (unapproved) judgment. The Court confirmed its agreement to refer the EU law issue in the case to the European Court of Justice. The Court refused the State’s applications seeking denial of locus standi to the Plaintiff and/or seeking security for costs.

5. The matter will be listed before the Court again on 12th May 2010 for submissions on the form of question or questions to be referred to the ECJ.

Under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1974 most criminal prosecutions are in the charge of the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”). Some offences are assigned to other legal persons (e.g. Government Ministers) for processing in prosecution by the statute under which they are created.

In fact most criminal prosecutions are brought by members of the Garda Siochana in the name of the DPP.

Before the 1974 act the prosecutor was the Attorney General. Consequently, it was, before 1974, a social fiction imposed on the nation that the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute was taken by the Attorney General without regard for the fact that he was a highly politicised figure, held his post at the behest of the Taoiseach and was the confidante and counsellor of the Governement and its members.

The DPP has no role in the investigation of crime. He (or she) receives a file from the Garda Siochana. The file contains the available evidence. The DPP decides, on the evidence in the file, to prosecute or not to prosecute and whether to prosecute on indictment (in the Circuit Court or Central Criminal Court) or summarily (in the District Court).

Prosecutions on indictment are “contracted out” to barristers in private practice. It is a valuable connection to be on the panel for work coming from the DPP.

Ideally, such a person would have considerable experience in criminal cases. That experience can be gained only when working in defence of prosecutions (otherwise the prosecution of offences would be placed in the hands of inexperienced practitioners and that, it is submitted, ought not to happen).

Experience, it is hoped, should dampen zealotry. It is not the job of a prosecutor to “win”, but to facilitate in doing justice. The steady presentation of the available evidence is the job of the prosecutor. That evidence must be such that there is left no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant.

In fact, the DPP has issued “Guidelines for Prosecutors”. stressing the need for the prosecutor to act honestly, fairly, impartially and objectively. The Guidelines enjoin the prosecutors to;

“(k) carry out their functions honestly, fairly,
consistently impartially and objectively
and without fear, favour, bias or prejudice;”

This is fine in theory, but the decision to prosecute is often made in circumstances where the complainant, sometimes inevitably, has a private grudge against the accused. It is, in such circumstances more important than ever that the circumstances in which the prosecutor got his or her experience qualifying him or her to get work from the State, should have no bearing on whether the private grudge can be advanced at the expense of the public purse and at no risk to the complainant and great risk to the accused.

Digital Rights Update

THE HIGH COURT
2006 No. 3785P

Between

DIGITAL RIGHTS IRELAND LIMITED

Plaintiff

And

THE MINISTER FOR COMMUNICATIONS, MARINE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM, THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE GARDA SIOCHANA, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Defendants

UPDATE (25/3/2010)

1. Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. has taken a case against the Irish Government as seen HERE.

2. McGarr Solicitors act for Digital Rights Ireland Ltd.

3. DRI brought an application to the High Court to seek a ruling from the ECJ on an EU law issue. The State responded with its motion challenging DRI’s right to bring the proceedings. The Irish Human Rights Commission applied for leave to make submissions in the proceedings. These Motions were heard in the High Court in July 2008.

4. Judge McKechnie reserved judgment on those issues before the Court.

5. The Plaintiff has asked the Court to refer the issue of the validity of Directive 2006/24/EC to the ECJ. The State had brought this question to the ECJ. (The hearing began in the ECJ the very morning the Motions opened before Judge McKechnie). The Plaintiff endorsed the State case but went further; it says the Directive is not valid, not simply on procedural grounds, but on substantive grounds of breach of human rights and the fundamental law of the EU. This was a very important difference between the State and the Plaintiff on the Directive point.

6. The State asked the Court to deny locus standi to the Plaintiff and, in default of success on that request, asked that the Court order the Plaintiff to furnish security for costs to the State. Judgement on these points had also been reserved.

7. The case was mentioned before Judge McKechnie on 25th March 2010 on which occasion he indicated he would deliver his reserved judgment on 21st April 2010.

As this is written, the public perception of AIB and Bank of Ireland is that they are solvent. They may not be. If they are not, the Government, or part of it, knows it. The Government, although it is silent on the point, is in that case, in effect. perpetuating the illusion of the banks’ solvency. This split between what is officially the case and what is really the case is common. We have seen recently that, although they were not directly protected by the State, we slowly, and by chance, learned that Liam Carroll’s property interests were financially unsustainable with Paddy Kelly’s likewise, followed by Bernard McNamara’s. These truths, easily comprehended when brought to view, are part of the more obscure greater truth, that the crash of these property interests was facilitated by massive Government failures and that the possible insolvency of the banks was caused by the Government.

