Bismark reputedly said that nobody should get too close to the making of laws or sausages.

On Thursday, on behalf of the StopSOPAIreland.com campaign, I took a trip to Leinster House, to catch a glimpse of the sausage machine at work.

Together with Ian Bergin, who runs the Facebook campaign, and TJ McIntyre of DRI, I met with Catherine Murphy TD to discuss her scheduled exchange of questions with Minister Sherlock.

We experienced the minute-by-minute changes of timetables and proposals in relation to the disputed Ministerial Order.

We had originally believed that there would be a full debate that day on the matter. Instead, on arrival, we learned that instead there was to be a tightly structured 8 minute exchange of statements between Derek Keating for FG and Catherine Murphy for the Technical Group of Independents.

To put it at its lowest, this didn’t really seem to meet the needs of the situation.

Nonetheless, there was still the possibility being held out of a further, fuller debate. But when that debate might be- including rather incredibly, whether it would be held before or after the law had been signed- was subject to, um, flux. In all senses of the word.

While we were in the building, we took the chance to bend the ear of any friendly faces we happened upon. They all told us that the issue of the SOPAIreland Order had become one of the hottest potatoes in the Dáil in a bewilderingly short time. One TD told us that, a week ago, this proposal hadn’t had any kind of attention.

“But now…” he said, trailing off.

More than one TD spoke about getting hundreds of emails and what did or didn’t work as a lobbying tactic. Being civil was good. Basing an argument on logic, rather than threats was another point that got the thumbs up. (This was contrasted with what might have worked in the, shall we say, recent past). All expressed dismay at the impact of hundreds (or 50,000) of emails all arriving into an individual’s inbox. “After a couple of hundred, you’re just hitting delete.”, we were told by a TD’s assistant.

I suggested that the TDs offices were probably experiencing the inevitable consequence of the lessening of friction inhibiting communication between constituents and their representatives. Our campaign emails (ie your emails), it was acknowledged, were of a sort not usually seen. “These people, they represent a usually silent group – the people who really know about the internet”, as one other TD described them.

We then decamped to the Visitor’s Gallery, in time to see Catherine Murphy’s opening question to Minister Sherlock. I needn’t describe it for you- here’s the video:

SOPA Ireland in the Dáil

Today started with more Digital Rights Ireland business- of the courtroom kind- before easing off a little. The Minister had rounded off the night before by confirming that he would hold a Dáil debate before, rather than after, the passing of the SOPA law into force.

That he had been unable to confirm that order of events on Thursday gives a little peep into the kind of day he’d been having.

By 4.50 today, Catherine Murphy TD (a former client) was able to confirm that the debate would go ahead on Tuesday evening at 5.30pm and last 50 minutes.

Just received word that next week's debate on #sopaireland will take place on Tuesday at about 5:30pm. May be subject to change.

January 27, 2012 5:50 pm via webReplyRetweetFavorite

@CathMurphyTD

Catherine Murphy

Last week, this law wasn’t going to be published.

Last week, there was no media attention for this proposal.

Last week, there wasn’t any possibility of the matter going to Cabinet to be discussed.

Last week, the idea of a Dáil debate on this Ministerial Order would have been absurd.

“But now…”

Thank you all.

You will have noticed the black banner across the top of our site this week.

You may also have noticed the sudden flurry of media appearances and debates on radio around the issue of Minister of State Sean Sherlock’s plan to introduce a law to allow the music labels (and other copyright holders) to seek injunctions forcing Irish ISPs to block access to sites they don’t like.

“I will introduce this imminently, by the end of January.”
- Minister Sherlock, Sunday Business Post, 22^nd Jan 2012

This SOPA Ireland law, as it is is called, is similar to the proposals defeated in the US only a week ago after a mass uprising of grassroots protest- first from Reddit, and then joined by the biggest names on the net- Google, Wikipedia and so on.

However, unlike that US law, people here can’t even expect to have this blocking law debated in their legislature. The Minister has said that he intends to deal with the matter by way of a Ministerial Order. Nor has he published the text of the law. The first we, the people of Ireland, will know about the text of this law will be when it is signed and brought into force.

