Legitimate Copyright Protection in Ireland: not SOPA – Sherlock
We all subscribe to the freedoms, the opportunities and the access to information that the Internet provides us with. Ireland is home to some of the world’s most innovative internet companies and we are determined to grow our reputation as a location where smart people and these smart companies can continue to innovate in this fast moving arena.
The last thing innovators need is a culture where the outputs of their creative endeavours have to be locked away or kept secret for the fear of theft. Ireland is very proud of the fact that we have a modern suite of intellectual property laws that by their very nature balance a range of competing interests and rights in a manner that is seen, right across the globe, as reasonable and proportionate.
Going right back to 22 December , 2002, the date by which every EU Member State had to have implemented Directive 2001/29/EC, every EU country has had to “ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by third parties to infringe a copyright or related right”. Having that provision enshrined in EU law and the laws of Member States for a decade has not restricted the development of the Internet or innovative internet companies. On the contrary, the Internet has flourished.
It may be useful to explain the background against which the requirement for the amendment to the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 has arisen. In the EMI & others versus UPC High Court judgment of 11 October 2010, Mr Justice Charleton decided that he was constrained by the wording of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 and thus could not grant an injunction to prevent infringement of copyright against an information service provider (ISP) in the circumstances of “mere conduit” (transient communications). In doing so, he stated that Ireland had not fully transposed the relevant EU Directive(s). As you will appreciate, non-compliance with EU law is a very serious matter.
The “Mere conduit” principle provides that if an ISP does not initiate a transmission, or modify the material contained in a transmission and does not select the receiver of the transmission, it is granted a “safe harbour” against liability, by virtue of the e-Commerce Directive [2000/31/EC]. However, according to the same directive, this freedom from liability does not affect the power of the courts to require service providers to terminate or prevent copyright infringements.

As far as can be ascertained from the judgment (the State was not a party to the case), the type of injunction sought was to require UPC to prevent infringement of the record companies’ sound recording copyright, through its internet “peer-to-peer” services, possibly involving a “three strikes and you’re out” scenario. This is where the ISP sends three warnings of increasing severity and if the infringement continues, discontinues access to the Internet. It is sometimes referred to as a “graduated response”. I understand that blocking access to infringing online sites may also have been sought.

Two EU directives (the Copyright Directive 2001 and the Enforcement Directive 2004) require that the holders of copyright – authors, music composers, lyricists, record producers etc. – are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right.

The Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation had considered that injunctions were available under Section 40 (4) of the Copyright Act and the inherent power of the courts to grant injunctions, which are equitable and discretionary remedies, granted according to settled principles, developed by the courts. However, this was not Mr Justice Charleton’s view. The record companies did not appeal the High Court decision and, consequently, the State has not had an opportunity to put forward its views on the legal principles involved nor on the construal of the relevant sub-sections of the Act, which we feel were not fully explored in the judgment.

The Attorney General’s Office was then asked (both by this Department and Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources) for its advice as to the implications of the High Court judgement. The prudent course, he advised, would be to introduce a Regulation to ensure compliance. After consultations with the Attorney General’s Office and the Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources, this Department launched a public consultation on the text of the proposed Statutory Instrument. The consultation attracted over 50 submissions from interested parties. For the avoidance of doubt, the Government has decided to introduce a Statutory Instrument to restate the position that was considered to exist prior to this judgment.

Concerns have been expressed that the proposed Statutory Instrument mirrors the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in the United States. These concerns are not based on fact. The purpose of the Statutory Instrument is simply to provide explicitly that injunctions may be sought, as obligated by the two EU Directives cited above. It should also be noted that such injunctions are available in all other Member States of the European Union by virtue of the two Directives already referred to. In granting such injunctions the courts must take account of Court of Justice of the European Union judgements. These require that a fair balance be struck between the various fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order and the principle of proportionality. That would include, inter alia, the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals who are affected by such measures, the freedom to conduct a business enjoyed by operators such as Internet Service Providers, the protection of private data and right of freedom of expression and information.

In proposing to amend the legislation, I am particularly conscious of the importance of online content and digital businesses in the Irish context and, accordingly, am simply seeking to ensure Ireland’s continued compliance with its obligations under the relevant EU Directives following the decision of the High Court in the aforementioned UPC case.

I trust that this information will clarify the issue.

You may also have noticed the sudden flurry of media appearances and debates on radio around the issue of Minister of State Sean Sherlock’s plan to introduce a law to allow the music labels (and other copyright holders) to seek injunctions forcing Irish ISPs to block access to sites they don’t like.

“I will introduce this imminently, by the end of January.”
- Minister Sherlock, Sunday Business Post, 22^nd Jan 2012

This SOPA Ireland law, as it is is called, is similar to the proposals defeated in the US only a week ago after a mass uprising of grassroots protest- first from Reddit, and then joined by the biggest names on the net- Google, Wikipedia and so on.

