Our offices are, almost, in Lower Bridge Street and I travel down Clanbrassil Street daily to get to them. It is an ironic occasion every morning for me to join the single lane of traffic traveling north on Patrick Street in front of St. Patrick’s cathedral. Until recently there were two lanes for the north-bound traffic; now, one is a dedicated bus lane.

In 1953, Dublin Corporation determined to ensure that traffic would not be hindered by narrow streets like Clanbrassil Street and Patrick Street. They should be widened, it felt. The Corporation persisted in this feeling from 1953 to 1989 when it finally built a “dual-carriageway” along [some of] Clanbrassil St. and on into Patrick Street.

The fact that the planned Compulsory Purchase Order, to implement this, undermined the values of the properties along the west side of Clanbrassil Street and Patrick Street, from 1953 onwards, is neither here nor there.

What is of moment is this: we no longer care about traffic, that is, the private motor car. We have changed our viewpoint. We cheerfully squeeze it daily into a narrow traffic lane in Patrick Street. That’s not the only change. Dublin Corporation is now Dublin City Council: it hasn’t gone away and it is still an institution of vision.

Currently, it has a vision for a waste incinerator in Ringsend. Perhaps we need such a thing. But will we always? Will we always think it a good thing to burn rubbish? To burn it within the city?

The answer is yes, because the operator of the proposed incinerator will compel us to do it, under the terms of a contract signed by it and Dublin City Council.

Peculiarly, the property rights in rubbish may be more easily defended than the property rights in buildings.

It is a surprising fact that most contracts are concluded without reference to lawyers. It is surprising because of the extent of the law of contract and the effect of getting something wrong in the conclusion of the contract.

Contract law is an essential element of the world of commerce. Buying and selling things is what contract law is about. So, too, is the provision of services.

Most contracts are for small items and small sums; our transactions as we buy our groceries are typical. We do not expect to have to enter written contracts for these items, and we don’t. Nevertheless, these sales are subject to ascertainable conditions and terms, nowadays often emanating from the European Parliament.

If the Government decides to build substantial roadways across the landscape it will, of necessity, enter a contract, or contracts, to achieve that objective; the alternative would be to establish a national workforce in the employment of the State to directly build the roadways. We don’t do that.

Signing a contract for a new roadway (or a new building) is a significant matter. The contract will have to provide for a great number of things, not least the specification for the type or quality of road or building.

A lawyer should not be far removed from this occasion. After all, who drafted the contract? It should have been a lawyer. What if the written terms contain an ambiguity? There is a standard method, or rule, for dealing with that; the contract is interpreted against the person who drafted it.

There is another practical approach; use a standard form of contract. The benefits of such a form are enormous. Any ambiguities will have been eliminated, and the experience of predecessors will have been built into the contract with clauses providing for all the issues and matters that need to be addressed or provided for.

However, these large contracts will often have special conditions to be inserted into them; the facts will require it. It is a general rule that special conditions override general conditions where there is a conflict between them. In that case there is an unavoidable need for a lawyer.

In the construction industry many contracts commence as a consequence of the conclusion of the main contract. The contractor will, of necessity, have to source the skills required to do some of the work, possibly most of it, from specialist sub-contractors. Because of the time consumed in finding the sub-contractors, there may be exchanges of letters of intent or such like. Astonishingly, the result may be that there is no contract between the contractor and the sub-contractor. If the sub-contractor does work in such circumstances, it will still be entitled to be paid. The claim will be in quasi-contract on a “quantum meruit” basis. The work will be valued at market rates and a profit element will then be added. That is what the sub-contractor will be entitled to.

For the contractor, this may be a severe blow. Claims of delay, if any, (there will be such) and consequential, loss will not be enforceable by the contractor.

In construction contracts the payment of liquidated damages is a benefit to the parties. Depending on the circumstances it can benefit the developer by relieving it of the obligation to prove a loss, whereas it can generally benefit the contractor in relieving it from the necessity to resist a [valid] claim and also introduces certainty as to consequences of the contractor’s default. Both parties can avoid expensive disputes in the courts with consequent delay for the project.

However, it is not a carte blanche for the contractor to neglect its obligations in terms of time, say.

In Bath and North East Somerset District Council -v- Mowlem Plc [2004] CA, Mowlem refused to follow an architect’s instruction. The developer council advised Mowlem that if it persisted in its refusal the council would engage another contractor to do the work. Mowlem again refused to do the work and the council instructed another contractor on the matter whereupon Mowlem refused to allow the replacement contractor on the site to do the work.

The council applied for an injunction to effect entry for the replacement contractor. Mowlem, in resisting the application, claimed that the only loss accruing to the council was a loss of time and that was capable of being remedied under the terms of the contract, which fixed liquidated damages for the delay.

