We hope our doctors are thoughtful, attentive and kind, but we also expect them to be competent, ie, rational. That’s why we expect them to seek the facts. Before you seek the facts you need to know what facts you are seeking. That applies to the legal industry as much as to the medical profession.

The practice of law is much more a collective effort than medicine is. It cleaves more to convention than medicine does, say.

This writer was in High Court 2 in the Round Hall of the Four Courts a few days ago. The Personal Injuries list was called over. It was a very long list. It featured those personal injuries actions which had now reached their hearing date and in which the parties had arrived in court for trial. But they did not get their trial, most of them. They were, metaphorically, in a traffic jam. Cases were still in the list and being called over that had first appeared a week before; that meant the parties and their witnesses (potentially, if not actually) had been returning again and again to the Four Courts seeking a trial and had been failed again and again. Each succeeding day brought a new cohort of cases into the list. They too, failed to get a hearing and would have to come back the next day, and the next day and so on.

The judge struggled to express what everybody was feeling; that it was time to consider abandoning ship, metaphorically, and cancel the list. But he would not do it, unless the Counsel asked him. He then resiled from this, to laughter, saying it was not a matter where they had a vote.

But of course, they do and should. The courts system would not function without the lawyers. However, the forensic traffic jam was a symptom of another problem; a cumulative failure to settle the cases.

Taking a benign view of politics, this is the kind of problem that prompts Ministers for Justice to commission a Report from the likes of The Committee on Court Practice and Procedure. See the PDF of the Committee’s 29^th Report (dated 2004) HERE- [DOC] CCPP 29th Report - Courts Service

In that Report the Committee remarked;

“At present a very small proportion of personal injuries cases go to trial. However, litigants have the right of access to the courts and the process available should be the dispensing of justice in a speedy, efficient and effective manner.”

And again;

“It… [personal injuries litigation]… is a small proportion of the High Court work. High Court judges are required to hear cases in lists on Personal Injuries, Bail, Bankruptcy, Chancery, Commercial, Common Law Motions Circuit Court Appeals, Family Law, Garda Compensation, Judicial Review, Probate, Proceeds of Crime Act, Asylum, Admiralty, Solicitors Act, Medical Council, Nursing Council, Dental Council, Extradition, European Arrest Warrants, The Hague Convention, The Luxembourg Convention and Crime.”

The Committee failed, among other failures, to look at the implications of the sentence “At present a very small proportion of personal injuries cases go to trial.” The statement is accurate and the credit belongs to the two branches of the legal profession, but those settled cases were not investigated by the Committee. The Committee was to “…examine all aspects of practice and procedure relating to personal injuries litigation and consider whether the present system of practice and pleadings is appropriate to modern personal injuries litigation.”

Surely the criterion of the success or failure of a practice or procedure is that it assist in the process of settlement? If the Committee did not investigate what was good and working in the then current system, how could they be said to have considered “modern personal injuries litigation”. (What is that?)

Then there was the note of regret; “However, litigants have the right of access to the courts…” and the recitation of the various lists, clearly addressed to lay ears. Those lists are not equivalent to each other and some generate vastly more work than others or, conversely, some generate little work.

What is notable is that Reports like this (particularly this one) depart from “initial conditions”. Here, the Minister defined the initial conditions. The Report then recites the then current practices. What is absent is evidence that the Minister’s conditions are pertinent to some real problem or that the current practices are seriously deficient.

We know that the practices and procedures were changed subsequent to the Report.

Now the Personal Injuries List is breaking down.

Don’t expect expressions of regret from any participants, or admissions that the changes for which the Minister was responsible have led to this.

However, even civil proceedings following a road traffic accident will generate pleadings criticising the defendant. They, too, may imply a moral failure on the part of the defendant, or, just as pertinently, may be construed as doing so.

Construction may be everything; if the object of criticism thinks the criticism may lower him/her in the estimation of right-thinking members of the community he/she may sue for defamation. Absolute privilege is a defence to a defamation action and, under Section 17 (2) (i) of the Defamation Act 2009, attaches to reports published of proceedings before the Irish courts whether in the Republic or in Northern Ireland. The Section reads;

“…it shall be a defence to a defamation action for the defendant to prove that the statement in respect of which the action was brought was…… a fair and accurate report of proceedings publicly heard before, or decision made public by, any court-….”

To avail of this provision, the proceedings must have been held in public. This means that, for instance, the content of pleadings or an affidavit not opened in court will not be covered by the provision. (The writers of such pleadings or affidavits are protected, with absolute privilege, under Section 17 (2) (g) of the Defamation Act 2009).

The reporters of those pleadings or affidavits, if they are not made public in the court proceedings (i.e. not opened in court) are protected by qualified privilege under Section 18 of the Defamation Act 2009.

What if the judge, for instance, mutters “…I’ve read the affidavit…” and moves on? Has it been opened? Is it reportable?

That is a current issue in the UK.

