1. I have been injured; will the person who injured me, or his/her insurance company, hasten to fully compensate me?

No, they will not. This is human nature and also implied in the social arrangements under which we live.

2. Will the Injuries Board ensure that my interests are fully looked after?

No, it will not. It has a limited focus. It only addresses one question; the level of compensation the injured person ought to get. It does little to ensure that you will actually get your compensation.

3.         How can that be?

An injured person will get nothing unless he/she can prove, if necessary, that some other person has been at fault and that the injury results from that fault. The Injuries Board expressly excludes consideration of fault.

4.         Surely that’s a good thing?

Yes, if the person who injured you expressly admits the fault.

5.         Will that happen in the Injuries Board system?

No, it never comes up for mention.

4.         Who will look after my interests, then?

You will.

5.         How do I do that?

By fully understanding what is implied in the Injuries Board system.

6.         What is implied in the Injuries Board system?

The Injuries Board system exists to ensure that any legal costs incurred by you as a result of your injury will be borne by you and not by the person who injured you.

7.         Is that true?

Not completely. That’s how the Injuries Board started out, but it has changed its mind. It now makes an effort to make your opponent pay for your legal representation, or some of it, if you, the injured person, are a vulnerable person.

8. I have been injured. Am I not vulnerable by that fact alone?

No, not in the view of the injuries board. In the view of the person from whom you are trying to extract compensation, or his/her insurance company, yes, you are vulnerable, but that is advantageous to them and they owe you no duty to reduce your vulnerability.

9.         I am inexperienced in these matters. Am I not vulnerable by that fact, then?

No, not in the view of the injuries board.

10.       What is a vulnerable person, in the view of the Injuries Board?

Someone who needs legal advice to make the application to the Injuries Board.

11.       But surely no such advice is necessary?

The Injuries Board thinks it is sometimes. If you are a vulnerable person.

The title to this post is tongue-in-cheek. It is the appellation attached to one High Court judge, deemed too generous to personal injury plaintiffs, by a politically well-connected barrister.

It is worth bearing in mind that the plaintiffs will have successfully overcome many difficulties. They will have established that their defendant breached any number of duties owed to them. (See HERE for the Health & Safety Authority’s Guidance on Manual Handling of Loads. Breach of the Regulations referred to in the Guidance is a breach of a statutory duty; negligence aside, to breach the Regulations is sufficient to trigger a liability. Claims arising from back and similar injuries are some of the most intractable faced by lawyers and judges).

The legal industry in Ireland is small. It is a certainty that “Santa’s Grotto” heard of his new nickname and was intended to hear of it. It was, objectively, calculated to curb his “excesses” in the award of damages to personal injury plaintiffs.

It is an issue of interest to know which of these persons, the judge or the barrister, was right about the value of personal injury claims, but it is much more timely to ask; with a barrister like that strutting his stuff, how can any reasonable person think that Ireland has or had an “Independent Legal Profession”?

Sure, he was independent of the judge, but whose spokesperson was he?

In the provision of services to public authorities there is an exception to the obligation to place the business out to tender; the exception is legal services. This is why Government and State agencies can, without a blush, allocate substantial earning opportunities to the big Dublin firms of solicitors (some more than others) even where the work is not very esoteric or specialised. It is ridiculous to suggest that these firms are “independent”.

Consequently, the legal profession is not independent. Asserting it is does not make it so.

All employers have a responsibility to protect their employees, contractors and visitors from accidents and injuries. The obligation to secure the safety of independent contractors is specifically expressed in Section 12 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005.

This means that confusion as to who is or is not an employee need not deprive an injured person from securing proper compensation when injured in a workplace.

The employers duty includes ensuring:

That the employer provide employees with the necessary machinery and tools to complete the job. Those tools and machines are to be maintained in a safe condition.

The workplace must be kept in a safe, tidy condition with floors, doors and gates clean and clear and free from hazards.