The court disagreed and stated:

Mowlem is not entitled to breach its contract. The agreement on liquidated and ascertained damages is not an agreed price to permit Mowlem to do so, and it does not preclude the court granting any other relief that may be appropriate. In my view, the Council’s case is right in principle.”

There was evidence to show that the council’s loss would exceed the liquidated damages and the court affirmed the injunction granted in first instance to the council.

It seems my post on bidding for public contracts in the construction industry missed one element – bid-rigging. See HERE.

Apropos cost overruns, it is interesting to note HERE that when Siemens hits a delay on a project in China and, elsewhere, defects on a project in Budapest it suffers a loss of €200 million, but when roads cost more in the UK the taxpayer takes the loss. Who, in the name of goodness, does the UK Roads Authority use to write its contracts?

Should we not ask our Irish ambassador in China to procure a copy of the Siemens contract and urgently check with the National Roads Authority for an assurance that their contract writer is not the same one as used by the UK Highways Agency?

I have written (HERE) of the need for speed in challenging the award of a public contract where the provisions of the Regulations governing such contracts have not been followed. (European Communities (Award of Public Authorities’ Contracts) Regulations 2006 (Statutory Instrument No. 329 of 2006) ).

The Regulations expressly embody a good idea; that the nation get the best value for money. It is not easy to ensure this.

For instance, one assumes the contract for the “regeneration�? of Ballymun was awarded on the criteria adopted in the 2006 Regulations (not pursuant to them; they post-date the Ballymun contract).

We now see (HERE) that the Ballymun contract is €500 million over budget.
Who can now say that the seemingly more expensive underbidder was not in fact the cheaper of the bids? (Assuming there was an underbidder).

The problem is endemic in such contracts (especially in IT contracts).

In truth, neither the contractors nor the public authorities seeking tenders genuinely know what the costs of such projects are; the tenders are guesses.

The man who built the Empire State building in New York was asked what the most important element was in the construction; he replied, “getting the contract�?.

Following that line of thought, the best guess is the one that seeks, not to estimate the actual cost of the project, but to guess the cost projection of the public authority for the project. That will secure the contract.

It is possible to try and ensure that the cost overruns do not fall to the account of the public, but that, too, seems to be hard to avoid as we see in the Metronet debacle HERE and HERE.

What Transport for London seemed to have overlooked was the freedom of the individual members of the Metronet consortium to become sub-contractors (they gave the contracts to themselves) When Metronet went into administration, Transport for London continued answerable for the claims of those sub-contractors.

It is an important element in the negotiation of such contracts to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that there will be no re-negotiation of the contract later. The World Bank has this to say on the matter:

8.3.1Avoiding renegotiations
According to one study,55 percent ofwater concessions awarded in Latin America were renegotiated in the 1990s,many within two years ofthe award (Guasch 2004). In some cases, the operator or contracting authority may reasonably refuse to renegotiate.Moreover,developing a reputation for being hard-nosed could reduce the likelihood that the contracting authority will be exposed to opportunistic behavior in the future. In other cases,circumstances may have changed in ways that mean the current arrangements are no longer appropriate,and renegotiation can help both parties.
Often,both the contracting authority and the operator have strong incentives to renegotiate rather than terminate the arrangement:contracting authorities are often concerned that terminating the arrangement may result in an interruption to key services,while operators do not want to lose any past investment or future profit. Yet renegotiation changes a previously agreed arrangement.The contracting authority or the operator may try to renegotiate in order to reduce its risk exposure or to gain advantages it was unable to obtain in the initial agreement (Box 8.1).When the operator is selected based on the lowest tariff bid or highest concession payment,operators may engage in aggressive bidding strategies (lowballing) to win the contract and then seek to renegotiate for more favorable terms once competitive pressure is no longer an effective constraint.

Modern governments have phenomenal spending power. Like a householder, they need to engage tradesmen and professionals of various types to do work the State needs done.

You want a new motorway? Here is a company to build it. You want a new harbour? Here is a company to dig it. You want a contract drafted for the motorway construction to secure your interests and ensure you get value for money? Here is the solicitor to write it for you.

These contracts are very valuable. They allow the person to whom the contract is awarded to, at the very least, pay the wages of the staff of the successful tendering company, say, during slack industry trading periods.

They also represent opportunities for pork-barrel politics. The politician who formulates and guides the policy resulting in the decision to have a motorway in the first place and then the decision as to who will get the contract, wields enormous power. The exercise of that power can secure re-election by the votes of grateful beneficiaries or the money to win those votes in an election.

Clearly, they represent opportunities for criminal activity in the form of fraud and corruption.