The recent apology from the British Government to the victims of the Thalidomide scandal reminds us of what is required when important issues are denied or ignored; quality journalists.

In the UK they had the Sunday Times “Insight” team under Harold Evans. As editor of the Sunday Times, Evans refused to knuckle under in the face of Distillers’ court injunction preventing the newspaper from publishing the truth (to the extent then known) about the cause and history of the dreadful birth defects that had appeared as a result of the use of the Thalidomide drug by women. (Distillers was the distributor of Thalidomide).

(Ironically, given the title to this post, a newspaper of the name “Sunday Times” continued to exist after Harold Evans left it, but it was not what it had been; Rupert Murdoch owned it then).

At the crucial time and on the central issue, openness, the UK courts came down emphatically on the side of Distillers and attempted to impose secrecy.

Here in Ireland, if there were to be a reprise of that struggle we can not be sure that the courts’ response might not be equally inadequate.

The reasons for this are twofold; access to public records is still regularly denied as a consistent Government policy, and, within the court system, access to paper and electronic records is a matter of chance and whim. The Government has not only set the policy of “closed” administration, it has written the legislation to make it legal to refuse access to public records.

There is an argument to be made that the broad statement in the blog post “Slip and Fall” acknowledging impunity for public authorities for non-feasance is wrong.

Under the European Convention on Human Rights, persons have the following rights;

Article 8: The right to respect for home (private and family life)
Article 2: the Right to life;
The First Protocol, Article 1: the right to protection of property.

Under the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, the Courts are obliged to interpret Irish law to conform with the Convention.

In Guerra v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 357, toxic emissions from a factory injured many nearby residents and killed some. The ECtHR found that the absence of information on the effects of living near the factory breached the Applicants’ right to respect for home under Article 8 of the Convention.

Consequently, where a failure by public authority would result in a breach of an Article of the Convention, it would be incumbent on the authority to act and the authority would be liable in those circumstances for any failure to so act.

We have the Ryan report to consider; there is a lot to consider.

What are we to make of the judges of that era? (Strictly the era has not ended; the Ryan Commission had a time period to consider, that period only has ended).

A handy, if not good, place to begin on this, is with Jeremy Bentham.

Bentham said, of “the right to silence”;

If all the criminals of every class, had assembled and framed a system after their own wishes, is not this rule the very first which they would have established for their security? Innocence never takes advantage of it; innocence claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of silence.”

As a matter of fact he was wrong in saying that “innocence never takes advantage of it”, otherwise the practice and procedure of criminal trials in his day would have demonstrated case after case of defendants proving themselves to be innocent, something that did not happen.

He was wrong also to imply that invocation of the “privilege of silence” was a sign of guilt. Determination of guilt was and is the precise purpose of a trial. His opinion implied that the burden of proof should rest on the accused, something civilised nations currently do not admit as reasonable.

In reality, Bentham was on the comfortable side of a power relationship.

He was not the first and will not be the last such person.

Crimes are prosecuted because it suits the person in power to launch the prosecution. Whether that is a proper action depends on the circumstances of the prosecutor as much as the circumstances of the accused.

What, for instance, of Ireland’s political and administrative leaders during the years of the Bush administration in the USA?

(Actually, let us confine the inquiry to the period after the passing of the International Criminal Court Act 2006).

Under Section 8 of the Act of 2006:

Any person who does any act specified in paragraph 3 of Article 25 (crimes ancillary to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) is guilty of an offence (in this Act referred to as an “ancillary offence”)”

Under Article 25 (3) (c) it is an offence for a person who;

(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;

“War crimes” are defined in Article 8 and include;

Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial;”

That is exactly what George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld did to the prisoners of Guantanamo, as was generally known.

Furthermore, they used Shannon airport to facilitate the transport of some of those prisoners to Guantanamo;

When will we have an investigation of the complicity (or ignorance, if such be the case) of our politicians, particularly our Ministers for Justice etc. during those years, in relation to those matters?

The law relating to the arrest of suspects is complex.

Every arrest must be in accordance with law. Members of the Garda Síochána have extensive powers of arrest, but do not have a right to arrest on a whim, or for a wrongful purpose.

Members of the public have a power of arrest in some circumstances, but this post does not deal with that.

It is a criminal offence to resist a lawful arrest, but not an unlawful arrest. Some unlawful arrests are plainly that; more often than not they are seen to be unlawful with hindsight.

