England and Wales have taken strange roads in the administration of justice, so it pays to keep an eye on the legal profession there.

What a pleasure then to discover from the new Chairman of the Bar Council [there], in his inaugural address [see it HERE] that, of former Chairmen;

Some were extraordinarily efficient at chairing meetings; some made a point of sending e-mails at 4.30a.m; some were international class gourmands; others had a wonderful oratorical facility.

Are the barristers bonkers? Did they know of the predilection to 4.30 a.m. emails and still vote for that guy? Did they think the gourmand was even going to give them tips on how to get a piece of that lifestyle?

Of course, he may well have done just that, in which case, bring him back!

It is surprising how often the willfulness of lawyers or litigants drives litigation, rather than evidence. We see an instance of this in the “theory” that William Shakespeare did not write the “Shakespearean canon” and that the plays and poems were written by, among others, Francis Bacon. This theory was first advanced by Delia Bacon in a book published in 1857.

The essential element of the book, in explaining its success, was prolixity. A work is prolix if it is too long. It is a general human failing to think that there must be substance to something if it can be written about at length.

At any length, Ms. Bacon’s book was too long.

In this vein, some solicitors and some barristers stand out for an inability to produce short affidavits. They talk all around the problem, avoiding the terms in which the opponent has defined the issues. This may be very good in principle, but it is tiresome in practice and oppressive when the prolix affidavit is sworn in the cause of big institutions, for, in truth, this is a feature of struggles with big institutions; they try to talk the problem away.

In the public service strike, the courts stopped work on Tuesday the 6th of November 2009. This is of less interest than the stoppage of the previous Friday. The judges of the superior courts went to school that day and, of necessity, ceased working. Why was this interesting fact not reported by the media? More importantly, why do we not know the subject of the lessons of the day?

We owe great debts to Montesquieu but he over-egged the pudding when he asserted the primacy of the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. The Executive power will not countenance, and never has, full judicial independence.

Consequently, it is naïve to think a court is not an agent for the application of Government policy, as expressed in law (and sometimes not so expressed).

This may not be the context for the judges’ lessons, but we can hardly think they need refreshers on whether Ms. Donohoe should have won in Donohue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.

Perhaps they needed a good talking to about the imperative to front-load legal costs on uppity Plaintiffs seeking injunctions?

Or why proposals to re-introduce the death penalty into Ireland ought to be seriously addressed, to distract from current political difficulties?

Or why the current chaos in the Irish legal system, that is the provision of discovery of documents, should persist?

Of course, the lessons may not address these things at all. They may be perfectly standard “continuous professional development” stuff, consisting of a review of recent case law on some theme, say, Tort law.

Either way, it behooves the media to at least ask what is taught at Judge school. It might tell us something about Ireland we need to know, and God knows, we know very little.

The King’s Inns is the only Inn of Court in Ireland. The UK has four; Middle Temple, Inner Temple, Lincoln’s Inn, and Gray’s Inn.

In the King’s Inns the students and Benchers of the Inns eat dinner in the Great Hall of the Inns during term time. Each student diner is supplied with beer and half a bottle of wine (or port). Each Bencher diner is also supplied with those drinks, and brandy or whiskey. In Ireland, every judge of the superior courts is a Bencher of the King’s Inns. In the King’s Inns the last Thursday of each term is “Grand Night”.

The drinks allocation is doubled on “Grand Night”.

The ostensible purpose of the dinners is to follow the tradition by which education was imparted to new barristers; they learned what was what by eating, and conversing, with the practising barristers.

Nowadays, they probably confine themselves to conversation about how bad the Government is, or how fortunate Ireland is to avoid the US experience with the use of the death penalty, as reported HERE by the Guardian.

Of course, by the end of a Grand Night, they may be discussing how good the Cabinet is, (especially the Minister for Finance who is qualified as a barrister) and how the Guardian is not a quality newspaper.

Britain and Ireland have similar, but different, legal systems. In Britain it is permitted for solicitors and barristers to agree to act for no, or a reduced, fee, conditional on being entitled, on winning the case, to charge the client (and a losing opponent) an enhanced fee (one larger than the norm). This is known as “a conditional fee agreement” (CFA).

This is not possible in Ireland.