HERE is the legal submission, in skeleton form, of the Guardian newspaper on the entitlement of the newspaper to have access to the papers upon which the [UK criminal] Courts are making or going to make their judgments.

See HERE for a statement relevant to this question in an Irish context.

So, before you can publish “a fair and accurate report” you must access the material. There is no right of access, under the Freedom of Information Acts, to Irish court records. In the High Court the records are under the control of the President of the High Court and in the Circuit Court under the control of the President of the Circuit Court.

Currently, in the High Court, civil pleadings are no longer filed in the Court. They are simply exchanged between the litigants and, later, a booklet of pleadings is delivered to the Court to facilitate the hearing of the action.

All of this is in considerable contrast to US courts. There, the general public has access to the court records. Indeed, they are often published on the internet by the court authorities. This is essential, for instance, in relation to a class action. There, the general public must be able to understand the issues to know whether to subscribe to the proceedings as an injured claimant.

When will Ireland catch up with the UK, not to speak of the US?

From an evidential point of view this is equivalent to looking at the murder weapon in a criminal trial, or looking at a large machine which cannot be brought to court with convenience.

It is normal for the parties to the dispute to be given the opportunity to accompany the judge (or the jury, as the case may be) with legal advisors in the “viewing” by the finder of fact.

The reason for this is to ensure the adoption of fair procedures and to preclude the possibility of some novel (and irrelevant) element, unseen and unknown by, and to, the parties colouring the judge’s perception and opinion.

The inspector found that, Mr. Jim Flavin, having received legal advice, broke the law as to insider dealing, but, in the light of the advice, did so inadvertently.

Oddly, the judge who appointed the inspector to conduct the investigation said, in making the appointment:

The earlier proceedings were concerned only with the civil law and did not have to address culpability or responsibility of persons who may have advised or planned the transactions.”

How did that interesting idea fall by the wayside, as it appears to have done?

In the King’s Inns the students and Benchers of the Inns eat dinner in the Great Hall of the Inns during term time. Each student diner is supplied with beer and half a bottle of wine (or port). Each Bencher diner is also supplied with those drinks, and brandy or whiskey. In Ireland, every judge of the superior courts is a Bencher of the King’s Inns. In the King’s Inns the last Thursday of each term is “Grand Night”.

The drinks allocation is doubled on “Grand Night”.

The ostensible purpose of the dinners is to follow the tradition by which education was imparted to new barristers; they learned what was what by eating, and conversing, with the practising barristers.

Nowadays, they probably confine themselves to conversation about how bad the Government is, or how fortunate Ireland is to avoid the US experience with the use of the death penalty, as reported HERE by the Guardian.

Of course, by the end of a Grand Night, they may be discussing how good the Cabinet is, (especially the Minister for Finance who is qualified as a barrister) and how the Guardian is not a quality newspaper.

Good luck to them.

It’s a pity they don’t seem to have done the same for parties to litigation.

Given that they are close to the persons who make up the Rules Committee of the Superior Courts, they will be unlikely, currently or in the future, to direct any criticism or complaint at the work of the Committee.

The Rules determine what the experience of going to court will be like.

The Committee, in effect, makes the Rules of the Superior Courts; the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform has a nominal role but he, I venture, is busy elsewhere when the Rules get changed. (I could be wrong; perhaps it is a State secret, and the Committee does the bidding of the Minister).

In any event, the Courts Service will not be looking askance at any practice or procedure under the Rules.

The Committee is one example of bodies that, in effect, make and promulgate law. The Rules are published in the form of Statutory Instruments. Statutory Instruments are generally seen as “secondary legislation”. “Primary legislation” is to be found in the Acts of the Oireachtas. The Acts often make provision for detailed regulations to be made, “fleshing out” the bones of the particular Act. To be lawful the “regulations” must not go beyond the terms of the Act; they must express the “policies and purposes” of the Act.

The reason for this lies in the Constitution. Only the Oireachtas has the power to make law. Nevertheless, there are on occasion instances where “secondary legislation” is in fact “primary legislation”. Regulations made under the European Communities Act 1972 (as amended) have this status.

Most “secondary legislation” takes the form of a statutory instrument.

The European Communities Act 1972 aside, “ordinary” statutory instruments become law after, notionally, having been laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas.

This is an antiquated procedure to give the validity or endorsement of the Oireachtas to the instrument. Given the fact that the Executive dominates the Oireachtas with regard to primary legislation, the idea that the Oireachtas might even notice the statutory instrument being “laid” is a delusion.

Consequently, a vast body of law is promulgated every year and is open to challenge, in effect, only by Judicial Review proceedings in court.

FLAC has just issued a condemnation of the fact that, in Ireland, access to justice is denied many due to lack of resources. Free legal aid is available only to a limited number of people and for a limited number of issues.

Challenging the State in Judicial Review (particularly the Rules Committee of the Superior Courts) is definitely, practically, off that list of issues.

But it would be hard to beat the title of the book – “Represent Yourself in Court and Win!”, for an unhelpful and irritating phrase.