Therefore, as a practical matter, even if a person believes that his/her arrest is unlawful, it is wiser to submit and challenge the arrest and its consequences later. (See Section 18 (6) Non-Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997).

The general purpose of an arrest is to charge the suspect with a crime and bring him/her before the courts.

In Ireland, there are exceptions to this. (Strictly, these exceptions should be thought of as “detention” rather than “arrest”).

Under Section 30 of the Offences against the State Act 1939 (as amended), a Garda may arrest a suspect (whom it is suspected has committed one or more of certain offences) and take him/her to a Garda Station for questioning.

Likewise, under Section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 and Section 2 of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 a Garda may arrest a suspect and take him/her to a Garda station.

These detentions are subject to rules and regulations. Commonly, suspects are released without charge after such detentions; but equally commonly the suspect is charged with an offence and brought before a court.

The charging document may be a charge sheet or it may be a summons. The charge sheet will be delivered to the suspect at the Garda station whereas the summons will be delivered later when it issues from the District court.

A person charged on a charge sheet needs bail; no bail is needed on a summons.

The Gardaí may give bail or the court may determine the bail when the accused appears there.

(This bail will be a personal bail; a promise to pay a sum of money if default in appearance in court occurs, or it may be that AND a similar promise from a third party). The Irish bail system is unlike the system in the USA.

Equally unlike the USA, in Ireland we do not have “the Perp Walk”.

The Courts Service has issued information on what it means to go to court as a witness.

Good luck to them.

It’s a pity they don’t seem to have done the same for parties to litigation.

Given that they are close to the persons who make up the Rules Committee of the Superior Courts, they will be unlikely, currently or in the future, to direct any criticism or complaint at the work of the Committee.

The Rules determine what the experience of going to court will be like.

The Committee, in effect, makes the Rules of the Superior Courts; the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform has a nominal role but he, I venture, is busy elsewhere when the Rules get changed. (I could be wrong; perhaps it is a State secret, and the Committee does the bidding of the Minister).

In any event, the Courts Service will not be looking askance at any practice or procedure under the Rules.

The Committee is one example of bodies that, in effect, make and promulgate law. The Rules are published in the form of Statutory Instruments. Statutory Instruments are generally seen as “secondary legislation”. “Primary legislation” is to be found in the Acts of the Oireachtas. The Acts often make provision for detailed regulations to be made, “fleshing out” the bones of the particular Act. To be lawful the “regulations” must not go beyond the terms of the Act; they must express the “policies and purposes” of the Act.

The reason for this lies in the Constitution. Only the Oireachtas has the power to make law. Nevertheless, there are on occasion instances where “secondary legislation” is in fact “primary legislation”. Regulations made under the European Communities Act 1972 (as amended) have this status.

Most “secondary legislation” takes the form of a statutory instrument.

The European Communities Act 1972 aside, “ordinary” statutory instruments become law after, notionally, having been laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas.

This is an antiquated procedure to give the validity or endorsement of the Oireachtas to the instrument. Given the fact that the Executive dominates the Oireachtas with regard to primary legislation, the idea that the Oireachtas might even notice the statutory instrument being “laid” is a delusion.

Consequently, a vast body of law is promulgated every year and is open to challenge, in effect, only by Judicial Review proceedings in court.

FLAC has just issued a condemnation of the fact that, in Ireland, access to justice is denied many due to lack of resources. Free legal aid is available only to a limited number of people and for a limited number of issues.

Challenging the State in Judicial Review (particularly the Rules Committee of the Superior Courts) is definitely, practically, off that list of issues.

My post on audio recordings in Garda custody is about establishing the grounds for the making of adverse inferences at trial, not about the procedure for interrogation in Garda custody.

Under Section 19A of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 (as inserted by Section 30 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007), it is open to a court to make an adverse inference (of guilt; what else?) arising from …the failure of an accused to mention… [“…any fact relied on in his or her defence in those proceedings, being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time clearly called for an explanation from him or her when so questioned, charged or informed, as the case may be…]

Consider what this implies; it implies that, after the interrogation is over, the Gardai encounter the articulated defence of the accused and feel (presumably) that it is not credible, given the failure of the accused to refer to that defence during the interrogation. They can only ask the court to effectively, take the same view, if the conditions set out in Section 19A of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 (as inserted) are met. One of those conditions is that the interrogation is recorded electronically, or, with the permission in writing of the accused, recorded other than electronically.

Hence, to lay the ground for asking the court to make the adverse inference the Gardai must get the consent in writing of the suspect/accused to non-electronic recording where that form of recording is not available, or is not being used.