In Britain, these CFA arrangements are most common in personal injury claims. In Ireland the principal law applicable to such claims and the terms to be agreed between solicitors and clients is S.I. No. 518/2002 — The Solicitors Acts, 1954 To 2002 Solicitors (Advertising) Regulations, 2002

Under the Regulations it is illegal for a solicitor to advertise “No win, no Fee”. Solicitors are not permitted to calculate their fees by reference to a percentage of the compensation recovered for the client. (Or as the Regulations put it, “In contentious business, a solicitor may not calculate fees or other charges as a percentage or proportion of any award or settlement”.

Furthermore, not only are solicitors subject to the foregoing restrictions but are also restricted from offering “legal services involving contentious business… at no cost or reduced cost to the client”

Indeed, it is the obligation of a solicitor to give an estimate of the costs of the legal services to the client in writing, at the commencement of the engagement.

Finally, the Regulations provide, inter alia, advertisements shall not “be published in an inappropriate location”.

(We know for sure that the back of a bus is an inappropriate location).

Contrary to conventional thinking, the critical conversation is, often, not the conversation of the client with his/her solicitor, but the conversation of the solicitor with an expert.

This is definitely the case in medical negligence actions.

The issue in a medical negligence action is whether the defendant deviated from approved or appropriate practice. It is an error, usually, to think that the plaintiff will succeed if he/she proves that there would have been no injury had the defendant followed a different course of action. (The exceptional case where it would not be an error would be one where the court was persuaded that the conventional practice carried such obvious defects that it was indefensible and where the court effectively condemns the defendant and the practice.)

Thus, in the conversation with the expert, the solicitor is assessing the likelihood of the success of a defence claiming conventional merit for the defendant’s actions.

Incidentally, the solicitor is also assessing the quality of the expert.

Sometimes the quality of an expert shines out.

Former Supreme Court judge Donal Barrington, for instance, has seriously misled the general public (some) of the quality of our judges following his appearance on Nightly News with Vincent Browne. They have assumed that all our judges are of his high quality.

Would that it were so.

Often, in the conversation between the solicitor and the expert, the expert is not aware of any body of opinion supporting the defendant’s actions. This implies a criticism either of the expert or of the defendant.

It is the solicitor’s job to correctly judge whether the expert or the defendant is wrong.

For solicitors in Ireland income from conveyancing has “fallen off a cliff”. Solicitors practicing in that area were very likely to have taken an investment share in some development or other. (There is a marketing opportunity here for tee-shirts; “the devil made me …..” (insert suitable words)).

For some, the black hole of bankruptcy may loom. (A bankrupt may not practice as a solicitor in Ireland). That aside, these entrepreneurs can hold their heads high; after all, Ireland itself has too much debt.

They cannot, however, flee to New York to practice law. They appear very strict on debt levels for lawyers there.

Mr. Robert Bowman was assessed by a committee of New York lawyers on his application for admission to the New York bar. He passed with flying colours.

His creditor, it seems, was not so happy. Mr. Bowman had a heavy student loan outstanding. In the way of creditors (some) they did the counter-intuitive thing; they appealed the committee’s decision, successfully.

Five judges thought he was unworthy to practice law. As George V. Higgins has remarked; “ … a judge is a guy who used to be a lawyer”.

So, the former lawyers may just possibly have done Mr. Bowman a favour. He has now become a plaintiff, with his creditor as his defendant, and has challenged the judges’ decision.

It appears that he does not, in law or otherwise, owe all the sums claimed by the creditor. The creditor has, it appears, “churned” the debt, doubling it in size over just two years.

Mr. Bowman has appeared, photographed, in “the New York Times” with a complimentary CV attached.

Lucky breaks arrive in strange circumstances.

In the UK they purportedly reformed the system of civil justice with the Woolf Report. There is some reason to doubt this.

Now, a debate has started, questioning the complacent view that the reforms were successful.

The debate has the unseemly presence of Lord Woolf in it. It is unseemly for him to “defend” his “reforms”. The subject is too important to be tainted by an effort to defend a personal investment.

However, the debate is a salutary reminder of how far behind we in Ireland are. The UK has a debate; we have nothing.

Instead, we still have a Rules Committee that had to be restrained by the Oireachtas from compelling barristers to wear wigs and that coolly front-loads the costs of litigation on litigants; all without any input into these “ideas” from the profession.

This blog has previously referred to the wearing of wigs by barristers. Until fairly recently the wearing of a wig by a barrister was compulsory under the Rules of the Superior Courts. (The Rules are law [well, a kind of law] and are made by the Rules Committee. Its membership is chosen, it would appear, to be representative of some of the various “interests” in the legal system).

