There is an argument to be made that the broad statement in the blog post “Slip and Fall” acknowledging impunity for public authorities for non-feasance is wrong.

Under the European Convention on Human Rights, persons have the following rights;

Article 8: The right to respect for home (private and family life)
Article 2: the Right to life;
The First Protocol, Article 1: the right to protection of property.

Under the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, the Courts are obliged to interpret Irish law to conform with the Convention.

In Guerra v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 357, toxic emissions from a factory injured many nearby residents and killed some. The ECtHR found that the absence of information on the effects of living near the factory breached the Applicants’ right to respect for home under Article 8 of the Convention.

Consequently, where a failure by public authority would result in a breach of an Article of the Convention, it would be incumbent on the authority to act and the authority would be liable in those circumstances for any failure to so act.

The Courts Service has issued information on what it means to go to court as a witness.

Good luck to them.

It’s a pity they don’t seem to have done the same for parties to litigation.

Given that they are close to the persons who make up the Rules Committee of the Superior Courts, they will be unlikely, currently or in the future, to direct any criticism or complaint at the work of the Committee.

The Rules determine what the experience of going to court will be like.

The Committee, in effect, makes the Rules of the Superior Courts; the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform has a nominal role but he, I venture, is busy elsewhere when the Rules get changed. (I could be wrong; perhaps it is a State secret, and the Committee does the bidding of the Minister).

In any event, the Courts Service will not be looking askance at any practice or procedure under the Rules.

The Committee is one example of bodies that, in effect, make and promulgate law. The Rules are published in the form of Statutory Instruments. Statutory Instruments are generally seen as “secondary legislation”. “Primary legislation” is to be found in the Acts of the Oireachtas. The Acts often make provision for detailed regulations to be made, “fleshing out” the bones of the particular Act. To be lawful the “regulations” must not go beyond the terms of the Act; they must express the “policies and purposes” of the Act.

The reason for this lies in the Constitution. Only the Oireachtas has the power to make law. Nevertheless, there are on occasion instances where “secondary legislation” is in fact “primary legislation”. Regulations made under the European Communities Act 1972 (as amended) have this status.

Most “secondary legislation” takes the form of a statutory instrument.

The European Communities Act 1972 aside, “ordinary” statutory instruments become law after, notionally, having been laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas.

This is an antiquated procedure to give the validity or endorsement of the Oireachtas to the instrument. Given the fact that the Executive dominates the Oireachtas with regard to primary legislation, the idea that the Oireachtas might even notice the statutory instrument being “laid” is a delusion.

Consequently, a vast body of law is promulgated every year and is open to challenge, in effect, only by Judicial Review proceedings in court.

FLAC has just issued a condemnation of the fact that, in Ireland, access to justice is denied many due to lack of resources. Free legal aid is available only to a limited number of people and for a limited number of issues.

Challenging the State in Judicial Review (particularly the Rules Committee of the Superior Courts) is definitely, practically, off that list of issues.

“Continuous Professional Development” (CPD) is an idea with a banal element. It behooves everybody to stay on top of their job, and to express that in jargon is to suggest that the work of some people is beyond accountability; otherwise, why the need to nudge them to competence?

Of course we know the work of some people is beyond accountability, but that is for another day and another subject.

The Government’s new Bill on “Surveillance” is certainly a necessary topic for a CPD seminar, not least in that the Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform, in announcing it to the media, laconically, but defiantly, remarked that it would cause upset in “human rights quarters” (or words to the same effect).

Now, to whom was he referring? We can only say with confidence that he was not referring to the Government: (the Bill is a collective product of Government, not the work of the Minister).

Implicitly he was referring to the judiciary. Each judge in Ireland is sworn (and has sworn) to defend, protect and vindicate human rights. The Minister has given clear warning that the Government’s Bill is calculated to injure, in some way, human rights in Ireland.

Keeping that in mind, it would be naïve to think that breaches of human rights under this Bill will be confined to some areas of County Limerick. No, we may expect the breaches, of which the Minister warns, to occur across the country.

So, the CPD seminar or seminars will have to cater to professionals in every county in the country. Bring it on.

Hopefully, the Government’s vandalism will run up against systemic opposition; senior Gardai are currently attending countrywide seminars on the application of human rights in policing. Perhaps the things they learn (but there will always be dunces) will permit them to do their jobs correctly and not as the latest political lifebelt dictates.

If the risks of litigation were equivalent to the risks of betting on this year’s Aintree Grand National, with Mon Mome winning at 100/1 nobody would dream of going to court. Luckily, the risks are lower, or can be made to be lower.

Nevertheless, the risks are high, given the unavoidable costs. Those costs are particularly high in Ireland. We have a Criminal legal aid scheme which works reasonably well; we have a Legal Aid Board which directs funding, essentially, to Family Law litigants.

And that’s it.

Neither the Government nor the Rules Committee of the Superior Courts have ever shown the slightest interest in facilitating litigation. In fact, the Government has positively legislated to obstruct and undermine personal litigants (as opposed to corporate litigants) from vindicating attacks on their rights or entitlements.