The employer is vicariously for the negligence of his/her employees, so a worker injured by the negligence of a fellow worker is entitled to compensation from the employer.

Employees working at a height are protected by S. I. No. 318/2006 – Safety, Health and Welfare at Work (Work at Height) Regulations 2006.

This writer remembers, he thinks correctly, that the phrase “compo culture” was coined by a PR spokesman for Dublin Corporation (now Dublin City Council). Probably the spokesman was simply adapting a phrase coined elsewhere, because the title to this post is known in the UK and, it appears in Australia.

Taken literally, we can confidently say that it is a universal social principle that compensation be paid where loss is suffered and the liability to pay for that loss lies with someone other than the victim.

This formulation is very wide; it will cover cases of injury arising from negligence, say, (See HERE for a treatment of Tort law in common law jurisdictions) but also claims for indemnity under an insurance contract.

The principle is not undermined by individual failures in making payment.

Taken with the provisions of domestic law a regional example of that universal principle is to be found in the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 6).

We are now, unfortunately, familiar with some compensation principles which, by arcane means, apply when banks fail. Certain creditors of such banks are compensated for their losses arising from default. The compensation is so certain that the default is scarcely admitted and is, for practical purposes, imperceptible. By those arcane means the liability to pay the compensation is passed to the citizens of the country responsible for supervising the failed bank. (The arcane means are not legally binding means).

It was always clear that the phrase “compo culture” was not an attempt to deny any compensation to any and all claimants; it was directed against one small class of persons, those persons who had been personally injured by negligence or breach of statutory duty. In effect, it was a brazen effort, if taken literally, to repudiate the obligation on wrongdoers of remedying the losses they had inflicted on others.

Life is complicated; consequently it has come about that the liability to pay compensation for personal injury frequently rests on both a liability in negligence and a liability under a contract of insurance. We see this in Domican v AXA Insurance Ltd. [IEHC] 2007 where the judge remarked that the plaintiff and the defendant had a relationship with each other (arising from the fact that the defendant had agreed to insure and indemnify a person whom the plaintiff claimed had injured him through negligence). In the UK that relationship is expressed in a civilized way in the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010.

Ireland has no such legislation (and no proposals to remedy the situation). The UK made such provision as far back as 1933.

The Irish State has a very poor record in defending the constitutional right to compensation for personal injury. That should come as no surprise when we reflect on the reason why the Minister for Defence (and Ireland consequently) became liable to compensate soldiers in what was known as “the Army deafness cases”. A civil servant had consciously decided not to make provision to protect the hearing of soldiers from exposure to loud and damaging noise. That decision was recorded and the record was obtained by the claimant soldiers, all of whom could show they suffered hearing loss or damage following that decision. (Even without the decision the State would have been liable; it was not a novelty that loud noise is dangerous). The reason for the poor record is straightforward; Ireland clearly has (or had) a very poor quality of civil servant and politician. (In the Irish Times of 11^th December 1997 a headline read; “Smith says deafness claims are wrong and immoral”. Smith was the Minister for Defence.)

It is generous to say Ireland’s record is poor on this issue. Ireland is malevolent on the point. See HERE and HERE for this writer’s opinions.

Dear Mr. KenMore,

You will shortly be Taoiseach. I know that my voice is not foreign to you. I have an accent (metaphorically speaking) like Dermot Gleeson SC. That should alarm you but I know it will not. This is not because you are schizophrenic (which you are), but because, in your field, you need to keep talking and the explication of process uses a lot of words. Lawyers can elaborate process and consequently generate words. Like an oasis in the desert they seem to offer life (political life, in your case) allowing you to hold the floor, to occupy space of every kind, but principally space in the minds of others.

There is no guarantee that this is of value of the listeners. Perhaps you disregard this, at least for a time. That is a mistake. Before he was chairman of Allied Irish Banks Dermot Gleeson SC was legal advisor to Michael Noonan, who was brought to the point where he said he would eschew legal advice if he had his life (political, again) to live over. Maybe he will (eschew legal advice AND live his [political] life over again).

