evidence

In everyday life we must, and try to, say what we mean. This is doubly the case in giving evidence. Look at this:

QUESTION;   You didn’t call out for help?

REPLY:           No.

By this reply, the witness has now sworn that he/she DID call out for help. We see this if we express the intended reply at length –

“Yes, I did not call out for help” (or, “I did not call out for help”).

Counsel must be careful of this. A question and its reply will enter the transcript (where there is one). That transcript is the only admissible record of the trial, in any appeal. It is not (practically) open to correction. Only the witness can correct his or her mistake, if there be one, because what is in issue is what is meant and only the witness may explain that. There are no witnesses in an appeal hearing, to do that explaining.

What Counsel is presumably intending is to elicit the reply “I did not call out for help”, OR, “I did call out for help”.

Alternatively, the proceedings have arrived at an intended (or otherwise) crisis point. Perhaps the Counsel is dozy and complacent and the witness is not, or it is the reverse, (or they both are). Perhaps the significance of calling for help, or not calling for help, is considerable. Perhaps not calling for help is not credible. That implies the witness is not credible.

Better still, perhaps the witness is challenging the Counsel and means to convey – “So what, if I did not call out for help?” This is unlikely. A witness of that calibre would not make the grammatical mistake of simply saying “No” in reply to the question. The reply from such a person would be – “That’s right, I did not call out for help.”

The modern age (possibly prior ages also) has trouble with negation in English speech but there is little excuse for it. The English rule is clear; a double negative is an affirmative.

“I can’t get no satisfaction” means “I can get satisfaction”. In fact, it implies that it is next to impossible for the speaker to fail to get satisfaction. From the little we know of Mick Jagger, that was true, but we feel he would have replied “No” to our question; he is, or was, that type of person also.

When the Food Safety Authority of Ireland tested a range of Irish frozen beef burgers, purchased from Irish and British supermarkets, it found evidence that they contained horse meat and/or pig meat.

It found that the source of the offending meat was the respective manufacturer of the beef burger. In the case of Silvercrest Foods Ltd. almost 30% of one burger constituted horse meat.

These facts were sufficient evidence to prosecute the various manufacturers (and the retailers).

Prosecutions are necessary because of the overriding objective of securing the safety of consumer food in the EU. If you are a manufacturer it is easy to ensure the safety of the food produced in your factory; you make sure that your sources are safe.If you fail to do this you should be prosecuted.

Under EU law Ireland is obliged to prosecute for breaches of EU law and the known facts were evidence of breaches of EU law and Irish law. The person responsible for ensuring there are prosecutions is the Minister for Agriculture and Food. That means there will be no prosecutions because he has shown he does not agree with the law.

He thinks that negligence is insufficient to get a conviction or even to bring a prosecution. He implies that proving knowing and deliberate adulteration of food is what is required to bring a prosecution and get a conviction but this is not and should not, be the case.

His is the latest in a long line of Irish failures. Ireland is an extreme example of a noted problem; regulatory capture. When a regulated industry (such as banking) exerts sufficient influence, its regulator becomes its champion and defender instead of its regulator.

Here we go again.

This blog has looked at the drawbacks of informality in conducting court proceedings HERE.

It seems the situation can be worse than this blog had believed.

In Thema International Fund PLC v HSBC Institutional Trust Services [Ireland] (2011) IEHC the judge made the following remarks:

“It has become a growing practice for solicitors acting for parties in cases before the courts (and, I would venture to suggest, in particular, the Commercial Court) to copy correspondence to the court. Some lay litigants have adopted the same course.”

AND

“…care should be exercised that documents which may not ultimately be admitted are not brought to the court’s attention until such time as there has been a proper decision as to whether the relevant documentation is to be admitted.”

AND

“However, parties should exercise care to ensure that only documents which are properly before the court are included. It should not be assumed that a party has a right to bring documents to the court’s attention where there is at least an argument as to whether the document is properly before the court. Simply sending documents to the Court Registrar for the attention of the judge, without reaching agreement with the other side, is, in those circumstances not, in my view, proper practice.”

Dolly Mapp was a formidable woman. When the cops of Cleveland Ohio arrived at her door, in the early 1960’s or thereabouts, seeking a person in her house, she declined to allow them entry. They called in reinforcements (what a woman!). They searched her house and found pornographic material. She was convicted, lost on appeal and won in the US Supreme court [Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643; S.Ct. 1684]. The cops had searched without a warrant. Dolly had been convicted under the law of Ohio. The US constitution [14^th Amendment] protected a citizen from unreasonable search and seizure and in 1914 the US Supreme court had ruled evidence obtained in breach of the constitution could not be relied on in a Federal prosecution. Mapp v Ohio decided that that position also applied to State prosecutions. (Most criminal prosecutions were under State law, so most defendants had been left without the protection of the constitution until Mapp).