Currently, it is obligatory on judges of the superior courts to likewise wear wigs.

As an issue this is simply not open to debate. The wearing of wigs is required because that’s the way it is.

Situations like this can be explained, but not by seeking opinions to explain the reasons for the situation. Instead we have to look to psychology.

The real purpose is to assert wordlessly, the finality of rational adjudication from the judge. That is, it is intended to define rationality by reference to the wig; rationality emanates from the wig. Without it, there is doubt and possibly confusion.

In 1973 David Rosenhan and some colleagues demonstrated that “sane” and “insane” were social constructs.

Likewise, in the field of law, the “plaintiff”, the “defendant” and the “judge” are social constructs.

This very dangerous [from one point of view] for the judge.

Leo Tolstoy has remarked:

The most difficult subjects can be explained to the most slow-witted man if he has not formed any idea of them already; but the simplest thing cannot be made clear to the most intelligent man if he is firmly persuaded that he knows already, without a shadow of doubt, what is laid before him.”

There must, in short, be mechanisms to cut short the revelation of alternative, including superior, expositions of reality.

The judicial wig is one of those mechanisms.

Legal practitioners easily forget how arcane it is to do what they do. When the time comes they recognise one thing; giving evidence is intimidating.

It is intimidating even if the advocate asking them questions is inept and persists in making mistakes of various kinds (it happens).

Those mistakes may arise out of ignorance of the law of evidence and/or the necessary procedures to conform to that law.

Normally, the evidence for the Plaintiff is presented to the court first. The reason for this is that the burden of proof lies on the Plaintiff; he/she it is who is making allegations about the Defendant. The case is about those allegations, nothing else; (except where there is a counterclaim).

When all the evidence (from witnesses or otherwise) of the Plaintiff has been presented to the court, the Defendant will call his/her witnesses to rebut that evidence of the Plaintiff. That is, this will happen assuming the Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. A prima facie case is one which, in the absence of rebuttal evidence from the Defendant, will entitle the Plaintiff to a verdict.

When a party calls a witness to give evidence, the advocate for that party is not permitted to “lead” the witness. That means that the questions put to the witness should not suggest the answer. Such questions are called “leading questions”. As a rough (but mistaken) rule of thumb, if the answer to the question is “yes” or “no”, the question is a leading question.

In practice, some leading questions are permitted. They are very useful to introduce non-controversial facts about the witness, for instance.

The examination of a witness by the advocate calling that witness is called “examination in chief”. It is more difficult to do this than it is to “cross-examine”. What the advocate must avoid doing, is to give the evidence himself/herself. A leading question has this effect; it suggests to the witness the evidence he/she should give.

Consequently, some witnesses struggle to answer questions in examination in chief, because they are surprised by the circumspect character of the questions. They come to life during the “cross-examination”.

“Cross-examination” is the process whereby the advocate for a party asks questions of the witness called by the other party. That advocate is not restrained in the form of the questions asked; leading questions are permitted. (Cross-examination is not bullying; bullying is not permitted).

To say that an advocate may ask leading questions is not to suggest that that, or any advocate, is completely free in the questions asked. Only relevant evidence is admissible in a trial; irrelevant evidence is inadmissible, therefore questions about irrelevancies are not permitted.

It is the job of the opposing advocate to ask the judge to disallow such questions. (Unless it is thought better to leave the opponent to drown in those irrelevancies).

Furthermore, it is the job of the Defendant’s advocate to, in due course, in cross-examination, give the Plaintiff’s witnesses an opportunity to comment on the case which the Defendant’s witness or witnesses will say in relation to the matters testified to by the Plaintiff’s witnesses. (The penalty for the Defendant if this does not happen can be severe).

When cross examination is finished the advocate who called the witness has a chance to ask further questions of the witness, but only to address new matters arising from cross-examination and requiring clarification.

The trial will proceed in this fashion with each witness being called and asked questions, first in examination in chief, then in cross-examination and then, maybe, in re-examination. Then the next witness is called.

The reason why cross-examination is so prominent in the mind of a witness is that the major purpose of those questions is to undermine the evidence given by the witness. This is not to say that that process will be successful; often it is not. In fact, cross-examination may “free” the witness to address the evidence again and deliver it more cogently and persuasively than first time around.