However, unlike that US law, people here can’t even expect to have this blocking law debated in their legislature. The Minister has said that he intends to deal with the matter by way of a Ministerial Order. Nor has he published the text of the law. The first we, the people of Ireland, will know about the text of this law will be when it is signed and brought into force.

This is grossly wrong. This is why we were so enthusiastic when Sabrina Dent suggested that we launch a petition website to let other people (a) know what was going to happen and (b) tell the Ministers responsible that they object to the proposal.

That was long, long ago now. Monday morning to be exact. Since then, 30,000 people have emailed the Minister for State Sean Sherlock and Minister Richard Bruton at the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation to tell them they DO NOT WANT.

I, Richard Bruton, Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, in exercise of the powers conferred on me by section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972 (No. 27 of 1972) and for the purpose of giving further effect to Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [1], as amended by Corrigendum[2], hereby make the following Regulations:

- Opening paragraph of the leaked Draft Text of the Ministerial Order

Minister Sherlock has been traveling around the airwaves acting as a recruitment sergeant for the petition by providing worrisome, self contradictory, “reassurances” about what he intends to do.

All in all, so far, our Public Interest Campaign site has facilitated a very successful piece of civic action.

But more will need to be done. Minister Sherlock has said that he intends that Richard Bruton will bring the Ministerial Order to Cabinet.

This is, to put it mildly, unusual.

A Ministerial Order (otherwise known as a Statutory Instrument) is only intended to bring in secondary legislation -ie, tidying up the administrative side of policies and laws already passed through the Oireachtas after proper debate.

On 29^th July 2011, the Minister was put on notice of this difficulty when Digital Rights Ireland (our client) wrote to his Department;

It is significant that Charleton J. in EMI v. UPC [2010] IEHC 377 referred to any legislative intervention being properly a matter for the Oireachtas. The Opinion of the Advocate General in Scarlet (Extended) v. SABAM (Case C-70/10) similarly referred to a need for legislation in this area to be “democratically legitimised” (at para. 113).

It would be undesirable in any event for a matter dealing with fundamental rights to be disposed of by way of secondary legislation. It is all the more undesirable in this case, however, given the vague and open-ended nature of the powers involved. This is, in effect, a case of delegation heaped on delegation – rather than rules governing blocking and other remedies being made by primary legislation, or even secondary legislation, they are instead effectively being made by delegation to the judiciary.

The new plan to bring the matter to cabinet is an admission of the truth of that argument. But a discussion behind closed doors amongst a handful of Ministers is not good enough.

If a matter is so significant, contentious and complicated that it must be debated by Cabinet, by definition, it is not a matter which is suitable to be brought in by Ministerial Order without public debate and without careful scrutiny of the proposed text.

Ministers Bruton and Sherlock must now bring a Bill before the Oireachtas and let the sunlight in. This issue is too important to be left to the murk of backroom deals.

However, even civil proceedings following a road traffic accident will generate pleadings criticising the defendant. They, too, may imply a moral failure on the part of the defendant, or, just as pertinently, may be construed as doing so.

Construction may be everything; if the object of criticism thinks the criticism may lower him/her in the estimation of right-thinking members of the community he/she may sue for defamation. Absolute privilege is a defence to a defamation action and, under Section 17 (2) (i) of the Defamation Act 2009, attaches to reports published of proceedings before the Irish courts whether in the Republic or in Northern Ireland. The Section reads;

“…it shall be a defence to a defamation action for the defendant to prove that the statement in respect of which the action was brought was…… a fair and accurate report of proceedings publicly heard before, or decision made public by, any court-….”

To avail of this provision, the proceedings must have been held in public. This means that, for instance, the content of pleadings or an affidavit not opened in court will not be covered by the provision. (The writers of such pleadings or affidavits are protected, with absolute privilege, under Section 17 (2) (g) of the Defamation Act 2009).

The reporters of those pleadings or affidavits, if they are not made public in the court proceedings (i.e. not opened in court) are protected by qualified privilege under Section 18 of the Defamation Act 2009.

What if the judge, for instance, mutters “…I’ve read the affidavit…” and moves on? Has it been opened? Is it reportable?

That is a current issue in the UK.

HERE is the legal submission, in skeleton form, of the Guardian newspaper on the entitlement of the newspaper to have access to the papers upon which the [UK criminal] Courts are making or going to make their judgments.

See HERE for a statement relevant to this question in an Irish context.

So, before you can publish “a fair and accurate report” you must access the material. There is no right of access, under the Freedom of Information Acts, to Irish court records. In the High Court the records are under the control of the President of the High Court and in the Circuit Court under the control of the President of the Circuit Court.

