The power of mythical thinking has to be experienced to be believed. Currently, in Ireland, nobody is more subject to its power than the judges of the Superior courts. (With the possible exception of the Irish catholic bishops).

Of course the legal profession is subject to the same myths as the judiciary, but that would not long outlast (I hope) the escape of the judiciary from their myths.

The myth of immediate interest is the fairytale that the Dail (Ireland’s lower parliamentary chamber) has any influence in the making or passing of legislation. It does not; legislation is originated by the Cabinet and driven through onto the statute books.

We know who is responsible, therefore, for the requirement that personal injury litigants must swear an Affidavit of Verification asserting the truth of the factual assertions set out in pleadings commenced on their behalf.

Willie O’Dea is in the Cabinet. He says, of his factually incorrect Affidavit, that when he realized his error in his Affidavit, he “put his hands up” and admitted the error. The Cabinet has endorsed this as the correct response. Consequently, no judge can, or should, ask for more of personal injury litigants.

Willie O’Dea’s understanding is not new or peculiar. His Affidavit will have contained the averment:

“I make this affidavit from facts within my own knowledge save where otherwise appears, and where so otherwise appearing I believe the same to be true.”

This statement is about appearances and beliefs. Willie was right to emphasise that his beliefs are the important thing and, of course, we know that appearances can be deceptive, especially to deponents in Affidavits.

That, clearly is what the Cabinet meant and means by the legislation imposing the obligation on personal injury litigants.

Judges take note.

Oddly, nobody has adverted to the role of the Attorney General in the Willie O’Dea kerfuffle. The Attorney General is the lawyer to the Cabinet. He clearly endorsed the view of the Cabinet, did he not? Maybe not. Whether he did or did not is not important. We are not entitled to know and nobody is asking.

But we should see him as he is, warts and all. We should not have to endure the consequence of more mythical thinking by the judiciary (and the Law Library). The Attorney General is down in the arena with everybody else. He fights for his clients. He represents their interests. He should not be accorded the deference he gets from the judiciary and the Law Library. (According to the Bar of Ireland, the Attorney General is the Leader of the Bar).

It is an obligation of an advocate, in cross-examination, to convey to the witness the evidence the advocate intends to adduce to rebut the evidence of the witness. This is called “putting” the case to the witness. The witness will have the presumed opportunity to comment on the “case” of the advocate’s witnesses.

The potential penalty for failure by the advocate to do this is a prohibition by the court on the advocate adducing evidence contradictory of the witness’ evidence. In fact, the advocate will, in such circumstances, concede the failure and ask for leave to, belatedly, “put” the case to the witness or witnesses. This may not be convenient (it usually is not) and may be impossible. It will certainly cost money. The cost will be met by the advocate’s client. The court ensures this by permitting the witness to return, conditional on the advocate consenting to an order against his/her client on the costs.

There are often matters on which the advocate has no evidence to present in rebuttal. That does not preclude the advocate from seeking to challenge the witness on the point or points. However, the advocate is not permitted to leave the witness under the mistaken impression that the challenge is the “putting” of the advocate’s case. To avoid this, the advocate “suggests” to the witness that “…………….”. This formulation is a signal to the witness that the advocate is asking the witness to agree or disagree with the advocate and that the advocate is not going to call rebuttal evidence.

The Courts belong to the public world. The speech (and writing) of the courts is public speech and public writing.

Consequently, we in our office occasionally nominate the late Conor Cruise O’Brien as our preferred witness (on any topic, in any case).

He excelled at public speech and writing. He was wonderfully combative and would not suffer fools gladly. In short, he would have made mincemeat of most counsellors. (That’s a good US word to describe a “trial lawyer”).

His gifts were self confidence and familiarity with the public world. Most witnesses lack both to some degree, especially the latter. They are vulnerable, consequently, to mendacious forms of cross-examination.