How would “Yourself” fare in People (DPP) v Cleary [2005] IECCA 51 where the Court of Criminal Appeal remarked;

There were a number of unusual features of the trial.”

The essence of the case against Mr. Cleary turned on two factors; first, the failure of the prosecution to prove certain elements of secondary legislation. Secondary legislation usually takes of the form of a Statutory Instrument. Unlike primary legislation, (Acts of the Oireachtas), judicial notice is not taken of Statutory Instruments. They must be proved, either by being produced to the court in the form as published in Iris Oifigiuil or by production of a copy as published by the Stationery Office.

The second factor was the taking of Mr. Cleary’s fingerprints by the Garda Siochana.

Apparently, the Gardai found a bag with what appeared to be an illegal drug in it. They waited nearby and arrested Mr. Cleary when he appeared. It was alleged that his fingerprint was found inside the lid of the box, holding the drug, which itself was in the bag.

On arrest, the Gardai took his fingerprints with his consent. (He was not obliged to consent. If he did not, only a Garda of the rank of Superintendent or above could oblige him to furnish the fingerprints.)

The Court of Criminal Appeal quashed the 2nd charge in the Indictment because of the failure to prove the secondary legislation. The 2nd charge (possession with intent to supply) was the more serious of the two charges.

The Court affirmed the conviction on the 1st charge, brushing aside the objection of defence counsel that Mr. Cleary’s consent to having his fingerprints taken was not an “informed consent”; (he was not told that the evidence could be used against him, thus, possibly, provoking a refusal to allow the taking of the fingerprints).

What amenable person from rural Ireland could possibly know how to prove secondary legislation in a trial?

Is there merit in book-burning after all?

She suffers from cerebral palsy after the alleged mismanagement of her birth.

The proceedings were taken by Emma Duddy of Letterkenny, County Donegal, represented by McGarr Solicitors, against the North Western Health Board, the former owners of Letterkenny General Hospital and Mr. Davidson, the obstetrician. Her mother Adrienne acted as her “next friend”.

Her mother went into hospital in Letterkenny in 1995 for the birth of Emma. The court heard allegations that the labour and birth were mismanaged.

The defendant was sued for negligence and breach of duty, including statutory duty, which the Plaintiff said, through her parents Adrienne and John, led to her severe disability.

No admission of liability was made by the hospital or Mr. Davidson and the action against Mr. Davidson was struck out as part of the settlement.

BETWEEN:

SHELL E & P IRELAND LIMITED

Plaintiff

And

PHILIP MCGRATH, JAMES PHILBIN, WILLIE CORDUFF,
MONICA MULLER, BRID MCGARRY, PETER SWEETMAN

Defendants

And

THE MINISTER FOR COMMUNICATIONS MARINE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Defendants to the counterclaim of second and fifth defendants

Update (20th November 2008)

1. On 18th and 19th November 2008, Judge Laffoy heard the application, on motion, of the State to determine as a preliminary issue whether the 2nd and 5th Defendants are precluded from raising “public law issues”.

2. McGarr Solicitors act for Brendan Philbin and Brid McGarry, the 2nd and 5th Defendants. Their counsel are Lord Dan Brennan QC and Mark Dunne BL. The Chief State Solicitor acts for the Minister, Ireland and the AG. Their Counsel are James Connolly SC and Charles Meenan SC. Eugene F Collins act for SEPIL. Its counsel are Patrick Hanratty SC and Declan McGrath BL.

3. The proceedings commenced in April 2005, when Shell E & P Ireland Ltd. (“SEPIL”), issued plenary summons proceedings against the defendants. Mr. Philbin was committed to prison for 3 months, effectively, on the application of SEPIL on the grounds that he had breached an injunction restraining him from preventing SEPIL from entering his land.

4. In the events that have happened, SEPIL applied for and received the leave of the court to discontinue its claims against the defendants. This happened after SEPIL had received the defences of the defendants and the 2nd and 5th Defendants had counterclaimed against SEPIL and successfully joined the Minister and Ireland and the AG as further defendants to the counterclaim. SEPIL’s discontinuance did not end the counterclaim. The counterclaim is substantial. As against the Minister, Ireland and the AG it claims that certain Compulsory Acquisition Orders made by the Minister regarding the land of the defendants are invalid. It also claims that a consent allegedly made by the Minister in favour of SEPIL, to construct a pipeline over the defendants’ land is invalid.

5. The Minister, Ireland and the AG assert that these are “public law issues”. They assert that issues like these can be challenged only under the procedure set out in Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. They assert that, that being so, those claims of the defendants are late. They assert that the claims, to be admissible, should have been made within the time limits of 3 or 6 months (at most) after the making of the CAOs and the consent.

6. The defendants deny they are confined by the provisions of Order 84 and/or its “time limits”. They say that Order 84 is not an exclusive procedure; that it cannot be used to shut out the hearing of claims against the State where the State has wronged citizens, particularly with regard to the private property of the citizen. They say, consequently, that the counterclaim should proceed to a full hearing on its merits.

7. Judgment has been reserved.