The mere occupation of space is a miserable ambition. Look at the outgoing government.

This letter is to ask you to repudiate what is graphically currently known as “stuff”. Stuff is process; it is the surface. It is the shiny trivia of life.

I propose that you look instead to principles not process. I know nothing of the principles of banking beyond what commonsense might suggest to me. I do, however, know something of what is fair and I write this letter to suggest that you commit to fairness in this election. Fixing a bank will not secure fairness, but fairness, in principle, is a requirement to secure good banking.

Here are some easy reforms to bring fairness to the people of Ireland;

A) Restore the limitation period for personal injury plaintiffs from two to three years;

B) Repeal the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act of 2003;

C) Repeal the provisions of S. 10 of the Courts and Civil Liability Act 2004;

Michael McDowell SC wanted to reduce the limitation period for personal injury plaintiffs from three years to one year. Arguably three years is unfair; in matters of contract the period is six years, but I am not urging that you decide on that; just that you bring it back to three years. For many injured people it is no difficulty to take action within three years of their being injured, but there are many exceptions. On a question such as this, every effort should be made to ensure that nobody is shut out of justice. To close the door of the Four Courts (yes, it happened, literally) to injured plaintiffs is to favour reckless free riders over innocent people who have no social organization to represent them.

REFORM 1: Why should the limitation period be three years rather than two?

ANSWER: A limitation period exists to protect society from old stale claims. If a claim is old and stale a defendant may be unable to rebut the evidence of the plaintiff due simply to the passage of time. If matters had been addressed in speedy fashion a defendant might be able, by evidence, to show that it is not liable for the plaintiff’s injury or that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent to a high degree. However, this is hypothetical. Most cases of personal injury (car crashes etc.) are immediately known to a wide circle of people, including the “defendant”. In those circumstances the plaintiff’s delay is irrelevant to the defendant’s ability to defend itself.

On the other hand, a plaintiff needs time to start his/her proceedings. There are many obstacles to a plaintiff in this regard. The injury incapacitates the plaintiff; he or she cannot get the time, energy or opportunity to instruct a solicitor. The plaintiff may have money problems. The plaintiff, compared to the defendant, will often know less of the injurious event than the defendant. The plaintiff needs time to gather the evidence.

This point is seen in the extreme in cases of medical negligence. The courts have opined that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to issue proceedings in medical negligence cases without the back-up of an expert’s report confirming the negligence. How long does it take to get that? It can only be sought after the medical records have been received from the putative defendant. Thus, for such a plaintiff, gathering the evidence requires force of character; the recovery of medical records; the choice of expert to advise on the issues and the receipt of an opinion written, often, by a busy professional to a very high standard. None of these things can happen quickly.

The choice should not be between two years and three years, but between three years and some longer period.

REFORM 2: Why should the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 be repealed?

ANSWER: There are several reasons;

a) PIAB favours defendants; the system is mandatory for plaintiffs and voluntary for defendants;

b) PIAB generates delay for a plaintiff in the resolution of his/her problems;

c) PIAB facilitates the decay or dispersal of evidence exclusively in circumstances that favour the defendant and hamper the plaintiff.

d) PIAB is becoming irrelevant save to the extent of the effects referred to at a), b) and c) above.

REFORM 3: Why should the provisions of S. 10 of the Courts and Civil Liability Act 2004 be repealed?

ANSWER: It hinders the issuing of proceedings for personal injury in timely fashion. Compliance with S. 10 requires the injured plaintiff to gather substantial quantities of evidence and instruct lawyers relating to same, before issuing proceedings. A Personal Injury Summons is a substantial lengthy document and not readily compiled at speed. In lawyers’ language, could anything be more calculated to favour defendants compared to (personal injury) plaintiffs? For upwards of fifty years before 2004, court rules permitted the quick issuing of a Plenary Summons for a personal injury claim. Thereafter, the plaintiff had to serve a Statement of Claim with proper details of the claim pleaded. However, any delay in so doing was amenable to control by the court; it was not subject to the severest sanction – the expiration of the statute of limitation period. It is that sanction that now hovers over every personal injury plaintiff and is brought closer by the provisions of S. 10.

