THE HIGH COURT
Record No: 840P/2005
BETWEEN:

SHELL E & P IRELAND LIMITED
Plaintiff
And
PHILIP MCGRATH, JAMES PHILBIN, WILLIE CORDUFF,
MONICA MULLER, BRID MCGARRY, PETER SWEETMAN
Defendants

And
THE MINISTER FOR COMMUNICATIONS MARINE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Defendants to the counterclaim of second and fifth defendants
Update (17th March 2010)
1. On 18th and 19th November 2008, Judge Laffoy heard the application, on motion, of the State to determine as a preliminary issue whether the 2nd and 5th Defendants are precluded from raising “public law issues”.
2. McGarr Solicitors act for Brendan Philbin and Brid McGarry, the 2nd and 5th Defendants. Their counsel are Lord Dan Brennan QC and Mark Dunne BL. The Chief State Solicitor acts for the Minister, Ireland and the AG. Their Counsel are James Connolly SC and Charles Meenan SC. Eugene F Collins act for SEPIL. Its counsel are Patrick Hanratty SC and Declan McGrath BL.
3. The court has decided (judgment delivered on 4th March 2010) that the 2nd and 5th defendants are NOT precluded from raising “public law issues”.
4. The proceedings commenced in April 2005, when Shell E & P Ireland Ltd. (”SEPIL”), issued plenary summons proceedings against the defendants. Mr. Philbin was committed to prison for 3 months, effectively, on the application of SEPIL on the grounds that he had breached an injunction restraining him from preventing SEPIL from entering his land.
5. In the events that have happened, SEPIL applied for and received the leave of the court to discontinue its claims against the defendants. This happened after SEPIL had received the defences of the defendants and the 2nd and 5th Defendants had counterclaimed against SEPIL and successfully joined the Minister and Ireland and the AG as further defendants to the counterclaim. SEPIL’s discontinuance did not end the counterclaim. The counterclaim is substantial. As against the Minister, Ireland and the AG it claims that certain Compulsory Acquisition Orders made by the Minister regarding the land of the defendants are invalid. It also claims that a consent allegedly made by the Minister in favour of SEPIL, to construct a pipeline over the defendants’ land is invalid.
6. The Minister, Ireland and the AG asserted that these are “public law issues”. They asserted that issues like these can be challenged only under the procedure set out in Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. They asserted that, that being so, those claims of the defendants are late. They asserted that the claims, to be admissible, should have been made within the time limits of 3 or 6 months (at most) after the making of the CAOs and the consent.
7. SEPIL supported the State parties in their submissions and position.
8. The defendants denied they are confined by the provisions of Order 84 and/or its “time limits”. They said that Order 84 is not an exclusive procedure; that it cannot be used to shut out the hearing of claims against the State where the State has wronged citizens, particularly with regard to the private property of the citizen. They said, consequently, that the counterclaim should proceed to a full hearing on its merits.
9. The matter has been adjourned for mention before Judge Laffoy to 18th March 2010.

I have referred previously to the difficulties sometimes encountered with insurance companies.

However, an insurer does not always have the advantage.

If an insurer, meeting a claim of wrongful refusal of indemnity (meaning, the insured person sues for breach of contract following the making of a rejected claim), pleads a simple denial, the court will invariably restrain the defendant insurer from making an affirmative case and the insurer will be confined to undermining the plaintiff’s case (if it is possible).

This means that the plaintiff cannot and should not be surprised, in the litigation, by the advancement of some theory explaining the mechanism of loss (justifying the refusal of indemnity cover). In other words, the defendant insurer is obliged to plead its specific case and reason for refusing cover and cannot take the plaintiff by surprise in the running of the case.

Furthermore, if the defendant insurer is claiming that the claim falls into an exception specified in the contract of insurance, it is for the insurer defendant to prove that fact and not for the plaintiff insured to disprove it.

Accidents from errors in manual handling are the commonest source of injury in Irish workplaces.

If such an injury happens it invokes, potentially at least, the assessment of the event from the perspective of the duties of employers regarding such events. Chapter 4 of the General Application Regulations 2007 (SI 299/2007) particularly apply.

Any injury may result for these errors, but back injury dominates.