Conor Cruise O’Brien himself demonstrates this to some degree. He remarked that he recognised his enemies by their approbation of the ideas of Rousseau. This was a harsh standard. Few people know the source or sources of the ideas they use to prop up their speech, not to speak of their lives. To take everything they might say as defining them perfectly is just wrong. To challenge them to defend the propositions inherent in their speech is also, generally, unfair. After all, Rousseau, among other things, undermined the “Ancien Regime”; he pointed to the fact that social conditions were the product of bad government, not the fault of the populace in misery. These opinions would not generally be considered contentious now (among Social Democrats, anyway). Likewise, they are not rebutted by being paraded for inspection with some other doctrine of Rousseau’s, now, perhaps, considered indefensible.

What is the defining characteristic of real troublemakers is their failure to allude to any form of idea in their speech or writing. They seek instead to give the impression that they are simply representative of a general current view, undefined.

They speak in terms of the title to this post.

England and Wales have taken strange roads in the administration of justice, so it pays to keep an eye on the legal profession there.

What a pleasure then to discover from the new Chairman of the Bar Council [there], in his inaugural address [see it HERE] that, of former Chairmen;

Some were extraordinarily efficient at chairing meetings; some made a point of sending e-mails at 4.30a.m; some were international class gourmands; others had a wonderful oratorical facility.

Are the barristers bonkers? Did they know of the predilection to 4.30 a.m. emails and still vote for that guy? Did they think the gourmand was even going to give them tips on how to get a piece of that lifestyle?

Of course, he may well have done just that, in which case, bring him back!

It is surprising how often the willfulness of lawyers or litigants drives litigation, rather than evidence. We see an instance of this in the “theory” that William Shakespeare did not write the “Shakespearean canon” and that the plays and poems were written by, among others, Francis Bacon. This theory was first advanced by Delia Bacon in a book published in 1857.

The essential element of the book, in explaining its success, was prolixity. A work is prolix if it is too long. It is a general human failing to think that there must be substance to something if it can be written about at length.

At any length, Ms. Bacon’s book was too long.

In this vein, some solicitors and some barristers stand out for an inability to produce short affidavits. They talk all around the problem, avoiding the terms in which the opponent has defined the issues. This may be very good in principle, but it is tiresome in practice and oppressive when the prolix affidavit is sworn in the cause of big institutions, for, in truth, this is a feature of struggles with big institutions; they try to talk the problem away.

The King’s Inns is the only Inn of Court in Ireland. The UK has four; Middle Temple, Inner Temple, Lincoln’s Inn, and Gray’s Inn.

In the King’s Inns the students and Benchers of the Inns eat dinner in the Great Hall of the Inns during term time. Each student diner is supplied with beer and half a bottle of wine (or port). Each Bencher diner is also supplied with those drinks, and brandy or whiskey. In Ireland, every judge of the superior courts is a Bencher of the King’s Inns. In the King’s Inns the last Thursday of each term is “Grand Night”.

The drinks allocation is doubled on “Grand Night”.

The ostensible purpose of the dinners is to follow the tradition by which education was imparted to new barristers; they learned what was what by eating, and conversing, with the practising barristers.

Nowadays, they probably confine themselves to conversation about how bad the Government is, or how fortunate Ireland is to avoid the US experience with the use of the death penalty, as reported HERE by the Guardian.

Of course, by the end of a Grand Night, they may be discussing how good the Cabinet is, (especially the Minister for Finance who is qualified as a barrister) and how the Guardian is not a quality newspaper.

As a consequence of Section 49 of the Courts and Courts Officers Act 1995;

49.—A barrister or a solicitor when appearing in any court shall not be required to wear a wig of the kind heretofore worn or any other wig of a ceremonial type.”