Clients may have a variety of difficulties with a solicitor. (See HERE on the topic of changing solicitors).

What if the solicitor dies?

What will happen to your litigation, say?

Possibly, nothing adverse. If your solicitor was in a partnership, another partner will continue running the action. (This might be a benefit rather than a disadvantage; not all solicitors are talented).

If your solicitor was a sole practitioner you are in trouble. You will need to change solicitors. (Strictly speaking, this is untrue; on the death of your sole practitioner solicitor you do not have a solicitor). You will need to find a new solicitor.

That solicitor will need to negotiate the transfer of the file. This might be straightforward or it might not be. See HERE about solicitors’ liens.

Once possession of the file is lost, so is the lien. When the file comes into the possession of the new solicitor he/she may file a Notice of Change of Solicitor in the Central Office of the High Court. There is a stamp duty on the Notice of €22.00.

The solicitor then serves this on the solicitor of the opponent and proceeds with the litigation.

The musings by the Director of Public Prosecutions as reported HERE warrant a book written on them. He has pointed to the need for, and social value of whistleblowers.

This being a blog, a posting will have to suffice.

His musings were followed by a proposal from the Minister for Justice, the terms of which are currently obscure.

Assuming that there is no co-ordination between the Minister for Justice and the DPP, and assuming them to be decent, well-meaning office holders, why do these pronouncements appear as if the speaker was the first to address the problem?

The Labour Party tabled a Whistleblower’s Bill and it went nowhere. It was within the power of the Minister’s party to drive it, or to kill it. It was killed.

Transparency International has compiled a review of the lack of protection for whistleblowers in Ireland. See it HERE.

Transparency International recommend one single piece of legislation to protect (and promote) whistleblowing. As they point out, the UK did exactly that in 1998 with the Public Interest Disclosure Act. See it HERE
.
Of particular interest to this blog (we are personal injury lawyers, albeit multi-tasking) are the provisions of Section 27 of the Safety Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005. See it HERE.

Now read the obligations imposed on employees HERE by Section 13 (h) of the Safety Health and Safety at Work Act 2005.

The DPP thinks that recourse to the Employment Appeals Tribunal is cold comfort for a dismissed employee whistleblower.

Surely the Government knew this in 2005, if the DPP can know it now?

Sometimes it is difficult for lawyers to recognize who is the boss.

In Kerr v Molloy and Sherry (Lough Egish) Ltd. [2006] IEHC 364, the defendant contended that the Plaintiff, a contract packer, was more experienced than his then supervisor, an assistant Operations manager and was therefore responsible for the accident in which he was injured. In fact he was working with the supervisor and gave evidence that he believed that the boxes they were stacking were improperly stacked and had informed the supervisor of this. The boxes fell on the Plaintiff. The defendant contended the Plaintiff should have refused to continue the work in the light of his perception. The judge said of this:

“At the hearing of this action, the claim of contributory negligence on the part of the Plaintiff was advanced on a single ground, that the Plaintiff had more experience in stacking these boxes in containers than Mr. O’Donoghue, so that, even though Mr. O’Donoghue was Assistant Operations Manager of the first named Defendant and, the Plaintiff a contract packer provided by the second named Defendant, the Plaintiff ought to have refused to continue with the work when Mr. O’Donoghue, for whatever reason, continued to build up the row of boxes without staggering the vertical spaces between the individual boxes. I find that the evidence did not support the contention that Mr. O’Donoghue had less experience in this work than the Plaintiff, so that he should be regarded as the helper and the Plaintiff found to be the person in charge of the operation. Mr. O’Donoghue’s own evidence clearly demonstrated that he had ample knowledge and very considerable experience of stacking these boxes in containers. In cross examination Mr. O’Donoghue accepted that he would not expect the Plaintiff to challenge him on any aspect of the job. The Plaintiff protested that having pointed out to Mr. O’Donoghue the possible danger involved in stacking the boxes in the manner in which he was doing it, he could hardly be expected to leave the job and go across to the office and complain to Mr. Bannigan, the Operations Manager. I find that it would be wholly unreasonable to expect the Plaintiff to do this.”

