Any solicitor should reasonably be glum now. No office will escape the consequences of Ireland’s financial troubles and, ignoring runes, we need only read the recent record of our neighbour, the UK, to see what those consequences might be.

Let’s start with the straightforward stuff; Thomas McGoldrick, a solicitor, stole £1.25 million from a client left paralysed (from the neck down) by a traffic accident. The judge sentenced him to ten years in jail. McGoldrick’s firm acted for the client in his personal injury action. McGoldrick met the client once and when the compensation was lodged in the client account McGoldrick treated it as his own, driving a Mercedes and Jaguar with personalised number plates and sending his children to expensive prep schools.

In the UK, as in Ireland, theft like this is, effectively, a charge on all solicitors; the Law Society Compensation Fund has to make good the loss.

Any normal person might go off the rails on hearing news like this. Take Esther Cunningham for example. She was defending her cousin on a dangerous dog prosecution but had to be escorted from court after kissing a solicitor, swearing at an usher and insulting the prosecutor while “fortified” with brandy. To her credit her legal representative said of her; “The forcible kissing of a solicitor is something that has been difficult to accept”. Who, among her colleagues, would not agree?

Distraction, even while remaining on the rails, so to speak, could also be easily foreseen following on such troubles. Consider how readily a solicitor, raffling a house, could forget to get a licence to run a lottery. The then-President of the Law Society , Paul Marsh warned his colleagues against launching prize draws because he feared that, as the recession deepened and house prices continued to fall, more people might be tempted to establish prize draws. He also feared that they could be used to conduct mortgage fraud or for money laundering. He pointed out that anyone found guilty of running an unlawful lottery faces a maximum sentence of 51 weeks in prison and/or a fine of up to £5,000 under the Gambling Act 2005.

One wonders whether Mr. Marsh was not himself distracted. Did he not know what many of his members were then doing? They were bribing people to get work for their firms.
A report described the practice in relation to the “miners’ scandal” in these terms;

“…some law firms charged fees to the miners out of their compensation awards. This “success fee” was often charged on the ground that the miner had been introduced to the solicitor by a claims handling company or trade union that had charged the solicitor to send the case to them.”

Bribing middlemen for work is the first step to full-time, big-time bribery. Get a scruffy office in Tottenham and become a bagman for Halliburton, delivering £100 million in bribes to Nigerian politicians. That’s a business model any Irish property developer would cheerfully take up. In this case it was a solicitor.

Strictly, as a business model it lacks something; the bribes are going in the wrong direction. Christopher Haan, a consultant solicitor knew that. Despite charging his client, Mr Abela £1.4 million in legal fees (on a share purchase), Mr Haan was clandestinely also advising a Mr Baadarani, who was selling his stake in the Italian company to Mr Abela. Mr. Haan got £400,000 from Mr. Baadarani.
“This is not a case of a technical conflict of interest,” Mr Abela’s, counsel told the court, “but of an intentional preferment of one client’s interests over another.”
Mr Haan’s actions, he said, were negligent, deceitful and a breach of contract towards Mr Abela, adding that simultaneously advising the buyer and seller of a company implied fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.
Mr. Haan may have known what Mr. Seldon, another solicitor, did not know; that you can be pushed into retirement against your will (and will need every cent you can get).

Or, powerful vested interests lodge a complaint with your Regulator and, despite their tendentious objectives (the complainants were the opponents of the solicitor’s clients) you just survive the trial your Regulator puts you through.

Here in Ireland, being a Republic we, in theory, are no respecters of persons. Oops! Not so, perhaps.

In any event Michael Ford a client of Michael Napier, a former President of the Law Society lodged a complaint with the Law Society about Napier. Napier had represented Ford in a long case against Exxon Mobil, but Ford discovered that Napier’s firm had also been acting for Esso, a wholly owned subsidiary of Exxon.

Ford was not pleased about this. How could he now know that Napier did everything he could to vindicate his interests?

The complaint went nowhere fast. Only when it went to the Scottish Legal Complaints Commission did Ford get a hearing. The Commission found that the Law Society’s investigation was a systemic failure.

Too bad.

Here are some issues not addressed so far (in the papers I read).