In or about 1986, on a tip-off, police in California flew an aeroplane over the backyard of Mr. Ciraolo. They perceived a crop of marijuana in his yard, got a search warrant and found 73 plants. The California court of appeals applied Katz v United States 389 U.S. 347 and ruled the flight an unauthorised search and a breach of Mr. Ciraolo’s expectation of privacy. The US Supreme court found against Ciraolo on the grounds that he had lost his right of expectation of privacy because he had exposed the back yard to the occupants of the numerous aeroplanes flying over his house. The court disregarded the fact that those occupants were passengers in domestic flights (at great heights, presumably) whose chances of inspecting and recognising marijuana in the backyard were nil.

One wonders what the US court will say when the cops buy and deploy drone aircraft and thermal imaging technology.

Then there are those special places like Birr, County Offaly where, recently, the 41^st Irish Hot-Air Balloon competition took place.  Will the Garda Síochána buy a balloon or opt for a drone?

The Gardaí have had a history of their own difficulties with search warrants and the like. See HERE for the latest episode on that front and for a very good analysis of the case law relating to that history.

If the BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico happened in Irish waters who would be held responsible?

The question is intentionally ambiguous. It seems to refer to a functioning “administration” which would search out culprits and assign blame and punishment. It seems also to refer to the principles by which blame and perhaps punishment would be assigned.

The first aspect might lead to a rant and should be avoided; it is the second aspect to which I refer, and even that can prove contentious. Consequently, I am invoking consideration of the civil law only.

We know that BP is the lead partner in the drilling of the oil well. We know that the partnership hired an oil drilling platform, and crew, from Transocean. It also engaged Halliburton, as engineers, to pump cement slurry into part of the oil well structures to contain oil.

If damage is caused to a third person during a BP-like operation in Ireland, that person would look to the law of negligence and nuisance to found a claim for compensation. The burden of proving negligence would lie on the injured person. It can be anticipated that the BP partnership would plead that it hired competent independent contractors and that, in standard Irish legal principles, it is not liable for damage caused by any negligence of those contractors.
The Plaintiff would, understandably, reject this. Some obligations cannot be delegated, particularly if they are risky. Drilling an oil well under the sea is risky, particularly at a depth of a mile.

The Plaintiff would still have to prove negligence. If the cause of the accident is to remain unknown, the Plaintiff might be in trouble. (In the BP incident, this is the significance of the admission Barack Obama extracted from BP; proof of negligence need not now be addressed by claimants in civil negligence claims against the BP partnership.)

In Ireland, there would be no admission of liability by a Defendant like BP. Faced by the formidable problems in proving liability in negligence, an Irish Plaintiff would look to the law of nuisance for success. Nuisance is a tort of strict liability. A Plaintiff does not need to prove “fault” to win. He simply needs to prove the source of the damage and that the Defendant was the source.

A leaking oil well is a public nuisance. If the oil damages the property of others the Defendant drilling the well is strictly liable.

Proof of loss from such a source would, itself, require to be sophisticated. Proving loss of profit is not easily done, but would be easy in comparison to the obstacles Plaintiffs commonly have to face in Ireland to hold powerful interests to account.

Readers will have seen reference HERE to a plea in a medical negligence case as to the meaning of a “consent” signed by the patient (who was having an operation to make her sterile).

In Fitzpatrick v National Maternity Hospital [2008] IEHC 62 the Defendant claimed that the mother (in labour) declined an episiotomy or a forceps-assisted birth (leading to the damage to the infant). The court rejected this plea, and rejected the evidence of the Defendant, intended to evidence it.

In fact the evidence from the defendant was unequivocal; it alleged the parents had each rejected the offered treatment in circumstances where the staff said…

“…they could not be responsible for the consequences for her or her baby.”

… if the mother did not agree to the proposed actions.

The court said:

“I find on the evidence that Senior Midwife O’Dwyer did not, nor did Dr. Wiza, nor indeed did Staff Midwife Murphy (though on the evidence it was hardly her place to do so given the presence of the others) explain the severity of the plaintiff’s condition to either Mrs. Fitzpatrick or Mr. Fitzpatrick at any time prior to the birth of the plaintiff. I cannot imagine how it could be legitimately stated that this couple were extremely difficult to deal with in labour. I have already found that they were encouraged to and did formulate a birthplan which was given to and discussed with Staff Midwife Murphy on Mrs. Fitzpatrick’s admission to the labour ward, who then brought Senior Midwife O’Dwyer into the discussion.”

Errors of judgment on the probability of an event are usually incorrigible. In short, even evidence that we are wrong will not persuade us that we are wrong in making a judgment as to whether something is or was probable or not. This is a serious problem. If we remain unaffected by evidence we are very unlikely to seek the advice or opinion of a statistician or other expert to help us estimate the probability of an event.

Road traffic accidents are common, but we rarely witness them happening. If we made a judgment of their frequency based on our experience, we would be wrong.

The title to the post is a tongue-in-cheek reference to “law” as in “law blog” and is, generally, a solecism.

The “law” is a reference to a common error. If we see a roulette wheel or some other random generator device favour red five times in sequence, we believe that the chance of it showing black, the alternative, on the next spin is greater than it showing red. For most people, this is a harmless error, excepting compulsive gamblers and property developers.