I have never known of an Irish solicitor to wear such a wig or to have been required to wear one. The same was not true of barristers. The Rules of the Superior Courts did require a barrister to wear such a wig. In other words, the Oireachtas had to intervene to prevent the Rules committee from persisting in that requirement. (The requirement was in Order 105, Rule 3 of the RSC of 1962)

It is interesting to note the reluctance of the Irish bar to abandon the wig. It is a sign of poor character that a barrister would continue to wear a ceremonial wig without compulsion. (In the UK they are conflicted, as seen HERE. They are trying to get to “business suits”, but court dress includes the wig; the whole shooting gallery in fact.)

I have referred to the committee as a bunch of obscure unelected people HERE.

They may be that, but powerless they are not.

They have changed the Rules of the Superior Courts to ensure that costs on interlocutory applications are not deferred, to be “costs in the cause”.

This is a serious matter.

When Lord Woolf delivered his report in 1996 (“Access to Justice”), one of his objectives as he told an Irish conference on reform of civil law was:

…to make the system more equal. By more equal I mean achieving a situation in which it is not possible for a party to use greater resources to deprive the party who has less resources of the opportunity of obtaining justice.”

The original practice of usually making costs, “costs in the cause” was not a free ride for chancers; the bill eventually had to be paid. However, when that decision as to the identity of the person to pay was made, the court knew exactly why that person should pay.

The new rule favours parties with resources; the more resources that party has the greater the advantage. The new rule may even ensure the precipitate premature ending of the case; a complete denial of justice.

1. Legal education is expensive. It is not desirable that a person educated for legal work should fail to gain employment. (That statement is too broad; like medical practitioners, some legal practitioners should not be working, but the statement is true generally). The Chairman of the Bar Council of Ireland admits the profession (he means the Bar) is “pear shaped”. By this he means a small proportion of barristers get most of the work (and most of the income). Any expressions of concern from him at this should be taken with a pinch of salt; the Bar Council of Ireland subscribes, and always has, to the Social Darwinist notions of Herbert Spencer. Whatever the legal professional equivalents of thrift, hard work and sound family life are, the Bar Council of Ireland attributes the road to professional success to them.

2. The public is not demanding the Bar Council give up its delusions. No journalist would file a report to the effect that it was, but journalists do report that the public is demanding regulation of the professions. This is not credible. Ordinary people do not express themselves like that; they demand justice and fairness. They do not think that “regulation” delivers justice and fairness and therefore do not make demands for regulation.

3. It is said, or implied, that there is insufficient work for all lawyers. This may be true, but it remains to be demonstrated. A growth in numbers in the legal profession may reveal that, previously there were insufficient numbers of lawyers, rather than show there are now too many. The subject of interest is “work” not “numbers”. It is an unsustainable proposition to say there is not enough work for Irish lawyers. It is true only by reference to a perverse and reactionary definition of “work”. It is predicated on the further dubious proposition that levels of injustice in Ireland are very low. Where there is injustice there is work for lawyers. (Getting paid for that work may be problematic, but that is another issue).

4. Consumers have no confidence in the legal system. The reason for this is that they have little or nothing, as consumers, to do with the legal system. (A “consumer” is a purchaser of a commercial product or service). Lawyers work for consumers, who become their clients, if the consumer has a claim arising from a defective product or service. Consumers are a vanishingly small cohort in lawyers’ clients. The main reason for this is not that Irish products and services are top-notch; it is that the value of the claim does not usually warrant the investment of money needed to vindicate the disappointed consumer.

5. It may be true (who knows?) that clients have low levels of confidence in the legal system. Perhaps they are sceptical of the likelihood of being treated justly in an Irish court, based on newspaper reports of judgments from time to time. They may even have little or no confidence in lawyers, having gone through a bruising family law case. It cannot be true, however, that they have little or no confidence in their own lawyer; they hired him or her and would not have done so if they positively had no confidence in him or her. In any event it is probably misleading to use the term “confidence” in this context, something many clients would probably recognize intuitively. The emotion felt is probably closer to hope than anything else, or, in the case of very inexperienced clients, expectation. “Confidence” is something based on past experience; most clients have little experience of the legal system. What of a client accused of the offence of dangerous driving? How can his/her emotional state be said to be one of “confidence”, when the most positive outcome may, to the knowledge of the client, be one where public humiliation is attenuated by the lawyer speaking for the client, rather than snatching an acquittal from the situation? Nobody, save the more immature readers of Erle Stanley Gardner, expects a lawyer to have only innocent persons for clients.