An employer is obliged

a) to seek alternative methods to manual handling;
b) to keep any such alternatives in working order;
c) to train staff in the techniques of manual handling as required;
d) to up-date training where this appears necessary;
e) to ensure that staff do not lift weights heavier than those stipulated in the weights guidelines (Health and Safety Authority);
f) generally to assess the risk where manual handling is unavoidable

Below are whimsical examples of pleading in a personal injury claim. The pleadings are not in order and do not conform to current pleading requirements for personal injury actions. Nevertheless they reflect the strange world of conflict in a personal injury lawsuit.

2009 No. 123
The High Court

BETWEEN Joseph Brush Plaintiff

and

Plastic Surfaces Ltd. Defendant

STATEMENT OF CLAIM

Delivered the 1st Day of April 2009 by
Skin & Bone Solicitors for the plaintiff
of Victory House Broad Street Dublin 1

1. The Plaintiff is a housepainter and he resides at 54 Shady Lane Rathcormac Dublin 10.

2. At all material times hereto the plaintiff was employed as a painter at the defendant’ s plastic-coated fabrics factory at Leafy Hollow Rathcormac Dublin 10 which said premises is owned and managed by the defendant.

3. It was a term of the said contract of employment between the plaintiff and the defendant and/or it was the duty of the defendant to take all reasonable precautions for the safety of the plaintiff while he was engaged upon his work, not to expose him to a risk of damage or injury of which they knew or ought to have known, to provide and maintain safe and adequate and suitable plant, tackle and appliances to enable the plaintiff to carry out his work in safety, to take all reasonable measures to ensure that the place where he carried out his work was safe and to provide and maintain a safe and proper system of work.

4. On or about the 1st day of March 2009 the plaintiff was in the course of his aforesaid work, lifting a roll of plastic- coated fabric when he injured his back. In descending a set of steps immediately following his back injury the plaintiff slipped on the said steps and lost his footing and fell down several steps, knocking over and burning himself with the contents of an open jar of hydrochloric acid which was standing at the bottom of the said steps.

5. The plaintiff injured his back, fell and burned himself with hydrochloric acid as aforesaid owing to the negligence and breach of duty on the part of the aforesaid defendant its servants or agents, in or about the management, maintenance and supervision of the aforesaid premises and the prevention of grave risk to the plaintiff.

Particulars of Negligence and Breach of Duty (including Statutory Duty)

A. Failed to provide the plaintiff with safe or adequate mechanical lifting equipment or assistance in the performance of his task of lifting the roll of plastic-coated fabric as aforesaid.

B. Failed to instruct the plaintiff in respect of safe and adequate lifting arrangements for the lifting of heavy or awkward loads.

C. Required the plaintiff to perform the said lifting operation without assistance.

D. Failed to take appropriate or any steps to obviate the said back injury accident.

E. Failing to provide any or any adequate lighting on the said staircase when they knew or ought to have known that the presence of slippy plastic or other foreign material was a common hazard on the said staircase which could not be spotted by the person using the said staircase in the absence of adequate lighting thereon;

F. Failing to take any or any adequate precautions for the safety of the plaintiff while he was engaged on his aforesaid work;

G. Exposing the plaintiff to a risk of damage or injury of which they knew or ought to have known;

H. Failing to provide a safe and proper system of work;

I. Failing to provide any or any adequate supervision;

J. Exposing the plaintiff to unnecessary and avoidable risk;

K. Failing to warn the plaintiff of the dangers presented by slippy plastic and other foreign material on the said staircase when the lighting thereon was inadequate;

L. Failing to provide competent workmates;

M. Failing to provide a safe place of work.

N. Leaving a jar of dangerous and corrosive chemical open where it might be spilled and injure the plaintiff especially in his distressed state.

O. Failing to warn the plaintiff of the dangers presented by the jar of hydrochloric acid on the said staircase.

P. Requiring or permitting the plaintiff to lift and move a load which was heavy and likely to cause him injury in breach of Article 68 of the General Application Regulations 2007 (SI 299/2007).