In the UK, if lawyers agree to work for a litigant, conditional on winning to get paid, they are, in law, entitled to get paid a premium on their fees for taking the chance of not getting paid. These agreements are known as Conditional Fee Agreements. In Ireland, such an agreement would be probably illegal and would possibly result in a failure to recover any fees for the lawyer party to the agreement.

Again, in Ireland, the torts of maintenance and champerty are still alive and kicking. Consequently, we are falling further and further behind the UK in many issues relating to legal profession and the practice of law.

See HERE for news from the UK of the timely development of investment opportunities in litigation.

Litigation, whether personal or corporate, is so expensive it behooves a litigant to take whatever steps are available to offset the risks. In the UK, that is now possible.

We, with our Government, will wait a long time for progressive social-minded policies in this area.

One can imagine Mr. Cowen’s feelings when he learned of the hanging of two pictures of him in public, in which pictures he was shown, by implication only, as naked; firstly, possibly in the loo and secondly, holding his underpants.

The pictures were to some degree, caricatures.

It is a defamation to lower someone in the eyes of right thinking members of society. If the defamation is a picture it is a libel. A libel is the making of statements in permanent form that disparage the plaintiff or tend to bring him into ridicule or contempt.

For a small review of Irish law on defamation see this earlier post HERE.

Mr. Cowen is not a normal person; he is the Taoiseach. As such, he must accept that he is open to comment and attack more than a private person. In short, attacks on him have the benefit of qualified privilege where such attacks, directed towards private persons, would not have that privilege.

What do the pictures say of him?

Possibly the following;

He is a human being;

He is a failure as a politician (he is without cover and “is in the toilet”)

He is not handsome;

He is unashamed of his failings/disadvantages:

These are mild statements to be made of a Taoiseach. They were made before, as appears to be the case, he procured the confiscation of the pictures by the police, including other pictures made by the same artist with a view to prosecuting the artist on public decency (or indecency) grounds.

Now to say that of the Taoiseach is a serious charge. But it is warranted, given the events. In the light of that, the implied comments of the pictures are mild.

In 8 A.D. the Emperor Augustus condemned the poet Ovid to live in Tomis in Moesia.

Tomis was at the edge of the Roman Empire on the Black Sea, near the mouths of the Danube, a mere 450 miles or so from a bend in the Volga where Stalingrad would later be sited.

Ovid’s trial was held in camera before the Emperor. His ostensible offence was the writing of the Ars Amatoria. Eight years had passed since its publication: the Emperor’s real motivation lay in the discovery of the wanton life of his daughter Julia and he was in search of a scapegoat.

Ovid was that scapegoat.

This truth, or context, deprived Ovid of the chance to address the Emperor’s motivation in condemning him to exile, as he wrote from Tomis to his friends and public in Rome.

In the face of power, formally judicial or otherwise, it is necessary to be circumspect.

As Ovid discovered, and told his Roman readers, the Danube and even the Black Sea would freeze over in winter. He expressed his anguish in the recollection of his last moments in Rome;

Iamque quiescebant voces hominumque canumque,
Lunaque nocturnos alta regebat equos.

At last all noise of men and dogs was still,
The moon was driving high o’er heaven’s hill.”

His life in Tomis is recalled and examined in “An Imaginary Life” by David Malouf. Malouf’s book, a sustained work of imagination, is a reflection on what it is to be human. Ovid’s humanity, in the loneliness of his exile, is counterpointed by the strange example of a feral boy found by the inhabitants of Tomis and brought in from the barbarous wastes of the steppe.

Under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms everybody in Ireland has a right to life. It reads:

Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a
court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided
by law.

Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of
this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than
absolutely necessary:”

This is the context in which to see any occasion when a person dies in police custody or as a result of State action.

Furthermore, however, it is incumbent on the State to properly investigate deaths. To fail to do so is itself a breach of the Convention.

The job of the police who carry out these investigations is not easy. Every police officer is trained in the giving of evidence. If they do not wish to disclose the true course of events it is easy for them to tailor their account to suit the needs of the situation.

It is a delusion promoted by crime writers to think that a witness can be “broken” in the witness box. Very rarely, a witness can be demolished, but that is not the same thing.

The obligation on the State (and the investigating detective) was summarised HERE by the House of Lords (in a case of suicide in police custody):

…it [the investigation] had to be initiated by the state itself, to be prompt and carried out with reasonable expedition, it had to be effective and conducted by a person who was independent of those implicated in the events under investigation.”

Step forward WALLANDER!

In Chief Constable of The Hertfordshire Police (Original Appellant and Cross-Respondent) V Van Colle [2008], the House of Lords has denied (3 to 2) that there is a civil legal right against the police for failing to take action to prevent criminal violence to the Plaintiff.

The leading case is Osman v United Kingdom (1998) 29 EHRR 245.

In that case the Plaintiff/Complainant was the widow of Ali Osman, and the mother of Ahmet Osman. Mr. Ali Osman was shot dead and Ahmet was wounded by Ahmet’s former teacher. The event was preceded by a history of deviant behaviour by the teacher towards Ahmet which was investigated by Ahmet’s head teacher and reported to the police. The ineffective police response was to “lay an information of careless driving” against the teacher.