6. The tribunals, each and every one of them, came into existence because of profound failures of the political system. The level of payment to the lawyers in the tribunals was a direct result of the influence of politics on the legal world and not the reverse. The various Attorneys General (political appointees par excellence) were at the heart of the fixing of payment to those lawyers.

7. The legal profession, both branches, prides itself, (often without justification, but sometimes correctly) on adjusting its fees to the personal situation of the client. What is wrong with that process? If a poor person is not charged a commercial rate, who is to complain? If a rich person is charged a rate commensurate with his/her ability to pay, his/her complaints are without foundation. Citing as authority, on the subject of fees, what some barrister says of solicitors (or vice versa) is the journalistic equivalent of making a point by telling a “Paddy the Irishman, Paddy the Englishman…” joke.

8. The customers of the big city firms of solicitors are sophisticated users of legal services. They do not need external protection. The people who need protection are the employed (and junior partners, if such they be) solicitors of the big firms. Hand-wringing about fee padding is just that; hand-wringing. To say this, is not to condone fee padding, but the causes and the persons effectively responsible should be defined correctly. A workplace that measures the value of work, by reference only to income, is a bad workplace. The “owners” of the practice are answerable for that. Such persons do not have to institute fee padding themselves to get the benefit of it.

9. The “general public” has no opinion on the remuneration of lawyers. It is a political myth that it does. It is one of many political hobbyhorses generated to provide a subject for “public” debate to raise a political profile or deflect attention from real political failures or shortcomings.

10. Competition in the delivery of legal services is not necessarily a good thing. Indeed, “competition” in any field is not necessarily good. Who wants economic competition in the delivery of medical services? Some services should not be measured by the cost of the service. They should be measured by the quality. Unthinking economic notions like “competition” can imply a race to the bottom.

11. What economic commentator will experience the conduct and outcome of major litigation and suggest it should be judged on an “economic” perspective? Few. Litigation more closely resembles a military operation. In 1863, in the course of the US Civil War, General U. S. Grant telegraphed Colonel Murphy of the US Federal Army at Holly Springs telling him to post more guards. The Colonel went to bed, neglecting to do so. The Confederates, that night, burned Federal stores at Holly Springs to the then value of $4,000,000. A failure like that is not an economic issue; it is a personal failure. There are many current Murphys who ought to, but do not, face court martial as Colonel Murphy rightly did.

12. Even the “economists” like Mr. Charlie McCreevy and Ms. Neelie Kroes adjust themselves (quiet differently in the case of those individuals) to reality. Something can be theoretically anathema but practically acceptable to Ms. Kroes, it seems. So much for theory.

The Irish Times is on odd newspaper. It seems to aspire to be a place rather than institution. An institution implies a purpose, a place implies openness to the contingent.

We see this recently in an article on “the Legal Profession”.

The article is a review rather than a report. It is, in fact, an opinion piece.

There is a place in life for opinion pieces, but the Irish Times is overly fond of them.

This post is a modest attempt to counter the Irish Times.

1. It is, in the context of a newspaper article, pointless to speak of “the Legal Profession”. The term must refer, at least, to the collective of persons practicing law (in Ireland). The profession, as most people know, is a divided profession. There are solicitors and there are barristers. That division is a modest indication of this fact:- lawyers are disparate. They live by instructions from individual clients. They spend most of their time acting on the instructions. In short, their daily work has little to do with the collegiate aspect of the profession. Indeed, the work often requires the deliberate eschewing of “collegiality” and emphasizes the individualism implicit in a society that has privatised the practice of law. (The practice of law does not necessitate the existence of private practitioners, but that is the system we have in Ireland).