6. As a result of the aforesaid matters the plaintiff suffered severe personal injury, other loss and damage.

Particulars of Personal Injury
The plaintiff experienced severe pain in his lower back on lifting the roll of fabric. He suffered further pain on falling down the staircase further injuring his back and his right foot. On striking the jar of hydrochloric acid the contents spilled out onto both of the legs of the plaintiff and pooled about him as he sat on the landing. It burned his hands, legs, feet and buttocks.
The plaintiff was taken to St. Cuthbert’s Hospital where he was examined on arrival. He was conscious but in considerable pain. He had two degree burns on his legs and feet with three degree burns on his hands and buttocks. His burns were dressed and he was then X-rayed for his back and leg complaints. Soft tissue injury of his back was diagnosed and he was prescribed bed rest and physiotherapy as soon as the acid burn injuries allowed. A fracture of the cuboid was first suspected based on the X-rays of the right leg. The plaintiff suffered severe pain from his back at this juncture and was prescribed pain killers. The plaintiff was suffering from pain in the lower back region, radiating down the right leg. He was found to have restriction of movement in the lumbar spine together with tenderness in the right lower and lumbar and buttock region. Straight leg raising was restricted.
The plaintiff’s above injuries caused and continue to cause severe pain and discomfort. His capacity to enjoy his work and life generally has been severely diminished by his injuries. His complaints continue, may be permanent and the onset of adverse sequalae cannot be ruled out.

Particulars of Special Damage

Hospital Bills (unascertained and continuing)
Doctors’ Bills (unascertained and continuing)
Chemists’ Bills (unascertained and continuing)
Travelling Expenses (unascertained and continuing)
Loss of Wages (unascertained and continuing)
Damage to Clothing (unascertained and continuing)

Michael Soap B.L.

To the Registrar
Central Office
Four Courts
Dublin 7

And:
Fat & Smooth
Solicitors for the Defendant
Corkscrew Lane
The Highway
Dublin 2

________________________________
2009 No. 123
The High Court

BETWEEN Joseph Brush Plaintiff

and

Plastic Surfaces Ltd. Defendant

DEFENCE

Delivered the 2nd Day of April 2009 by
Fat & Smooth Solicitors for the Defendant
Corkscrew Lane, The Highway Dublin 2

1. The defendant denies that the plaintiff was employed as a housepainter at their premises in Leafy Lane Rathcormac Dublin 10 as is alleged or at all.

2. The defendant denies that the plaintiff was lifting a roll of plastic-coated fabric as is alleged or at all.

3. The defendant denies that the plaintiff fell on descending the staircase as is alleged or at all.

4. The defendant denies that the plaintiff struck a jar of hydrochloric acid on the staircase or that same spilled on him as is alleged or at all.

5. The defendant denies that the plaintiff was caused to suffer, or did suffer, the onset of severe back pain as is alleged or at all.

6. The defendant denies that the plaintiff was caused to suffer an injury to his right leg as is alleged or at all.

7. The defendant denies that the plaintiff was caused to suffer burns to his legs, feet, hands and buttocks as is alleged or at all.

8. The defendant denies that the plaintiff suffered severe personal injuries, loss or damage as is alleged or at all.

9. If the plaintiff did suffer personal injury, loss or damage (which is denied) the defendant denies that the same was caused by the negligence or breach of duty of this defendant, it’s servants or agents, as is alleged or at all.

10. If the plaintiff did suffer personal injuries, loss or damage (which is denied) then the defendant says that the same was suffered or alternatively contributed to by the negligence of the plaintiff.

Joe Sunlight B.L.

To the Registrar
Central Office
Four Courts
Dublin 7

And:
Skin & Bone
Solicitors for the Plaintiff
Victory House
Broad St.
Dublin 1

Litigation is a contest and the contest is conducted according to rules. The express purpose of the contest is to do justice between the parties; therefore a rule which hinders that purpose must be dispensed with. It is the job of the judiciary to ensure that the rules achieve the purpose and not simply to ensure compliance with rules.

Unfortunately, in Ireland, one, at least, of the Rules of the Superior Courts hinders the doing of justice. That rule currently governs the making of “discovery” in proceedings. The rule is set out in Statutory Instrument 233 of 1999, and is the subject of a previous post in this blog HERE.

Discovery involves the obligation of a party to set out in affidavit what documents that party has, or had, in its power, possession or procurement, relevant to the issues in the action. Relevant documents are documents which help the case of the opponent or, alternatively, the party making the discovery. So, a document may be relevant in one or two ways; it may prove what is asserted by one party or disprove what is asserted by one party (or do both).

When the affidavit of discovery is sworn and delivered, the recipient may request inspection of the documents and seek copies.