That aside, the State, as a major economic engine, can “distort�? the free market in goods and services. The European Union is professedly wedded to ensuring such markets, as are of a minimum size, will be free.

Consequently, EU member states are obliged to adjust their national law to conform to Directive 2004/18/EC intended to ensure only economic considerations (broadly defined) are the determining factor in the awarding of those public contracts which reach the threshold limit.

(HERE is a reference to an Irish-related case dealing with the obligation to advertise (or not!), that the contract is available.)

Ireland passed European Communities (Award of Public Authorities’ Contracts) Regulations 2006 (Statutory Instrument No. 329 of 2006) to comply with its EU obligations in this regard.

The Regulations are legally binding on the awarding authority. In Chapter 3 there is set out the basis for the awarding of the contracts:

Criteria for the award of a public contract

66. (1) A contracting authority shall, in awarding a public contract on the basis of the tender that is most economically advantageous to it, adopt criteria linked to the subject matter of the contract.

(2) Except as provided by paragraph (1), a contracting authority shall award a public contract on the basis of the lowest price.

(3) For the purpose of paragraph (1), the criteria may include (but are not limited to)―
· quality,
· price,
· technical merit,
· aesthetic and functional characteristics,
· environmental characteristics,
· running costs,
· cost-effectiveness,
· after-sales service and technical assistance, and
· delivery date and delivery period or period of completion.

(4) The contracting authority shall specify in the relevant contract notice or contract documents or, in the case of a competitive dialogue, in the relevant descriptive document, the relative weighting that it gives to each of the criteria chosen to determine the most economically advantageous tender. That weighting can be expressed by providing for a range within an appropriate maximum spread.

If an unsuccessful party wishes to challenge the legality of the award of a public procurement contract it is necessary to do so as quickly as possible.
Failure to act swiftly will preclude the applicant from relief. (See HERE).

I have written on the prospect of emerging Building (Construction) disputes in the credit crunch HERE.

When a Mr. McGlinn decided to have a new house in Jersey his subsequent difficulties had little to do with a credit crunch. He was a participant in the success of The Body Shop chain and had an estimated net worth of £100 million.

Abbreviations are as follows;

McGLINN: [Employer]
HTA: [Architect]
WALTHAM: [Contractor]

As the court found in its judgment, McGlinn proceeded with the building of his £2 million house while the issue of a settled written building contract was “up in the air�?. His new house was aptly named “Maison d’Or�?, surely a reference, intended or not, to Nero’s “Domus Aurea�?

The case is of interest because it examines issues relating to the division of responsibility for a building disaster. The judge remarked that the house was basically a generally sound and secure structure, yet the Plaintiff had demolished it. The contractor had gone into liquidation and the architect was the principal remaining target of the claim. The implications of that appear in the judge’s remark;

In other words, I have endeavoured not to lose touch with reality; the mere fact that the contractor would have been found liable for an item of defective workmanship does not automatically mean that there is a sustainable case against the architect for failing properly to inspect.�?

The judgment commences and records:

This action concerns a house called ‘Maison d’Or’ that was built for the Claimant, Mr Ian McGlinn, in St Aubin, in Jersey. The house took three years to build, between January 1999 and December 2001. Following the departure of the building contractors in January 2002, when the house was substantially complete, it sat empty for the next 3 years whilst the alleged deficiencies in its design and construction were the subject of extensive investigation by a team of experts and contractors. In the early part of 2005, it was completely demolished. It was never lived in. It has not been rebuilt.�?

AND again on the subject of the contractual relations between the Plaintiff and the contractors (an important issue where a building contract had not been signed);

Despite the terms of the letter, no formal building contract was ever entered into by Mr McGlinn and Waltham, and, even more surprisingly, the letter was never updated. In August of 1999, after Waltham had been working on the site for many months, WL sent them a set of contract documentation which, in the round, duplicated in their entirety the documents sent out with the original tender enquiry. However, this contract was never signed by Waltham and sent back. Whether this was simply due to inadvertence is unlikely; there is a clear suggestion in the papers that Waltham deliberately decided that they could not sign up to this contract because they were unable to agree to a completion date for the works due to the number of variations. It is likely that this was a classic case where a contractor was allowed to start work before a contract was or could be agreed, and by the time the parties might have been in a position to formalise a binding contract, it had been overtaken by events. Mr Thornton said that it was his understanding that “the contract was not signed because it was in flux”. However, notwithstanding the absence of a contract, Waltham often wrote to HTA making claims pursuant to specific clauses of the JCT standard form, and purporting to rely on specific provisions that they considered helpful.