Currently, in the High Court, civil pleadings are no longer filed in the Court. They are simply exchanged between the litigants and, later, a booklet of pleadings is delivered to the Court to facilitate the hearing of the action.

All of this is in considerable contrast to US courts. There, the general public has access to the court records. Indeed, they are often published on the internet by the court authorities. This is essential, for instance, in relation to a class action. There, the general public must be able to understand the issues to know whether to subscribe to the proceedings as an injured claimant.

When will Ireland catch up with the UK, not to speak of the US?

Counsel: “That’s your opinion, judge”.

Judge: “Yes, it is.”

It was a moment of witless insolence. The judge had rejected Counsel’s submissions; Counsel disparaged the rejection by denigrating it as “opinion”.

He was wrong on many fronts.

(1) When you have lost, you have lost.

(2) When you are in a hole, stop digging.

(3) “Opinion” is all we have.

Plato confronted this issue; he opposed objective knowledge and opinion. Presumably this is the basis for the terms of Section 39 of the Broadcasting Act 2009.

Section 39 (1) (a) provides;

“Every broadcaster shall ensure that- “… all news broadcast by the broadcaster is reported and presented in an objective and impartial manner and without any expression of the broadcaster’s own views.”

This is nonsense.

All “news” is subjective; that is, a matter of, or expression of, opinion. It has been selected; it has been expressed in words or images, which have to be selected.

What is probably being addressed is “style” or, possibly, fairness. In short, a finding of breach should made by a literary critic or an artist, not by a judge.

That implies that the wrongful act of a broadcaster is not the promulgation of “his” opinion, but the suppression of alternative views. This is a difficult problem. There are views that ought not to be expressed, if not suppressed. We see that in the public burning of a Koran in the USA.

Domestically, what is in issue is this: on what possible moral basis does the Oireachtas claim the right to restrict the public expression of opinion?

We see another, less sub rosa instance of this in Section 16 (2) of the Legal Services Ombudsman Act 2009, which states;

“The Legal Services Ombudsman when giving evidence under this section shall not question or express an opinion on the merits of any policy of the Government or on the merits of the objectives of such policy.”

The Ombudsman’s evidence will be like a doughnut; it will have a lot missing.

PS. Judicial restraint is a requirement of the job. See HERE.

The recent apology from the British Government to the victims of the Thalidomide scandal reminds us of what is required when important issues are denied or ignored; quality journalists.

In the UK they had the Sunday Times “Insight” team under Harold Evans. As editor of the Sunday Times, Evans refused to knuckle under in the face of Distillers’ court injunction preventing the newspaper from publishing the truth (to the extent then known) about the cause and history of the dreadful birth defects that had appeared as a result of the use of the Thalidomide drug by women. (Distillers was the distributor of Thalidomide).

(Ironically, given the title to this post, a newspaper of the name “Sunday Times” continued to exist after Harold Evans left it, but it was not what it had been; Rupert Murdoch owned it then).

At the crucial time and on the central issue, openness, the UK courts came down emphatically on the side of Distillers and attempted to impose secrecy.

Here in Ireland, if there were to be a reprise of that struggle we can not be sure that the courts’ response might not be equally inadequate.

The reasons for this are twofold; access to public records is still regularly denied as a consistent Government policy, and, within the court system, access to paper and electronic records is a matter of chance and whim. The Government has not only set the policy of “closed” administration, it has written the legislation to make it legal to refuse access to public records.

The pictures were to some degree, caricatures.

It is a defamation to lower someone in the eyes of right thinking members of society. If the defamation is a picture it is a libel. A libel is the making of statements in permanent form that disparage the plaintiff or tend to bring him into ridicule or contempt.

For a small review of Irish law on defamation see this earlier post HERE.

Mr. Cowen is not a normal person; he is the Taoiseach. As such, he must accept that he is open to comment and attack more than a private person. In short, attacks on him have the benefit of qualified privilege where such attacks, directed towards private persons, would not have that privilege.

What do the pictures say of him?

Possibly the following;

He is a human being;

He is a failure as a politician (he is without cover and “is in the toilet”)

He is not handsome;

He is unashamed of his failings/disadvantages:

These are mild statements to be made of a Taoiseach. They were made before, as appears to be the case, he procured the confiscation of the pictures by the police, including other pictures made by the same artist with a view to prosecuting the artist on public decency (or indecency) grounds.

Now to say that of the Taoiseach is a serious charge. But it is warranted, given the events. In the light of that, the implied comments of the pictures are mild.

They are connected in one respect; a lawyer was at the centre of each event.

Lord Atkin, in the House of Lords, delivered the seminal judgement in Donoghue v Stevenson, and Charles Dawson, a solicitor, “found” the skull of Piltdown Man in an English gravel pit.