This is grossly wrong. This is why we were so enthusiastic when Sabrina Dent suggested that we launch a petition website to let other people (a) know what was going to happen and (b) tell the Ministers responsible that they object to the proposal.

That was long, long ago now. Monday morning to be exact. Since then, 30,000 people have emailed the Minister for State Sean Sherlock and Minister Richard Bruton at the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation to tell them they DO NOT WANT.

I, Richard Bruton, Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, in exercise of the powers conferred on me by section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972 (No. 27 of 1972) and for the purpose of giving further effect to Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [1], as amended by Corrigendum[2], hereby make the following Regulations:

- Opening paragraph of the leaked Draft Text of the Ministerial Order

Minister Sherlock has been traveling around the airwaves acting as a recruitment sergeant for the petition by providing worrisome, self contradictory, “reassurances” about what he intends to do.

All in all, so far, our Public Interest Campaign site has facilitated a very successful piece of civic action.

But more will need to be done. Minister Sherlock has said that he intends that Richard Bruton will bring the Ministerial Order to Cabinet.

This is, to put it mildly, unusual.

A Ministerial Order (otherwise known as a Statutory Instrument) is only intended to bring in secondary legislation -ie, tidying up the administrative side of policies and laws already passed through the Oireachtas after proper debate.

On 29^th July 2011, the Minister was put on notice of this difficulty when Digital Rights Ireland (our client) wrote to his Department;

It is significant that Charleton J. in EMI v. UPC [2010] IEHC 377 referred to any legislative intervention being properly a matter for the Oireachtas. The Opinion of the Advocate General in Scarlet (Extended) v. SABAM (Case C-70/10) similarly referred to a need for legislation in this area to be “democratically legitimised” (at para. 113).

It would be undesirable in any event for a matter dealing with fundamental rights to be disposed of by way of secondary legislation. It is all the more undesirable in this case, however, given the vague and open-ended nature of the powers involved. This is, in effect, a case of delegation heaped on delegation – rather than rules governing blocking and other remedies being made by primary legislation, or even secondary legislation, they are instead effectively being made by delegation to the judiciary.

The new plan to bring the matter to cabinet is an admission of the truth of that argument. But a discussion behind closed doors amongst a handful of Ministers is not good enough.

If a matter is so significant, contentious and complicated that it must be debated by Cabinet, by definition, it is not a matter which is suitable to be brought in by Ministerial Order without public debate and without careful scrutiny of the proposed text.

Ministers Bruton and Sherlock must now bring a Bill before the Oireachtas and let the sunlight in. This issue is too important to be left to the murk of backroom deals.

Modern newspapers are, or have been, full of Tony Blair. However, the US Blairs are more notable, particularly Montgomery Blair.

A US lawyer, from Kentucky, he represented Dred Scott in Scott v Sandford [1857].

Dred Scott was a black slave, married to Harriet and each owned by Major Emerson of the US Army (in the case of Dred, since 1832). Major Emerson had consented to the marriage of Dred and Harriet and had taken them to Illinois and the Wisconsin Territory. In each of these places slavery was prohibited. In 1837 Major Emerson married Eliza Sanford. The Emersons and the Scotts moved in accordance with Major Emerson’s army assignments and the Scotts were in Missouri when Major Emerson died, his wife inheriting his estate, including Dred Scott.

Dred Scott offered to buy his freedom from Mrs. Emerson but she refused and in 1846 Dred Scott sued her, claiming he was entitled to his freedom. He ultimately lost in the Missouri Supreme Court, it finding that he should have made his claim while he was in the free territories of Illinois and the Wisconsin Territory.

Dred tried again, in 1853, in Federal court. The defendant was the then executor of Major Emerson’s estate, John Sanford. Ultimately, represented by Montgomery Blair, Dred Scott lost again in the US Supreme Court, (the court mis-spelling Sanford’s name as “Sandford”). The majority on the court denied that Dred Scott was a citizen of the US and therefore the US Supreme court lacked jurisdiction over his claims. It found that the applicable law was that of Missouri, in which Dred Scott was a slave.