In Chief Constable of The Hertfordshire Police (Original Appellant and Cross-Respondent) V Van Colle [2008] there were two instances; in the first (Van Colle) case, Giles van Colle was threatened by and ultimately murdered by a man named Brougham. In the second case Stephen Smith was threatened by his former partner who subsequently attacked him with a claw hammer, seriously injuring him. The threats in both cases had been reported to the police who did nothing effective.

(Strangely, such failures may be common).

The quality of Lord Bingham’s minority judgment is a predictor that the issue will return and be reversed in the future.

He quotes Lord Keith in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 as saying;

There is no question that a police officer, like anyone else, may be liable in tort to a person who is injured as a direct result of his acts or omissions. So he may be liable in damages for assault, unlawful arrest, wrongful imprisonment and malicious prosecution, and also for negligence. Instances where liability for negligence has been established are Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 WLR 349 and Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 1 WLR 1242. Further, a police officer may be guilty of a criminal offence if he wilfully fails to perform a duty which he is bound to perform by common law or by statute: see Reg v Dytham [1979] QB 722, where a constable was convicted of wilful neglect of duty because, being present at the scene of a violent assault resulting in the death of the victim, he had taken no steps to intervene.”

He went on to say:

Considerable argument was devoted to exploration of the relationship between rights arising under the Convention (in particular, the article 2 right relied on in Van Colle) and rights and duties arising at common law. Should these two regimes remain entirely separate, or should the common law be developed to absorb Convention rights? I do not think that there is a simple, universally applicable answer. It seems to me clear, on the one hand, that the existence of a Convention right cannot call for instant manufacture of a corresponding common law right where none exists: see Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406.”

And again;

If, as other cases suggest, it is necessary for responsibility to be assumed for a duty of care to arise, then in my opinion the police assumed responsibility by visiting Mr Smith, initiating what was regarded by them as an investigation, assuring him that the investigation was progressing well and inviting him to call 999 if he was concerned for his safety. Public policy points strongly towards imposition of a duty of care: Mr Smith approached a professional force having a special skill in the assessment of criminal risk and the investigation of crime, a professional force whose main public function is to maintain the Queen’s peace, prevent crime and apprehend criminals. He was entitled to look to the police for protection and they, in my opinion, owed him a duty to take reasonable steps to assess the threat to him and, if appropriate, take reasonable steps to prevent it.”

What of a police force which pursues other agendas (“political”) rather than the enforcement of the law? In other words, where they are not so much negligent as complicit?

It may seem perverse to say it currently, but the world is improving. The world financial system is teetering; the people of Iceland must pay in cash for their needs and we in Ireland must endure cynical lies from people who personally failed in their jobs and wish the consequences to fall elsewhere on victims without power.

Nevertheless, it is true.

We see it in the abolition of an outrageous assumption; that people of power may beat up other people.

Section 24 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 provides;

24.—The rule of law under which teachers are immune from criminal liability in respect of physical chastisement of pupils is hereby abolished.”

My goodness, is it possible we may yet see a disciplinary code and complaints and regulation system for judges?

In Ireland, speaking generally, legal proceedings take the form of a contest. The contest is conducted according to rules, but a contest it is.

Contests do not guarantee proper, fair outcomes but they are superior to the alternative, no hearing to one (or more) party.

The phrase to describe such hearings without a party on notice is “ex parte”.

It refers to a court application brought by one person in the absence of and without representation by, or notification to, other parties.

In principle, such an application is a breach of fair procedures (as secured by the Irish Constitution) (and the European Convention on Human Rights).

Article 6.1 of the Convention reads:

In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

Nevertheless, such applications take place and courts make orders pursuant to them. The saving feature is that they are, to be proper, of a strictly temporary nature. The order will (or aught to) be limited in its effect to a time for the hearing of an application (“interlocutory”) (the other party having been notified of the intended application) to continue or renew the order made ex parte.

The applicant party will have notified the respondent party of the making of the order ex parte (and the order will bind the respondent forthwith) as well as giving notification of the date and time for the making of the “interlocutory” application.

Ex parte applications will, generally, be based on evidence presented in, say, affidavit form. It can happen that, subsequently, the evidence so presented is shown to be false or mistaken or generally unreliable.

For this reason a court has to be very careful in making orders ex parte. The absolute necessity for the making of the order without notification to the respondent must be shown. Considerable damage may be inflicted on the respondent, unfairly, by an order restraining the respondent from acting in some matter or fashion.

In addition, the publication of a record of the ex parte proceedings in court may libel the respondent. Under Section 18 (1) of the Defamation Act 1961, newspaper (and radio) publication of transactions in court are privileged, subject to the report being fair and accurate.

Arguably, to report the contents of the grounding affidavit or other allegation and/or the terms of the order, and to fail to report that an application was made ex parte (with an explanation of the meaning of that phrase) is not fair.

If that argument is accepted the report will lose its privilege and the publisher will be liable for the libel.