Normally, discovery is not ordered (if it is ordered), until the pleadings have been exchanged. The pleadings will have formally defined the issues in the action. This is important; the lawyers for the parties have no difficulty, usually, in perceiving the issues in the case after the pleadings are closed. Before the pleadings are exchanged, only speculation might show what the issues are and speculation is not a good basis for making judgments as to the relevance of documents, say.

Each party is very familiar, usually, with the documents it has, or had, in its power, possession or procurement. Conversely, the parties are far from familiar with the documents the opponent has or had in its power, possession or procurement.

Before 1999, when a court ordered the making of discovery, it was relatively easy for the party, ordered to make discovery, to decide what documents should be discovered. By that stage the pleadings had been exchanged; the issues were defined and the documents were familiar to the party.

Since 1999, the burden of deciding what documents should be discovered has now shifted to the opponent, to the person seeking the discovery. The problem is, that party is unfamiliar with the documents its opponent has, or had, in its power, possession or procurement. The makers of the rule in Statutory Instrument 233 of 1999 elided this difficulty, by equating an assumed knowledge of classes of documents with knowledge of the documents themselves. The party seeking discovery must specify the documents it wants discovered by reference to classes of documents, and justify this request by relating the class to the issues in the action.

The consequence of this is a mess. “Classes of documents” is an abstraction. It is next to impossible, in most cases, to justify a request for discovery by reference to some general description of documents. More importantly, it conceals another departure from the previous practice and procedure on discovery; relevance as a standard has been abandoned.

The new standard is knowledge or lucky guesswork.

Knowledge of the opponent’s documents is rare and nothing is then left but guesswork. Consequently, requests for discovery are easily dismissed and denigrated for what they are – guesswork.

There seems to be no end to the debt of gratitude the Irish (and now, the English) legal profession owe to the managing director of Ryanair.

He has clarified the words of a suitable jurisdiction clause on websites to confer jurisdiction within the EU. See HERE for how he did it. (This writer has adapted those words below to accommodate his purposes and intentions. Feel free to appropriate the clause without attribution, but on terms of repudiation of liability by this writer for such use).

He, (we are now back talking about the managing director; (see what happens when you eschew words like “aforesaid”)) has promoted (indirectly) the use of interrogatories in Irish practice and procedure.

He has generated legal work for members of the profession (with more to come in England).

These are not insignificant benefits. Why is the Chairman of the Bar Council silent in the presence of such merit?

The words:

Disputes arising from the use of this website and the interpretation of these Terms of Use of the McGarr Solicitors website are governed by Irish Law. All disputes relating to these Term of Use and the use of the McGarr Solicitors Website are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Ireland.”

Something new HERE and further evidence of deficiency in my legal education.

However, I look forward to the case where I inform a court that my client will so plead.

Ireland has nominal provision for multi-party litigation. Order 15, rule 9 of the Rules of the Superior Courts states:

9. Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one cause or matter, one or more of such persons may sue or be sued, or may be authorised by the Court to defend, in such cause or matter, on behalf, or for the benefit, of all persons so interested.

This has been interpreted restrictively and is little used.

Generally, as an alternative, “test cases” are pursued, one case being chosen to determine the issue of liability and thereafter cases are fought on the issue of quantum of compensation.

There is, in Ireland, a notion that it is the function of the Courts to avoid a “breach of the floodgates�?, an idea at considerable odds with the doctrine of the separation of powers.

Nevertheless, the Irish Law Reform Commission published, in 2005, a report on the subject recommending the introduction of Rules permitting the commencement of class actions and regulating their conduct.

There can be problems with class actions but in a small jurisdiction like Ireland these could be minimised.

The Bridewell, originally uploaded by Editor_Tupp.

1. The title phrase (Fiat Justitia Ruat Caelum: “let justice be done, though the heavens fall”). is incised in the stone above the entrance to the Bridewell police station in Chancery Street, behind the Four Courts. This has the appearance of an error; the District Court adjoins the police station (they are connected by an underground passageway to securely transfer prisoners from one to the other) and the phrase, logically, belongs on the court rather than the station.

2. The notion of bringing the powerful low and shaking the foundations of the State in the High Court, let alone in the District Court behind it, sits uneasily with the current State view of the modern law of Judicial Review as embodied in Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.