The consequences of the decision were very far-reaching. There was an immediate financial upheaval; the possibility that the Southern states could expand slavery into the territories disrupted a political balance between the North and the South and led to the US Civil War.

During the war Montgomery Blair served in the Lincoln cabinet, retiring in 1864 as part of a deal to stall a Fremont candidacy for President, leaving  the way open for Lincoln to seek a second term. Prior to that, Blair advocated the freeing of black slaves to undermine the power of the secessionists, a course followed by Lincoln in due course.

Like many lawyers, Mr. Blair’s representation of his client, Dred Scott, was not for money but from conviction.

As for Eliza Sanford, she learned there are some offers you should not refuse, even if you can. (She had gone to live in Massachusetts before the Supreme court decision and slavery was not permitted there. Massachusetts was a Union state in the war.)

Dolly Mapp was a formidable woman. When the cops of Cleveland Ohio arrived at her door, in the early 1960’s or thereabouts, seeking a person in her house, she declined to allow them entry. They called in reinforcements (what a woman!). They searched her house and found pornographic material. She was convicted, lost on appeal and won in the US Supreme court [Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643; S.Ct. 1684]. The cops had searched without a warrant. Dolly had been convicted under the law of Ohio. The US constitution [14^th Amendment] protected a citizen from unreasonable search and seizure and in 1914 the US Supreme court had ruled evidence obtained in breach of the constitution could not be relied on in a Federal prosecution. Mapp v Ohio decided that that position also applied to State prosecutions. (Most criminal prosecutions were under State law, so most defendants had been left without the protection of the constitution until Mapp).

In or about 1986, on a tip-off, police in California flew an aeroplane over the backyard of Mr. Ciraolo. They perceived a crop of marijuana in his yard, got a search warrant and found 73 plants. The California court of appeals applied Katz v United States 389 U.S. 347 and ruled the flight an unauthorised search and a breach of Mr. Ciraolo’s expectation of privacy. The US Supreme court found against Ciraolo on the grounds that he had lost his right of expectation of privacy because he had exposed the back yard to the occupants of the numerous aeroplanes flying over his house. The court disregarded the fact that those occupants were passengers in domestic flights (at great heights, presumably) whose chances of inspecting and recognising marijuana in the backyard were nil.

One wonders what the US court will say when the cops buy and deploy drone aircraft and thermal imaging technology.

Then there are those special places like Birr, County Offaly where, recently, the 41^st Irish Hot-Air Balloon competition took place.  Will the Garda Síochána buy a balloon or opt for a drone?

The Gardaí have had a history of their own difficulties with search warrants and the like. See HERE for the latest episode on that front and for a very good analysis of the case law relating to that history.

Collectively, lawyers are, sometimes, fantasists. We know this from the postulation of “the man on the Clapham omnibus” or the proposition “…something snapped in my brain…”.

These fantasies are overt. We live with others that are covert. I have in mind the continued refusal of the Irish courts to make provision for class actions.

Currently, the courts will only admit of claims from single persons or, exceptionally, groups who have suffered the same damage in the same circumstances. These groups are, in effect, individual litigants who have made their claim in the same proceedings. They will know each other or their lawyer will know each of them in detail.

In effect, the Irish courts are imposing a narrow political and social vision of society on the Irish people. That vision admits as legitimate only the claims of the individual (usually a man). In fact we know very well that society functions through group action and that the groups are often very large.

This attitude by the Irish courts is not exceptional. The EU is toying, again, with the idea of permitting limited class actions in member states. See an earlier post on this HERE.

In the meantime, UK courts have, without significant difficulty, made provision for the bringing of class actions, We see the result of that in the capitulation by Royal Dutch Shell in a class action brought by Leigh Day (solicitors) on behalf of the population of Bodo, a town in Nigeria.

Will Ireland suffer the humiliation of Irish citizens bringing a class action in London for events which happened in Ireland?

This writer remembers, he thinks correctly, that the phrase “compo culture” was coined by a PR spokesman for Dublin Corporation (now Dublin City Council). Probably the spokesman was simply adapting a phrase coined elsewhere, because the title to this post is known in the UK and, it appears in Australia.