What is often overlooked on these occasions is the effect of a finding of breach of statutory duty against an employer.

On this point the judge said:

“In the Plenary Summons and in the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff pleads his case both in negligence at common law and for breach of statutory duty pursuant to the provisions of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act, 1989 and, in particular s. 6 and the Fifth Schedule of that Act. I find that the Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence in relation to his claim based upon breach of statutory duty and is therefore entitled to succeed in full against the first named Defendant. It is unnecessary for the court in these circumstances to go on to consider the position in relation to his alternative claim based upon negligence at common law.”

This is a standard outcome of claims against employers by employees.

The revelation that Cardinal Brady was at the heart of a church hushing-up of crimes of Fr. Brendan Smyth prompts a reflection as to the malign uses of documents imposing confidentiality or curtailing rights.

In Byrne v Ryan [2007] IEHC 2007, the court considered a “consent” which a patient had signed prior to surgery. The Defendant referred to the terms of the consent suggesting that the Plaintiff might;

“…not become or remain sterile..”

The Defendant contended that this was a consent to the actual outcome of the sterilization operation (the operation had failed). The court rejected the argument, saying;

“It merely records the patient’s understanding that there is a possibility of failure.”

The courts have frequently rejected arguments that claims have been settled, as purportedly evidenced by “releases” signed by Plaintiffs.

In Horry v Tate & Lyle Refineries Ltd. [1982] 2 Lloyd’s reports 416, the Plaintiff suffered a personal injury at work. There was a possibility of a recurrence of the injury. The employer’s insurers negotiated a settlement with the Plaintiff who was not legally represented and was not independently advised. The injury did recur and the Plaintiff issued proceedings in respect of the original incident. The Defendants pleaded the “settlement”. The court ruled that the insurance company owed the Plaintiff a fiduciary duty of care to ensure that he got independent legal advice. They were also obliged to reveal the contents of their medical report on him, to him, and where their interests conflicted with his they owed him a fiduciary duty. Consequently, the settlement was not binding on him.

For more information see our Colour Supplement HERE

Many claims against employers can and will fail when the claim is made as one of negligence by the employer. However, because of the multitude of duties imposed on employers by statute, it is common for the employer to be found liable to the employee for an injury even where the employer has not been “at fault” (meaning, here, “negligent”).

The duty imposed by Regulation 28 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work (General Application) Regulations 2007 is a case in point. Its predecessor, Regulation 19 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work (General Application) Regulations 1993 was described in Doyle v Electricity Supply Board [2008] IEHC 88 as

“In the instant case, I have found that the plaintiff has not established a breach by the defendant of any duty at Common Law owed by the defendant to the plaintiff as his employer.
However, with effect from 22nd February, 1993, (when the Regulations of 1993 came into force), a statutory duty was imposed upon the defendant which has been described (by Kearns J.at p. 263 in Everitt) “as virtually an absolute duty” which requires the defendant “ . . . to ensure that . . . the necessary measures are taken so that the work equipment is suitable for the work to be carried out or is properly adapted for that purpose and may be used by employees without risk to their safety and health”.”

Regulation 28 (and Regulation 19 before it) imposes duties on employers relating to work equipment. The equipment must be suitable and free of risk to the employee. It is not necessary to prove that the risk was known to the employer; all that is required is to prove the injury and relationship of the injury to the equipment.