3. Judicial Review is a concept arising in “public law issues” or “proceedings”.

4. Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts defines the Judicial Review procedure in the High Court. Under the rule and the case law, an applicant is obliged to move very fast and seek the assistance of the Court as soon as possible.

5. Consequently, where the applicant has not done so, the Respondent (the State) very often seeks to rely on delay to preclude the raising of “public law issues”. The ostensible basis for these submissions is the alleged overriding necessity for certainty and stability in the deployment of administrative decisions. The attack normally takes the form of a request for a trial of a preliminary issue on a point of law before the applicant is permitted to address the factual basis for his or her case.

6. Occasionally, where the applicant has been granted leave to take Judicial Review proceedings the Respondent has appealed the decision. The Supreme Court in Gordon v Director of Public Prosecutions (([2003] 1 ILRM 81)) settled the question of the burden of proof on such applications as being heavier than the burden already discharged by the Applicant, namely to make an arguable case; on an application to have leave set aside, the standard is to demonstrate that leave should never have been granted, “a negative proposition”

7. Delay has not always been seen as a relevant issue. In State (Furey) v. The Minister for Defence (([1988] ILRM 89)). McCarthy J, stated

“Further, I see no logical reason why delay, however long, should of itself disentitle the certiorari applicant for that remedy who can demonstrate that a public wrong has been done to him – that, for instance, a conviction was obtained without jurisdiction, or that, otherwise, the State has wronged him and that that wrong has continued to mar or mark his life”.

(more…)

1. Are Pleadings public documents?

Answer:
No, in the sense that the public do not have a right of access to Pleadings.

2. Do the parties in the litigation have a right to make Pleadings public?

Answer:
Yes, subject to the necessity for care. Firstly, Pleadings contain allegations or assertions. Court proceedings are presumed to culminate in the production of evidence by a party to support the allegations contained within the Pleadings. The publication of claims of wrongdoing in a private dispute, subsequently unsubstantiated, would clearly be questionable. Indeed, publication of such claims would be a separate actionable wrong by the publisher.

3. Apart from reputation are there any other interests requiring protection?

Answer:
Yes. The administration of justice on occasion may need protection. Actions likely to interfere with the due administration of justice are undesirable and wrongful. In Ireland, it is settled law that the publication of extraneous matter or references before or during the course of a criminal trial, not being reportage of events occurring in the court room can be adjudicated a contempt of court.

4. Are there countervailing issues showing merit in the publication of Pleadings?

Answer:
Yes. In Ireland, with very, very rare exceptions, justice must be dispensed in public. However, oral transactions in court are often, in fact normally, impenetrable to members of the public or the press and the principle of public justice is not in fact observed. Recently the practice of the High court of reading its judgments in open court has been curtailed and the written judgment is handed out to the parties. This makes it more difficult for the press and the public to follow events.

5. Does the Irish High Court hold possession of Pleadings?

Answer:
No, the practice has changed. Nowadays the court office only receives the initiating document or summons. Subsequent pleadings are exchanged between the parties. This change is relatively recent. From the establishment of the court all pleadings were filed in the court office. These pleadings were emphatically not public documents. The public had no access to them with one exception. Members of one branch of the legal profession were permitted access to files regardless of whether they had a role in the dispute between the parties. This exception existed to facilitate the dissemination of legal drafting precedents to the legal profession. However, the privilege was confined to barristers and was denied to solicitors.

6. Is the High Court confined to adjudicating on private disputes?

Answer:
No. A substantial jurisdiction is vested in the court to adjudicate on public law issues, usually in the form of applications for “judicial review�?. Wrongdoing or legal mistakes or maladministration can be brought before the High Court to be remedied. By definition, at least one of the parties to these disputes is a public body. Public bodies are accountable to the public in one way or another and issues relating to their functions are public business and the public have an interest in their outcome. They also have, of necessity, a right to see the issues as set out in the pleadings in order to understand the case.

7. Is an issue involving European Union law a special case?

Answer:
Yes. The European Court of Justice publishes a summary of the pleadings of the parties on the web. The pleading of any dispute turning on EU law should also be published.

Following consultation with our clients Digital Rights Ireland Limited, we are now making available the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim in the case of Digital Rights Ireland Limited v The Minister for Justice and Law Reform, The Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and The Garda Commissioner in pdf format.

We have also added a link to the Statement of Claim to the previous list of pleadings in this case.