Taken literally, we can confidently say that it is a universal social principle that compensation be paid where loss is suffered and the liability to pay for that loss lies with someone other than the victim.

This formulation is very wide; it will cover cases of injury arising from negligence, say, (See HERE for a treatment of Tort law in common law jurisdictions) but also claims for indemnity under an insurance contract.

The principle is not undermined by individual failures in making payment.

Taken with the provisions of domestic law a regional example of that universal principle is to be found in the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 6).

We are now, unfortunately, familiar with some compensation principles which, by arcane means, apply when banks fail. Certain creditors of such banks are compensated for their losses arising from default. The compensation is so certain that the default is scarcely admitted and is, for practical purposes, imperceptible. By those arcane means the liability to pay the compensation is passed to the citizens of the country responsible for supervising the failed bank. (The arcane means are not legally binding means).

It was always clear that the phrase “compo culture” was not an attempt to deny any compensation to any and all claimants; it was directed against one small class of persons, those persons who had been personally injured by negligence or breach of statutory duty. In effect, it was a brazen effort, if taken literally, to repudiate the obligation on wrongdoers of remedying the losses they had inflicted on others.

Life is complicated; consequently it has come about that the liability to pay compensation for personal injury frequently rests on both a liability in negligence and a liability under a contract of insurance. We see this in Domican v AXA Insurance Ltd. [IEHC] 2007 where the judge remarked that the plaintiff and the defendant had a relationship with each other (arising from the fact that the defendant had agreed to insure and indemnify a person whom the plaintiff claimed had injured him through negligence). In the UK that relationship is expressed in a civilized way in the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010.

Ireland has no such legislation (and no proposals to remedy the situation). The UK made such provision as far back as 1933.

The Irish State has a very poor record in defending the constitutional right to compensation for personal injury. That should come as no surprise when we reflect on the reason why the Minister for Defence (and Ireland consequently) became liable to compensate soldiers in what was known as “the Army deafness cases”. A civil servant had consciously decided not to make provision to protect the hearing of soldiers from exposure to loud and damaging noise. That decision was recorded and the record was obtained by the claimant soldiers, all of whom could show they suffered hearing loss or damage following that decision. (Even without the decision the State would have been liable; it was not a novelty that loud noise is dangerous). The reason for the poor record is straightforward; Ireland clearly has (or had) a very poor quality of civil servant and politician. (In the Irish Times of 11^th December 1997 a headline read; “Smith says deafness claims are wrong and immoral”. Smith was the Minister for Defence.)

It is generous to say Ireland’s record is poor on this issue. Ireland is malevolent on the point. See HERE and HERE for this writer’s opinions.

Which of us is happy with our handwriting? Some, no doubt, but for many of us the admirable writing in our school handwriting workbooks is a thing of the past.

[The United States of America produced its Declaration of Independence in cursive script (HERE)]

So it is with other standards. Here in Ireland we call cursive script joined-up-writing and we aspire to that, but we have little tradition of its cousin, joined-up-government.

In Ireland, government must be conducted in accordance with the Irish Constitution and in pursuit of its objectives. One of those objectives is to vindicate the person [or the good name] of the citizen. That means that if a person is injured the State must and will ensure the citizen is compensated by any wrongdoer responsible for the injury.

You would think that this imperative would produce a regime directed to that purpose, but if you did you would be wrong.

Sure, in law a wrongdoer is liable to pay compensation, but Ireland is not anxious to ensure that that happens. If it were it would have introduced a system currently to be found in the United Kingdom. There, an injured person can enter an agreement with a lawyer to pay an enhanced fee for legal services, conditional on the claim being successful [“Conditional Fee Agreement”]. The defendant will then be liable for that fee in the event of success. In short, the UK recognizes that poor claimants are at a disadvantage relative to rich claimants, in legal proceedings.

This is an inherent feature of the previous UK position [and the current Irish one] where everybody is assumed to be a prosperous gentleman [probably Victorian] who pays his lawyer’s bills on a weekly or monthly basis and expects to recover those expenditures from any wrongdoer when he is successful in his claim that his lawyer prosecutes.