What, then, can be said about the precise legal relationship between Mr McGlinn and Waltham? It seems to me that it would be idle to suggest that there was no contract, given the fact that Waltham carried out £4 million worth of work at Maison d’Or and the clear warning against finding no contract at all in such circumstances from Steyn LJ (as he then was) in G Percy Trentham v Archital Luxfer [1993] 1 Lloyds Rep 25 at 27. There he made the point (with which I respectfully agree) that:

“The fact that the transaction was performed on both sides will often make it unrealistic to argue that there was no intention to enter into legal relations. It will often be difficult to submit that the contract is void for vagueness or uncertainty. Specifically, the fact that the transaction is executed makes it easier to imply a term resolving any uncertainty, or, alternatively, it may make it possible to treat a matter not finalised as inessential.”

It should also be noted that, although Waltham played no part in the hearing, their pleaded defence maintains the stance they adopted during the works: it assumes the existence of a binding contract, and indeed purports to rely on a number of the terms of the JCT Standard Form where they are considered to be helpful to the contractor, without ever addressing matters such as the agreed work scope or the contract completion date.

For present purposes it seems to me that Waltham and Mr McGlinn, through his agents, were agreed that, to the extent that it was consistent with the specific agreements that had been reached, the JCT Standard Form of Building Contract, 1998 Edition, would be incorporated into their contract. In addition, it seems to me that there was an agreement between Mr McGlinn and Waltham that the preliminaries and general conditions set out in Bill 1 of the Bills of Approximate Quantities would also be incorporated into their contract. That was certainly the important assumption on which WL operated. However, the fact that these JCT conditions look to have been broadly agreed as between Mr McGlinn and Waltham should not be taken to mean that the obligations of any of the professionals on this project must have been those which are envisaged to exist by the JCT Standard Form.�?

The architects, said the judge (failure to furnish a specification and to inspect being the main issues against them):

were obliged to inspect the works being constructed to their design in accordance with these principles. In respect of the structural works, and the M&E works, HTA’s obligation to inspect was more limited. It extended to ensuring that any co-ordination issues had been properly dealt with by Waltham, and it might possibly extend to any very obvious errors in the construction of these elements, but it would not be appropriate to impose upon HTA the same inspection obligation in respect of a detailed element of the work designed by, say, the engineer, as for an element of the work which they themselves designed. It is clear that in the former case, their inspection obligation must have been much less onerous. In addition, as set out in paragraph 210 above, HTA were obliged to carry out periodic inspections in respect of the interior/finishes, notwithstanding TDD’s primary design obligations.�?

Judgment was given for the Plaintiff against the architects and the consulting engineers for their failures. Those damages were in the region of £500,000. The judgment did not deal with the liability of the insolvent contractor, who, the evidence showed, had entered into a loan agreement with the architects, following the awarding of the work to the contractor, for the loan of £10,000 to them, without the knowledge of the Employer/Plaintiff.

The Irish property market has slowed if not stopped. According to the Irish Times the construction sector owes €100 billion to Irish banks.

In these circumstances there will be considerable pressure to avoid making due payment on contracts, not to speak of an inability to absorb the cost of contractors’ or developers’ errors.

In short, the frequency of disputes in the sector is sure to rise.

At the retail level they will not get to the level of the scandal in Spain, where the Guardian reported:

Britons are being scared off buying property on Spain’s Mediterranean coast, with the number of potential buyers plummeting after a series of corruption and planning scandals and the announcement of plans to demolish thousands of illegally built homes.�?

They will, however, get to the level where subsidiary agreements will appear and misunderstandings will grow.

The standard source of building agreements in Ireland is the suite of contracts devised by the Royal Institute of Architects in Ireland, some of which are listed HERE.

In the UK the standard source of building agreements is the suite of contracts devised by the Joint Contracts Tribunal Ltd. listed and downloadable HERE.

For Irish sub-contractors (nominated) the Construction Industry Federation form is used.

What happens when the disputes break out? That depends on the form of contract and indeed, the terms of the contract.

Many parties to these disputes fail to understand that the dispute is a legal dispute and that the terms of the agreement will, in principle, if not in practice, dictate the outcome of the dispute. In short, the contract is the source of the parties’ rights and obligations and the dispute will consist of teasing out the point on which one of the parties failed in its legal obligations, as defined by the contract/s.

This is not to say that parties can and do settle disputes on a practical basis, rather than a legal basis.

When this happens the experience can resemble THERAPY rather than law.

It is important to recognize that the expense of construction (which is considerable) carries the hidden reciprocal cost of the dispute and that the parties should budget for spending that money if and when the dispute breaks out. If that is budgeted for there will be a minimized loss of momentum in driving the dispute resolution process to an early conclusion.