In the UK they purportedly reformed the system of civil justice with the Woolf Report. There is some reason to doubt this.

Now, a debate has started, questioning the complacent view that the reforms were successful.

The debate has the unseemly presence of Lord Woolf in it. It is unseemly for him to “defend” his “reforms”. The subject is too important to be tainted by an effort to defend a personal investment.

However, the debate is a salutary reminder of how far behind we in Ireland are. The UK has a debate; we have nothing.

Instead, we still have a Rules Committee that had to be restrained by the Oireachtas from compelling barristers to wear wigs and that coolly front-loads the costs of litigation on litigants; all without any input into these “ideas” from the profession.

This blog has previously referred to the wearing of wigs by barristers. Until fairly recently the wearing of a wig by a barrister was compulsory under the Rules of the Superior Courts. (The Rules are law [well, a kind of law] and are made by the Rules Committee. Its membership is chosen, it would appear, to be representative of some of the various “interests” in the legal system).

Currently, it is obligatory on judges of the superior courts to likewise wear wigs.

As an issue this is simply not open to debate. The wearing of wigs is required because that’s the way it is.

Situations like this can be explained, but not by seeking opinions to explain the reasons for the situation. Instead we have to look to psychology.

The real purpose is to assert wordlessly, the finality of rational adjudication from the judge. That is, it is intended to define rationality by reference to the wig; rationality emanates from the wig. Without it, there is doubt and possibly confusion.

In 1973 David Rosenhan and some colleagues demonstrated that “sane” and “insane” were social constructs.

Likewise, in the field of law, the “plaintiff”, the “defendant” and the “judge” are social constructs.

This very dangerous [from one point of view] for the judge.

Leo Tolstoy has remarked:

The most difficult subjects can be explained to the most slow-witted man if he has not formed any idea of them already; but the simplest thing cannot be made clear to the most intelligent man if he is firmly persuaded that he knows already, without a shadow of doubt, what is laid before him.”

There must, in short, be mechanisms to cut short the revelation of alternative, including superior, expositions of reality.

The judicial wig is one of those mechanisms.

As a consequence of Section 49 of the Courts and Courts Officers Act 1995;

49.—A barrister or a solicitor when appearing in any court shall not be required to wear a wig of the kind heretofore worn or any other wig of a ceremonial type.”

I have never known of an Irish solicitor to wear such a wig or to have been required to wear one. The same was not true of barristers. The Rules of the Superior Courts did require a barrister to wear such a wig. In other words, the Oireachtas had to intervene to prevent the Rules committee from persisting in that requirement. (The requirement was in Order 105, Rule 3 of the RSC of 1962)

It is interesting to note the reluctance of the Irish bar to abandon the wig. It is a sign of poor character that a barrister would continue to wear a ceremonial wig without compulsion. (In the UK they are conflicted, as seen HERE. They are trying to get to “business suits”, but court dress includes the wig; the whole shooting gallery in fact.)

I have referred to the committee as a bunch of obscure unelected people HERE.

They may be that, but powerless they are not.

They have changed the Rules of the Superior Courts to ensure that costs on interlocutory applications are not deferred, to be “costs in the cause”.

This is a serious matter.

When Lord Woolf delivered his report in 1996 (“Access to Justice”), one of his objectives as he told an Irish conference on reform of civil law was:

…to make the system more equal. By more equal I mean achieving a situation in which it is not possible for a party to use greater resources to deprive the party who has less resources of the opportunity of obtaining justice.”

The original practice of usually making costs, “costs in the cause” was not a free ride for chancers; the bill eventually had to be paid. However, when that decision as to the identity of the person to pay was made, the court knew exactly why that person should pay.

The new rule favours parties with resources; the more resources that party has the greater the advantage. The new rule may even ensure the precipitate premature ending of the case; a complete denial of justice.