That assumed position is unreal. Such prosperous gentlemen are few and far between. Everybody knows this and yet, in Ireland, nothing is done to remedy the situation.

In fact, the opposite has happened. The government established the Personal Injuries Assessment Board [“PIAB”] to assist defendants. No claimant’s lawyer’s fees are payable by the respondent in the PIAB system. PIAB itself assures claimants that they do not need a lawyer to represent them, a claim at once untrue and an insult.

Any intelligent PIAB claimant must engage a lawyer at his or her own expense without any chance of making the defendant wrongdoer assume responsibility for that expense despite the fact that the defendant caused the expense to be accrued.

On top of all of that, in Ireland it is illegal for a lawyer to advertise that he or she will act for a claimant on the basis that the claimant will not have to pay legal fees if the claim is unsuccessful.

All in all, these provisions and arrangements are in direct opposition to the objectives of the Irish Constitution.

One of us, attending the High court recently, witnessed the following instance of judicial self restraint.

Counsel: “That’s your opinion, judge”.

Judge: “Yes, it is.”

It was a moment of witless insolence. The judge had rejected Counsel’s submissions; Counsel disparaged the rejection by denigrating it as “opinion”.

He was wrong on many fronts.

(1) When you have lost, you have lost.

(2) When you are in a hole, stop digging.

(3) “Opinion” is all we have.

Plato confronted this issue; he opposed objective knowledge and opinion. Presumably this is the basis for the terms of Section 39 of the Broadcasting Act 2009.

Section 39 (1) (a) provides;

“Every broadcaster shall ensure that- “… all news broadcast by the broadcaster is reported and presented in an objective and impartial manner and without any expression of the broadcaster’s own views.”

This is nonsense.

All “news” is subjective; that is, a matter of, or expression of, opinion. It has been selected; it has been expressed in words or images, which have to be selected.

What is probably being addressed is “style” or, possibly, fairness. In short, a finding of breach should made by a literary critic or an artist, not by a judge.

That implies that the wrongful act of a broadcaster is not the promulgation of “his” opinion, but the suppression of alternative views. This is a difficult problem. There are views that ought not to be expressed, if not suppressed. We see that in the public burning of a Koran in the USA.

Domestically, what is in issue is this: on what possible moral basis does the Oireachtas claim the right to restrict the public expression of opinion?

We see another, less sub rosa instance of this in Section 16 (2) of the Legal Services Ombudsman Act 2009, which states;

“The Legal Services Ombudsman when giving evidence under this section shall not question or express an opinion on the merits of any policy of the Government or on the merits of the objectives of such policy.”

The Ombudsman’s evidence will be like a doughnut; it will have a lot missing.

PS. Judicial restraint is a requirement of the job. See HERE.

Britain is about to go through one of its periodic episodes of legal dyspepsia. HERE is a report from the “Telegraph”. It suggests that the money to pay a successful party’s legal costs, following litigation, should, or may, be paid by the successful party from the compensation awarded in the litigation.

It must be borne in mind that the reporting of issues like this, in the UK or in Ireland, is always of a low quality. The journalists are invariably fully paid up members of some lobby group or other. The current dominant lobby group in the UK is the Conservative party, the principal party in the UK coalition Government.

Britain and Ireland have similar legal systems. “Similar” implies there are differences, and indeed there are. A very practical difference is the attenuated Irish system of State assistance for civil legal costs, compared with the UK system.

In Ireland, family law aside, there is, effectively, no State assistance to pay for civil legal costs. This means that an Irish resident must find the money to pay for lawyers from his or her own resources. Or, he or she must suffer a possible injustice in the absence of legal advice or representation.

It is worthwhile to contemplate what is meant by the phrase “legal advice”. In practice it might be the equivalent, metaphorically speaking, of a radio conversation from air traffic control to a lay passenger in an aircraft, guiding the passenger in the use of the controls and the method for bringing the aircraft to a safe landing on the runway. The chances of a crash are very high and if a pilot could be delivered to the aircraft it would be better.

Flying an aircraft is a learned skill. It costs money to learn the skill and to keep abreast of developments in aircraft design. In short, if the lives of passengers or the preservation of aircraft or property is a recognised goal it is necessary to make social arrangements to have a system that will produce pilots and pay them to land aircraft. Without that system it would be necessary to restrict or prohibit the use of aircraft.