(A) Quinn Insurance has a board of Directors. Sean Quinn is not on that board. The board has said nothing about the seizure of the company by the Provisional Administrators. Sean Quinn never stops talking about it and issuing press releases and public statements, including TV interviews.

Is he in fact in charge of Quinn Insurance?

This is possible. Under Section 27 of the Companies Act 1990:-

“…a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of a company are accustomed to act (in this Act referred to as “a shadow director”) shall be treated for the purposes of this Part as a director of the company…”

Does the Financial Regulator know anything about this that we don’t?

(B) Quinn Insurance has been accepting professional indemnity business from British solicitors. The mind boggles. Every now and again a wave of mortgage fraud sweeps Britain. Irrespective of whether the solicitors are complicit, the claims are numerous and large. It is very difficult to calculate the proper premium to match the risk. It is not easy, either, to refuse indemnity; the insured solicitors can fight.

Generally, the liability of a solicitor (arising out of his/her professional practise) is unlimited. However, under Section 44 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008, a solicitor may limit his/her liability to a degree not less than the current minimum sum for which a solicitor must carry insurance for (negligence) claims.

That figure is, currently, €1,500,000.

Insurance has a strange aspect which we often overlook; we are happy that we did not need it.

We do not think that the premia paid year after year to insure our house is wasted money. After all, we do not want our house to burn down; we just want to rebuild and restore it if it does. So, we pay a small sum of money to meet the possibility of having to pay the much larger sum if the house does burn down (or suffer some other form of damage).

Sometimes the question of what is a proportionate sum to pay as a premium to cover the perceived risk has to be publicly determined.

In the UK, unlike Ireland, there is anxiety that justice should be facilitated. By “justice” is meant the ready and easy opportunity to go to court seeking a remedy without being prevented by extraneous causes, like poverty. Poverty is relative; most people in Ireland would consider the costs of a High Court action (or even a Circuit court action) beyond them.

Consequently, the UK authorities have facilitated schemes intended to achieve this end.

One such scheme is to allow lawyers who work on a “no win, no fee” basis to charge a significantly higher fee when they are successful, and provide that the losing party has to pay that higher fee as a matter of course.

Another is to recompense a plaintiff his or her insurance premium for “After The Event” (ATE) insurance. This is insurance taken out to, effectively, help pay for some of the litigation costs of the plaintiff/insured.

Section 29 of the UK Access to Justice Act 1999 provides:

“Where in any proceedings a costs order is made in favour of any party who has taken out an insurance policy against the risk of incurring a liability in those proceedings, the costs payable to him may, subject in the case of court proceedings to rules of court, include costs in respect of the premium of the policy.”

Inevitably, the losing defendants (other insurance companies) took issue with the premia being charged for the ATE.

HERE ‘s the outcome of that dispute.

The power of mythical thinking has to be experienced to be believed. Currently, in Ireland, nobody is more subject to its power than the judges of the Superior courts. (With the possible exception of the Irish catholic bishops).

Of course the legal profession is subject to the same myths as the judiciary, but that would not long outlast (I hope) the escape of the judiciary from their myths.

The myth of immediate interest is the fairytale that the Dail (Ireland’s lower parliamentary chamber) has any influence in the making or passing of legislation. It does not; legislation is originated by the Cabinet and driven through onto the statute books.

We know who is responsible, therefore, for the requirement that personal injury litigants must swear an Affidavit of Verification asserting the truth of the factual assertions set out in pleadings commenced on their behalf.

Willie O’Dea is in the Cabinet. He says, of his factually incorrect Affidavit, that when he realized his error in his Affidavit, he “put his hands up” and admitted the error. The Cabinet has endorsed this as the correct response. Consequently, no judge can, or should, ask for more of personal injury litigants.

Willie O’Dea’s understanding is not new or peculiar. His Affidavit will have contained the averment:

“I make this affidavit from facts within my own knowledge save where otherwise appears, and where so otherwise appearing I believe the same to be true.”

This statement is about appearances and beliefs. Willie was right to emphasise that his beliefs are the important thing and, of course, we know that appearances can be deceptive, especially to deponents in Affidavits.