Mr. Dawson was a very respectable person, as witnessed by the fact that after his find of Piltdown Man, (officially named “Eoanthropus dawsoni”) critics of the claim that his find were the remains of an early human, were attacked in personal terms.

He allegedly found the remains in 1912. As late as 1938 a memorial was erected at the gravel pit in these terms;

Here in the old river gravel Mr Charles Dawson, FSA found the fossil skull of Piltdown Man, 1912-1913, The discovery was described by Mr Charles Dawson and Sir Arthur Smith Woodward in the Quarterly Journal of the Geological Society 1913-15.”

The memorial was, probably, a desperate last stand of the respectable people. The hoax was fully exposed in 1953 in, inter alia, the “Times”; but the truth had been available since 1923.

Tomis was at the edge of the Roman Empire on the Black Sea, near the mouths of the Danube, a mere 450 miles or so from a bend in the Volga where Stalingrad would later be sited.

Ovid’s trial was held in camera before the Emperor. His ostensible offence was the writing of the Ars Amatoria. Eight years had passed since its publication: the Emperor’s real motivation lay in the discovery of the wanton life of his daughter Julia and he was in search of a scapegoat.

Ovid was that scapegoat.

This truth, or context, deprived Ovid of the chance to address the Emperor’s motivation in condemning him to exile, as he wrote from Tomis to his friends and public in Rome.

In the face of power, formally judicial or otherwise, it is necessary to be circumspect.

As Ovid discovered, and told his Roman readers, the Danube and even the Black Sea would freeze over in winter. He expressed his anguish in the recollection of his last moments in Rome;

Iamque quiescebant voces hominumque canumque,
Lunaque nocturnos alta regebat equos.

At last all noise of men and dogs was still,
The moon was driving high o’er heaven’s hill.”

His life in Tomis is recalled and examined in “An Imaginary Life” by David Malouf. Malouf’s book, a sustained work of imagination, is a reflection on what it is to be human. Ovid’s humanity, in the loneliness of his exile, is counterpointed by the strange example of a feral boy found by the inhabitants of Tomis and brought in from the barbarous wastes of the steppe.

The answer is yes, but appropriately.

Adrian Hardiman, a member of the Supreme Court expressed his opinion of Irish legal reporters recently (script seen HERE), and was attacked by, inter alia, the NUJ, HERE. (No comments, please on my use of latin ["inter alia"]).

In fact a court reporter has a very difficult job. The newspaper owner and the editor are very anxious to report what happens in court; any fair and accurate report is privileged and they are relieved of the phenomenal effort and anxiety required to prove the fact or facts of the proceedings.

However, the method of exposition in a court is not conducive to making clear what is actually happening in a case. Often, the case is developed through a series of motions and there may be considerable time lapses between the hearing of the motions. Even in a trial the “opening” by counsel may not reflect the actual events which take place in the trial. Proper “fair and accurate” reporting ought not to be a “quick and dirty” operation but the reporter may have no alternative to adopting that as a solution.

It is an open secret that court reporters are assisted by the legal practitioners. They are frequently furnished with a copy of the pleadings. These will contain some essential facts, at least. However, the reporter needs to know that what is pleaded may not necessarily be supported by evidence at the trial.

This relationship is fraught; the reporter should know that legal practitioners are seldom without an agenda of their own. That agenda will be more or less benign depending on the circumstances.

Equally, for a reporter to produce the kind of report that will please a judge is not necessarily a good thing; many judgments are overturned on appeal, sometimes because the judge’s conclusions were not supported by the evidence. Some judges are better than others (to put it mildly).

Consequently, a reporter should not look for the “core” of his or her report in the pleadings or in the characterisation of the case by counsel or in some diatribe by the judge (unless he or she is working for a “red-top”; then, always go for the diatribe).

I am open to criticism on this issue. What, it might be asked, should replace those opinions?

Truly independent opinion would be a good start.

Magisterial reporting would be better.

The latter is seriously problematic. I have adverted to the difficulty of ascertaining, on any particular occasion, exactly what has happened. However, those difficulties are insuperable if what is admissible as “fact” or “what has happened” is too tightly constrained. There is also the question of talent. Commonly we “know” what we have to find out, before we find it out. Fortune favours the prepared mind.

How, with the newspaper editor, do we identify the people with “prepared minds”, the people to whom we should assign the task of “finding” what happened?

There is no one way. However, we can be sure that anyone appearing on the Government’s “business heavyweights” list will not be a good choice.

The better choice would be a person like Knut Wickell, who spent two months in jail in 1910 for querying the Immaculate Conception. Knut, in the context of controlling a bank, had the added merit of being an economist, one spurned for most of his life because he lacked a legal qualification.

More merit.