On this view of matters, the UK favours the use of aircraft (meaning resort to legal principles and vindication of rights); Ireland restricts such use.

The UK, to encourage lawyers to work for plaintiffs who have insufficient funds to pay for personal injury litigation, introduced “conditional fee arrangements”. These are also known as “no win, no fee” agreements. If the plaintiff wins the action the unsuccessful defendant will pay the plaintiff’s lawyers. This alone was not a novelty; it is a principle (usually adhered to) that a losing litigant must indemnify the winning litigant against the winner’s legal costs of the litigation. This principle is intended to suppress unreasonable litigation. (It works, assuming litigants and lawyers are reasonable. Sometimes they are not.) In the UK this was implicitly seen as shifting a social burden (funding the vindication of rights) onto lawyers. For the lawyers this was a voluntary burden and they were only willing to take it up if they were paid for it. The pay was to be in the form of an enhanced fee if they were successful. This was seen as reasonable: they were carrying the costs of unsuccessful cases. The unsuccessful defendant, of course, paid the enhanced fee. This was seen as fair; the defendant could always limit his costs by not litigating. (As a practical matter, it can be always assumed a personal injury plaintiff has suffered a loss. It can also be assumed that the chosen defendant was very closely associated, at least, with that loss).

Ireland has established a very elaborate structure to facilitate some defendants who wish to limit their costs by not litigating; it set up the Personal Injuries Assessment Board. (“PIAB”). This also addresses a “social burden”. For the UK the social burden is the vindication of Plaintiffs’ rights; for Ireland it is the vindication of Defendants’ rights.

This judgment is broadly correct despite readily found exceptions. (Ireland expressly safeguards the rights of injured persons; the UK readily undermines their claims).

The legal system does not exist in a vacuum. It reflects society. It is pointless (and wrong) for a millionaire to sue a homeless person in a dispute about the ownership of a coat. Even if the millionaire is in the right, the cost of the litigation will outweigh the value of the coat. However, nobody (excepting the millionaire) would think it pointless, or wrong, for a homeless person to sue a millionaire about the ownership of a coat.

The UK, formerly, would facilitate a homeless person in those circumstances; Ireland did not and will not. The UK is now proposing that the coat be shared between the homeless person and his/her lawyers, to pay for the cost of the litigation. Now, the value of the coat will again determine whether there is to be a vindication of rights.

Real justice would recognise the inequality of arms in this struggle. The formal equality of litigants is often illusory. Lawyers know this and act accordingly.

So, we are back to the lawyers.

TO BE CONTINUED…

Ireland has strange Regulators, as we have learned. For example, what is the Irish Data Protection Commissioner doing about the Google “Street View” scandal?

The scandal involved the deliberate collection, by Google, of wi-fi data, through its Street View vehicles. Google Street View is part of Google Maps and Google Earth. It uses adapted vehicles (mostly cars) to travel through public locations in at least thirty countries in the world. The vehicles have cameras to record a 360 degree view of each location.

I saw one in Dublin in August.

While it was using the vehicles as a camera platform, Google also used them to secretly collect data passing over wireless networks. That data would be all, or part, of emails, passwords, videos, audio files, documents and network names.

Seemingly, German privacy authorities discovered this Google secret early in 2010 and launched an investigation. A proper investigation would require that the evidence be preserved, would it not? Here’s what Google put up on its website:

“On Friday May 14 the Irish Data Protection Authority asked us to delete the payload data we collected in error in Ireland. We can confirm that all data identified as being from Ireland was deleted over the weekend in the presence of an independent third party. We are reaching out to Data Protection Authorities in the other relevant countries about how to dispose of the remaining data as quickly as possible.”

This was more than the Data Protection Commissioner told us. In fact he told us nothing of the issue. HERE‘s his website.

Google’s reference to the data being “…collected in error…” was disingenuous. The data was collected calculatedly.

Bank robbery is irresistible if the only sanction is that you have to give the money back if you are caught.

Did we actually get our money back?