That, clearly is what the Cabinet meant and means by the legislation imposing the obligation on personal injury litigants.

Judges take note.

Oddly, nobody has adverted to the role of the Attorney General in the Willie O’Dea kerfuffle. The Attorney General is the lawyer to the Cabinet. He clearly endorsed the view of the Cabinet, did he not? Maybe not. Whether he did or did not is not important. We are not entitled to know and nobody is asking.

But we should see him as he is, warts and all. We should not have to endure the consequence of more mythical thinking by the judiciary (and the Law Library). The Attorney General is down in the arena with everybody else. He fights for his clients. He represents their interests. He should not be accorded the deference he gets from the judiciary and the Law Library. (According to the Bar of Ireland, the Attorney General is the Leader of the Bar).

1. It was (arguably) beyond the remit of the High Court inspector to make exhaustive comment on the giving of legal advice to Mr. Jim Flavin (“Flavin”) on the legality of the sale by Flavin of Fyffes’ shares.

2. However, the advice was wrong, the inspector says. (He could hardly say anything else, given that the Supreme Court effectively said the same thing).

3. Consequently, the question as to whether the solicitor who gave that advice was negligent could arise. Hopefully, the solicitor knew this and qualified the advice with the use of some formulation like “…on the one hand this… on the other hand that…”.

4. But then Flavin would have been in a quandary. He would not have been able to sleep with worry about the possibility that he was about to commit a crime.

5. But what of the solicitor? Is his sleep of no consequence? If he says, positively, that the sale of shares is legal; is not a crime, and is nonetheless wrong, is he not liable to the client? How can he sleep with the worry that his advice will prove to be wrong?

6. Even if he has nerves of steel and a will of iron, what can he say to the client who returns to him after the trauma of even a successful defence of the client’s actions? Did he not advise the client of the possibility, indeed the likelihood of litigation? If he did, surely the client had grounds to doubt the legality of what was proposed and if he did not surely the client, learning of the decision in C. W. Dixey and Sons Ltd. v Parsons [1964]192 E G where the court said;

“In the present circumstances the solicitor owed a duty of care to his client to take reasonable care, not only to protect his client against committing a breach of the law but to protect him against the risk of being involved in litigation… It would not do for him to say that in his view it was all right. There was an obvious danger that a different view might be taken. In the present circumstances the ordinary careful solicitor would have gone to see his clients and advised them not to sign.”

would be rightly aggrieved at the advice the solicitor had given.

7. Of course, there is another way of seeing the situation. There are some things upon which a solicitor should not venture an opinion or advice and clients should not seek such opinion or advice.

It is surprising how often the willfulness of lawyers or litigants drives litigation, rather than evidence. We see an instance of this in the “theory” that William Shakespeare did not write the “Shakespearean canon” and that the plays and poems were written by, among others, Francis Bacon. This theory was first advanced by Delia Bacon in a book published in 1857.

The essential element of the book, in explaining its success, was prolixity. A work is prolix if it is too long. It is a general human failing to think that there must be substance to something if it can be written about at length.

At any length, Ms. Bacon’s book was too long.

In this vein, some solicitors and some barristers stand out for an inability to produce short affidavits. They talk all around the problem, avoiding the terms in which the opponent has defined the issues. This may be very good in principle, but it is tiresome in practice and oppressive when the prolix affidavit is sworn in the cause of big institutions, for, in truth, this is a feature of struggles with big institutions; they try to talk the problem away.

Britain and Ireland have similar, but different, legal systems. In Britain it is permitted for solicitors and barristers to agree to act for no, or a reduced, fee, conditional on being entitled, on winning the case, to charge the client (and a losing opponent) an enhanced fee (one larger than the norm). This is known as “a conditional fee agreement” (CFA).

This is not possible in Ireland.

In Britain, these CFA arrangements are most common in personal injury claims. In Ireland the principal law applicable to such claims and the terms to be agreed between solicitors and clients is S.I. No. 518/2002 — The Solicitors Acts, 1954 To 2002 Solicitors (Advertising) Regulations, 2002

Under the Regulations it is illegal for a solicitor to advertise “No win, no Fee”. Solicitors are not permitted to calculate their fees by reference to a percentage of the compensation recovered for the client. (Or as the Regulations put it, “In contentious business, a solicitor may not calculate fees or other charges as a percentage or proportion of any award or settlement”.