2. It is a misnomer to use the term “the Legal Profession” as a reference to the Bar Council of Ireland or the Law Society of Ireland. Neither of these bodies is the profession. Even together they are not the profession.

3. Individual wrongdoing by a solicitor or a barrister implies little about any other lawyer. This is clearly the case where the wrongdoing consists of murder or armed robbery or dangerous driving. Even if it consists of mortgage fraud, it implies nothing about other lawyers. (Mortgage fraud may imply something about human nature, but lawyers, as such, are not accountable on that score). Mortgage fraud may indicate the desirability of having mortgage processing systems that will practically eliminate mortgage fraud. If so, any case of mortgage fraud has implications for other lawyers, not because they may succumb, but because it shows up something problematic and remedial. In Ireland, until the Irish banking industry demanded change, there was a system in place that, unlike the current system, hindered mortgage fraud. Any current or recent case of mortgage fraud points to the mistake that was made in yielding to the bankers’ demand. The Bar Council or Ireland was not involved in that mistake; the Law Society of Ireland was. Ironically, the mistake was made because of pressure, ostensibly, to meet the “needs” of clients.

4. Tax fraud is not something unique to lawyers. More than mortgage fraud, it implies nothing about other lawyers.

5. Falling incomes for lawyers do have implications for them and society. Assuming Irish lawyers deliver services that Irish society needs, it is socially undesirable that they are not properly paid for the work. The morale of any normal person would be affected by lack of money and/or recognition of the value of that work. Socially undesirable things usually (almost by definition) have undesirable effects for individual members of society. In this case it may be a neglect of a client’s business; or a refusal to represent a client. More likely than not it will take the form of a growth of unmet legal needs. There is, in the view of this writer, an ocean of this in Ireland. Now, even victims of personal injury may find themselves in this ocean.

To be continued…

Presently, the new Chairman of the Bar Council will be known.
So what; who cares?

To be the Chairman of the Bar Council is to rise to obscurity, excepting the possibility of judicial preferment later, on the strength of its occupation.

Yes, indeed, few people care, excepting the candidates and, possibly, their partners. The Bar Council of Ireland makes no reference to the Chairman on its website, unlike the Bar of England and Wales. That website gives at least one clue to explain this; it says the Attorney General is the Leader of the Bar.

The mind boggles, or should.

The Attorney General is the lawyer to the Government and anomalously has a role, under the Constitution, representing the State.

The Chairman has no chance against the Attorney General in a straight contest, or even in a not so straight contest.

It should not be so. The bar claims it is independent. If that is not a claim to be independent of the Government, to what is it a reference? The Bar of Ireland should not be led by the Attorney General. He is, or ought to be seen as, the opponent of the members of the bar, possibly as the opponent of their personal interests.

Apparently, the choice of at least one barrister in casting his vote for the candidates for chairman, will be decided by his view of the candidates’ field of work. He is reported to have declared that the Bar Council needs a chairman with “blue chip briefs�?.

It’s a pity this is not a reference to underwear. It’s a euphemism for being dependent on the larger firms of solicitors for work.

Now, there is great merit in this situation, if you have just been called to the Bar. You need work; you need an income. Indeed, you need to develop some skill of use to your clients or their solicitors. Blue chip briefs deliver all this, at a price.

The price is an absence of any claim to a broad social function.

Maybe that’s the way it should be. There is little evidence that the representative bodies of the Irish legal profession perform a broad social function, but has the world collapsed as a consequence? No; but it’s not improved either.

The representative bodies of the legal profession are a part of civil society. They should not simply express the financial interests of their members, especially a clique element of their members. Even less should they express or discharge, the interests of the Government or even the State.

If you have sold the pass on these points you have no difficulty choosing your lead representative on the basis that he is a huckster with attitude.