The courts, however, engage in exactly this exercise when they decide if something was or was not foreseeable. Clearly, evidence that something is common will secure a judgment that it was foreseeable, but an absence of evidence of the frequency of an event is not itself a basis to infer the frequency of an event; it is evidence of its being overlooked. The overlooking may be by the parties to litigation, or their lawyers, or it may be by the State or statisticians generally.

What is the likelihood of suffering injury from systemic failure in the Irish health system? Not very high, but not a remote possibility either.

We should remember what the statistics from the Personal injuries Assessment Board show us; Road Traffic Accidents are the major source by far of personal injury in Ireland. Even though PIAB does not assess medical negligence claims, such claims would never exceed the Road Traffic claims in frequency.

For more information see our Colour Supplement HERE

1. It was (arguably) beyond the remit of the High Court inspector to make exhaustive comment on the giving of legal advice to Mr. Jim Flavin (“Flavin”) on the legality of the sale by Flavin of Fyffes’ shares.

2. However, the advice was wrong, the inspector says. (He could hardly say anything else, given that the Supreme Court effectively said the same thing).

3. Consequently, the question as to whether the solicitor who gave that advice was negligent could arise. Hopefully, the solicitor knew this and qualified the advice with the use of some formulation like “…on the one hand this… on the other hand that…”.

4. But then Flavin would have been in a quandary. He would not have been able to sleep with worry about the possibility that he was about to commit a crime.

5. But what of the solicitor? Is his sleep of no consequence? If he says, positively, that the sale of shares is legal; is not a crime, and is nonetheless wrong, is he not liable to the client? How can he sleep with the worry that his advice will prove to be wrong?

6. Even if he has nerves of steel and a will of iron, what can he say to the client who returns to him after the trauma of even a successful defence of the client’s actions? Did he not advise the client of the possibility, indeed the likelihood of litigation? If he did, surely the client had grounds to doubt the legality of what was proposed and if he did not surely the client, learning of the decision in C. W. Dixey and Sons Ltd. v Parsons [1964]192 E G where the court said;

“In the present circumstances the solicitor owed a duty of care to his client to take reasonable care, not only to protect his client against committing a breach of the law but to protect him against the risk of being involved in litigation… It would not do for him to say that in his view it was all right. There was an obvious danger that a different view might be taken. In the present circumstances the ordinary careful solicitor would have gone to see his clients and advised them not to sign.”

would be rightly aggrieved at the advice the solicitor had given.

7. Of course, there is another way of seeing the situation. There are some things upon which a solicitor should not venture an opinion or advice and clients should not seek such opinion or advice.

Judge McMahon travelled to Lissadell to see the subject of the dispute between the owners and Sligo County Council about “public rights of way” on the estate.

From an evidential point of view this is equivalent to looking at the murder weapon in a criminal trial, or looking at a large machine which cannot be brought to court with convenience.

It is normal for the parties to the dispute to be given the opportunity to accompany the judge (or the jury, as the case may be) with legal advisors in the “viewing” by the finder of fact.

The reason for this is to ensure the adoption of fair procedures and to preclude the possibility of some novel (and irrelevant) element, unseen and unknown by, and to, the parties colouring the judge’s perception and opinion.

As this is written, the public perception of AIB and Bank of Ireland is that they are solvent. They may not be. If they are not, the Government, or part of it, knows it. The Government, although it is silent on the point, is in that case, in effect. perpetuating the illusion of the banks’ solvency. This split between what is officially the case and what is really the case is common. We have seen recently that, although they were not directly protected by the State, we slowly, and by chance, learned that Liam Carroll’s property interests were financially unsustainable with Paddy Kelly’s likewise, followed by Bernard McNamara’s. These truths, easily comprehended when brought to view, are part of the more obscure greater truth, that the crash of these property interests was facilitated by massive Government failures and that the possible insolvency of the banks was caused by the Government.

The recent apology from the British Government to the victims of the Thalidomide scandal reminds us of what is required when important issues are denied or ignored; quality journalists.

In the UK they had the Sunday Times “Insight” team under Harold Evans. As editor of the Sunday Times, Evans refused to knuckle under in the face of Distillers’ court injunction preventing the newspaper from publishing the truth (to the extent then known) about the cause and history of the dreadful birth defects that had appeared as a result of the use of the Thalidomide drug by women. (Distillers was the distributor of Thalidomide).

(Ironically, given the title to this post, a newspaper of the name “Sunday Times” continued to exist after Harold Evans left it, but it was not what it had been; Rupert Murdoch owned it then).

At the crucial time and on the central issue, openness, the UK courts came down emphatically on the side of Distillers and attempted to impose secrecy.

Here in Ireland, if there were to be a reprise of that struggle we can not be sure that the courts’ response might not be equally inadequate.

The reasons for this are twofold; access to public records is still regularly denied as a consistent Government policy, and, within the court system, access to paper and electronic records is a matter of chance and whim. The Government has not only set the policy of “closed” administration, it has written the legislation to make it legal to refuse access to public records.