Furthermore, not only are solicitors subject to the foregoing restrictions but are also restricted from offering “legal services involving contentious business… at no cost or reduced cost to the client”

Indeed, it is the obligation of a solicitor to give an estimate of the costs of the legal services to the client in writing, at the commencement of the engagement.

Finally, the Regulations provide, inter alia, advertisements shall not “be published in an inappropriate location”.

(We know for sure that the back of a bus is an inappropriate location).

Contrary to conventional thinking, the critical conversation is, often, not the conversation of the client with his/her solicitor, but the conversation of the solicitor with an expert.

This is definitely the case in medical negligence actions.

The issue in a medical negligence action is whether the defendant deviated from approved or appropriate practice. It is an error, usually, to think that the plaintiff will succeed if he/she proves that there would have been no injury had the defendant followed a different course of action. (The exceptional case where it would not be an error would be one where the court was persuaded that the conventional practice carried such obvious defects that it was indefensible and where the court effectively condemns the defendant and the practice.)

Thus, in the conversation with the expert, the solicitor is assessing the likelihood of the success of a defence claiming conventional merit for the defendant’s actions.

Incidentally, the solicitor is also assessing the quality of the expert.

Sometimes the quality of an expert shines out.

Former Supreme Court judge Donal Barrington, for instance, has seriously misled the general public (some) of the quality of our judges following his appearance on Nightly News with Vincent Browne. They have assumed that all our judges are of his high quality.

Would that it were so.

Often, in the conversation between the solicitor and the expert, the expert is not aware of any body of opinion supporting the defendant’s actions. This implies a criticism either of the expert or of the defendant.

It is the solicitor’s job to correctly judge whether the expert or the defendant is wrong.

It is a surprising fact that most contracts are concluded without reference to lawyers. It is surprising because of the extent of the law of contract and the effect of getting something wrong in the conclusion of the contract.

Contract law is an essential element of the world of commerce. Buying and selling things is what contract law is about. So, too, is the provision of services.

Most contracts are for small items and small sums; our transactions as we buy our groceries are typical. We do not expect to have to enter written contracts for these items, and we don’t. Nevertheless, these sales are subject to ascertainable conditions and terms, nowadays often emanating from the European Parliament.

If the Government decides to build substantial roadways across the landscape it will, of necessity, enter a contract, or contracts, to achieve that objective; the alternative would be to establish a national workforce in the employment of the State to directly build the roadways. We don’t do that.

Signing a contract for a new roadway (or a new building) is a significant matter. The contract will have to provide for a great number of things, not least the specification for the type or quality of road or building.

A lawyer should not be far removed from this occasion. After all, who drafted the contract? It should have been a lawyer. What if the written terms contain an ambiguity? There is a standard method, or rule, for dealing with that; the contract is interpreted against the person who drafted it.

There is another practical approach; use a standard form of contract. The benefits of such a form are enormous. Any ambiguities will have been eliminated, and the experience of predecessors will have been built into the contract with clauses providing for all the issues and matters that need to be addressed or provided for.

However, these large contracts will often have special conditions to be inserted into them; the facts will require it. It is a general rule that special conditions override general conditions where there is a conflict between them. In that case there is an unavoidable need for a lawyer.

In the construction industry many contracts commence as a consequence of the conclusion of the main contract. The contractor will, of necessity, have to source the skills required to do some of the work, possibly most of it, from specialist sub-contractors. Because of the time consumed in finding the sub-contractors, there may be exchanges of letters of intent or such like. Astonishingly, the result may be that there is no contract between the contractor and the sub-contractor. If the sub-contractor does work in such circumstances, it will still be entitled to be paid. The claim will be in quasi-contract on a “quantum meruit” basis. The work will be valued at market rates and a profit element will then be added. That is what the sub-contractor will be entitled to.

For the contractor, this may be a severe blow. Claims of delay, if any, (there will be such) and consequential, loss will not be enforceable by the contractor.